As the United Nations faces mounting political and financial pressures, its capacity to respond effectively to international insecurity is increasingly under strain. Ongoing conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and Iran are reshaping geopolitical priorities and diverting attention and resources from other regions, raising a fundamental question: who will keep the peace in Africa?

With political deadlock and financial pressures constraining the UN, African Union (AU)-led operations are increasingly called upon to address active conflicts, terrorism, and state fragility, despite severe funding and capacity constraints. There is a strong case for African states making African-led peacekeeping and arrangements for its funding a key priority in talks at the AU’s Extraordinary Summit on Conflict Prevention in Africa in August and the UN General Assembly this September.

These questions are explored in a three-part video series Peace Operations in Africa: A Changing Mission External link, opens in new window., produced by Amani Africa and the Nordic Africa Institute. The series examines the evolution and future of African-led peace support operations, the tensions between necessity, policy innovation, and dependency – and the importance of developing viable, predictable financing for their continued deployment.

Peacekeeping has entered a new era

Africa continues to be the region with the highest number of state-based and non-state conflicts, resulting in over 330,000 battle-related deaths in 2023 External link.. In 2025 External link., conflicts were recorded in 17 African countries. In recent years, battle-related deaths in Sudan, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burkina Faso, Mali, Nigeria and Somalia have reached levels not seen since the Rwandan genocide 32 years ago.

Today, peacekeeping must operate under conditions that differ markedly from those of traditional UN missions of the 1990s and early 2000s.

Conflict environments are increasingly shaped by asymmetric threats, including terrorism, organised crime, and climate-related insecurity. Rather than being deployed in post-conflict settings with established ceasefires, peace missions are now inserted into active conflict zones. Organised violence in Central Africa, the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa comprises multiple ‘warscapes External link.’, with overlapping political, military and economic interests, armed groups and external actors operating across national borders. Somalia External link. illustrates these complexities with competing regional interests resulting in fragmented peace support and continued dependence on international aid External link..

As reported by Zinurine Abiodu Alghali External link. a well-known expert practitioner, now at the AU mission to the UN in New York, the contemporary security landscape is marked by “hybrid threats and changing alliances,” External link. requiring peace operations to adapt continuously. At the same time, African peace support operations face significant institutional and resource limitations. The AU and its Regional Economic Communities (RECs) often struggle with coordination, overlapping mandates, and weak implementation capacity. A 2025 Amani Africa External link.review highlights persistent challenges in logistics, financing, and political cohesion, noting that even well-developed frameworks such as the African Standby Force are hindered by “structural, political, and operational gaps”.

This combination of high operational demand and limited capacity creates a structural tension at the core of African-led peace support: missions are expected to achieve ambitious objectives in environments that are both hostile and under-resourced.

Inside the AU: Africa has paid the price for its own peace and security

African peace support operations have become central to managing conflict across the continent. As reported in ACCORD's Conflict Trends External link., the AU counts 38 African-led peace operations in 25 countries over the past two decades. These operations have spanned a wide geography, from Comoros and the Ethiopia–Eritrea border to Liberia, Sudan, Somalia, Mali and the Lake Chad Basin. They have been authorised by the AU and key RECs, including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCS).

Beyond traditional AU operations, African governments have also established ad hoc security initiatives (ASIs) External link., or coalitions of the willing, to enforce peace or carry out more offensive operations. These include the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army External link.; the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) External link.; and the Joint Force launched by the G5 Sahel countries External link, opens in new window..

Inside the AUs Political Affairs, Peace and Security building in Addis Ababa is a memorial Wall of Heroes and Heroines External link. honouring African soldiers and civilians and listing the names of men and women who have died in the course of AU peace operations.

Somalia exemplifies the scale of the sacrifice. At least 3,500 External link. troops, primarily from Uganda and Burundi, have been killed during nearly two decades of AU-led missions to stabilise the country. In contrast, around 4,500 UN peacekeepers have died in External link.service during the organisation’s entire 78-year history. 

The case for Africa’s own peace support and enforcement

While structural shifts in the global security architecture will further erode external support for peacekeeping in Africa and elsewhere, the lessons of recent decades indicate that peacekeeping must evolve to meet changing conflict dynamics and new models of political and financial support.

Experiences from long-running UN peacekeeping missions in the Central African Republic External link, opens in new window., the Democratic Republic of the Congo External link, opens in new window., and South Sudan External link, opens in new window. highlight the limitations of traditional peacekeeping models. Peacekeepers have been present for many years, in some cases decades, yet conflict and instability persist. Other missions, such as the UN operation in Mali External link, opens in new window., closed largely unable to fulfil their mandates or protect civilians effectively.

African-led peace support operations (PSOs), designed for stabilisation and peace enforcement, have been presented as a more adaptable alternative, particularly when adequately resourced. As the UN faces geopolitical paralysis, African institutions can act as first responders to regional crises. Amani Africa describes this as the AU’s transition from a “junior partner” to a “principal actor” in peace and security governance. The AU’s capacity to deploy rapidly in high-risk environments such as Somalia contrasts sharply with the UN’s slower, consensus-based processes.

Paul D. Williams External link, opens in new window. argues that African forces achieved operational outcomes the UN would likely have struggled to match in Somalia. Due to its proximity to the conflict, the cultural familiarity of many of its peacekeepers, and its regional legitimacy, the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), helped stabilise Mogadishu and counter Al-Shabaab, although it relied heavily on EU and UN logistical support. Similarly, Cedric de Coning External link, opens in new window. suggests that the AU’s willingness to engage in peace enforcement reflects an adaptive response to asymmetric threats beyond traditional UN mandates.

The AU originally intended to establish an African Standby Force (ASF) External link, opens in new window. but progress has been slow External link, opens in new window., creating a vacuum that alternative forms of peace support have filled. The rise of terrorism has increased the need for rapid, peace enforcement operations, such as the AU missions in Somalia External link, opens in new window., the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) External link, opens in new window. and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) External link, opens in new window. against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin.

African-led peace support operations serve both political and symbolic functions. African ownership of peace processes signals the continent’s ability and willingness to contribute to global stability.

The funding gap

The EU’s African Peace Facility has temporarily addressed funding gaps, contributing over €2.7 billion to AU missions since 2004. UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) External link., marked a further step by allowing up to 75 percent UN financing for AU-led operations. Yet its implementation has stalled, reflecting a fundamental tension between African ownership and international oversight. Bridging this divide requires co-governance arrangements that preserve the AU’s strategic autonomy while meeting UN accountability standards.

The AU has strengthened its institutional readiness through its Compliance and Accountability Framework External link., enhanced financial oversight, mission support systems and measures to protect civilians External link. in line with international humanitarian and human rights law. While challenges remain, these advances call into question assumptions about the AU’s institutional limitations and reinforce arguments for more predictable and increased support for AU-led peace operations.

AU member states have raised nearly US$400 million for the AU Peace Fund External link. to finance institutional capacity building, mediation, preventive diplomacy and peace support operations. Additional private sector commitments External link., including a US$210 million pledge from Afreximbank over three years, demonstrate broad backing for African-led peace and security initiatives. While this marks important progress, it is still woefully little in light of the needs on the ground, with individual peace support missions often requiring hundreds of millions annually.

The extent of the AU’s funding challenges is well illustrated by the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) External link., which began operations in January 2025 without predictable financing despite extensive negotiations. Of its estimated US$196 million annual budget, only US$48.6 million had been pledged, leaving a substantial shortfall despite contributions from the UK, the AU and later the EU External link.. Combined with cuts to UN logistical support External link., the Somalia case highlights the impact of severe funding gaps, persistent arrears, dependence on uncertain external donors and the operational risks posed by financial shortages.

The future of Resolution 2719 remains uncertain. Although it was intended to unlock UN-assessed contributions for AU-led peace support operations, no such funding has materialised External link.. Furthermore, some argue that UN financing could undermine African ownership External link. or create a mismatch in command and control, while others question whether the UN Security Council is the appropriate body to oversee External link. such support. Nevertheless, the funding gap is real and urgent. As implementation stalls, confidence in the resolution is diminishing, while its case-by-case approach risks creating further bureaucratic delays and negotiation fatigue.

A credible framework for UN support would signal a renewed commitment to equitable multilateralism and help restore confidence among African states in global security institutions.

The necessary future of African-led peace support

The evolving AU–UN partnership should not be seen as a matter of convenience, but as a structural necessity within the contemporary international security architecture. As the UN reflects on its future in an era of polycrisis, African-led peace support operations should be recognised as a credible and increasingly necessary option in a climate of limited resources. In a fragmented global order, they are vital instruments for maintaining peace across the continent, with global implications.

Recommendations for Nordic policymakers and their constituencies at UNGA81 and beyond:

1. Advocate for and support new hybrid funding models
   Policymakers should prioritise a formalised hybrid financing model to reduce volatility in mission funding while preserving African political ownership. A practical approach is to advocate for dedicated UN-assessed peacekeeping budget lines for AU-led missions, supported by clear burden-sharing arrangements and fiduciary safeguards.
2. Contribute to new, adaptable, deployable African capabilities
   Interested stakeholders should help the AU’s transition from ad hoc coalitions to standing adaptive capabilities, as part of wider peace and security reforms. These should include enforcement-oriented rules of engagement, integrated civilian-military planning and the capacity to deploy emerging technologies, including secure artificial intelligence, drones and upgraded command-and-control systems.
3. Strengthen African political ownership and accountability
   Policymakers should welcome new ways of relating to the AU and RECs, while prioritising African leadership over mission design, mandates and resource allocation. This requires co-governance frameworks between African and international partners that build trust with both domestic constituencies and international partners, and reinforce African-led peace support operations.

Text: NAI Senior Researcher Angela Muvumba Sellström, with contributions from Tefesehet Hailu, Senior Researcher at Amani Africa.