Zambia election: Will economic recovery translate into votes?

A woman sells roasted corn on the streets of Lusaka, Zambia. Photo: AP Photo/Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi via TT.
Zambia's general election on 13 August will test whether the government's economic recovery is enough to secure another term for President Hakainde Hichilema and his ruling UPND Alliance. Despite successfully restructuring the country's debt and attracting major mining investments, many Zambians have yet to see tangible improvements in their daily lives, raising questions over public services and whether growth is reaching beyond the mining sector.
Fragmented opposition and democratic concerns
Zambia enters the August election with a strong democratic record, including repeated peaceful transfers of power between rival political parties. Yet the political environment has become more polarised since the last election in 2021.
Unlike the broad opposition coalition that helped President Hichilema defeat the main opposition party, the Patriotic Front at the last election, the current opposition is largely fragmented. The Electoral Commission of Zambia approved 14 presidential candidates, reflecting both an open electoral contest and divisions that reduce the likelihood of a single challenger uniting anti-government voters. The opposition has also been weakened by internal leadership disputes and the death of former president Edgar Lungu, with a prolonged dispute over his funeral and burial overshadowing much of the campaign
The election will be contested under a newly expanded electoral map, with the number of constituency-based seats increasing from 156 to 226. The government says the changes will improve representation, while opposition parties have criticised the delimitation process, arguing that it could favour the ruling party.
Some observers have raised concerns about democratic backsliding, citing controversial public order legislation, pressure on independent media and the use of criminal defamation laws against opposition figures as signs of shrinking civic and political space. In 2024, Patriotic Front secretary general Raphael Nakacinda was convicted of defaming the president over remarks alleging that he had sought to influence judges.
Despite these concerns, Zambia continues to rank among Africa's stronger electoral democracies, making the election an important test of the resilience of democratic institutions in an increasingly competitive and polarised political environment.
When President Hakainde Hichilema came to power in 2021, Zambia was recovering from a sovereign debt default, with high inflation and falling investor confidence. Five years later, the picture looks very different. The country has completed debt restructuring under the G20 Common Framework, its credit rating has been upgraded, inflation has fallen to single digits and the economy is expected to grow by more than six percent. Investment in the mining sector has also gathered pace.
But despite an impressive economic turnaround, poverty levels remain high, particularly in rural areas and wealth inequality has increased. Many Zambians continue to struggle with high living costs and power outages, driven by elevated food prices and hydro-electricity shortages linked to the 2024-2025 drought, as well as a lack of jobs outside of mining.
Public services under scrutiny
While some polls have shown Hichilema leading, the election outcome is far from certain, despite a highly fragmented opposition with 14 presidential hopefuls. Voters’ perceptions of his track record will be shaped by their everyday experiences and whether they feel their lives have improved during his term in office, explains NAI Senior Researcher Patience Mususa, who researches social inequality and natural resource governance in Zambia.
“The key criticism has been that the current administration has been outwardly focused – dealing with the debt and inward investment in mining – without adequately addressing the core concerns of citizens, particularly around public accountability. They will be judged on what they do domestically – that’s their biggest challenge,” she says.
“They were expected to tackle systemic corruption in public services, a major issue in the previous administration – particularly how money is spent in the health and education sectors. People wanted this done speedily. It affects their daily lives when they cannot access medicines and so on.”
The government has delivered on a popular election promise by abolishing school fees and reintroducing school feeding programmes. These reforms have brought millions more children into school. However, the relatively late rollout of school meals in much of the country could lead voters to see it as vote-seeking, says Mususa.
Another key reform has been the expansion of the Constituency Development Fund – from K1.6 million in 2021 to K40 million (US$ 2.17 million) per constituency in 2026 – giving communities greater control over spending on local infrastructure, schools and healthcare.
“The government has really scored on this,” says Bridget Bwalya, Associate Professor at the University of Zambia’s School of Natural and Applied Sciences, who researches smallholder agriculture, food systems and climate resilience in Zambia. “Most people really like it.”
Copper and the campaign
The mining sector has long shaped Zambia's electoral politics, particularly in Copperbelt Province, where communities increasingly expect mineral wealth to translate into visible improvements in jobs, infrastructure and public services – rather than primarily benefiting investors through tax incentives and other concessions, explains Mususa.
"You do not win an election unless you win over the mining communities," she says.
Zambia is Africa’s largest copper producer after the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and mining is the cornerstone of the government's economic recovery strategy, including plans to triple annual copper production to three million tonnes by 2031.
Interest from the United States, European Union and China has reinforced the country’s strategic importance in the global energy transition, alongside infrastructure projects such as the Lobito Corridor and the Tanzania-Zambia Railway connecting critical minerals to global markets.
Responding to long-standing pressure from mining communities, the government has introduced local content rules aimed at increasing procurement from Zambian companies and expanding local participation in the mining sector.
"There's been a lot of criticism about the state being too market-friendly and not leveraging its position on mineral revenues," says Mususa, adding that the government has been increasing the public sector stake in mines.
Alongside investments in mining, the government has also sought to position the country higher up global critical mineral value chains through local processing and manufacturing. Together with neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia has signed agreements with foreign investors to develop a regional battery value chain for electric vehicles.
"They have been very clear that they want inward investment in downstream areas and in other sectors such as agricultural value chains and pharmaceuticals," says Mususa, pointing to foreign investments in copper processing, fertiliser production and building materials.
Who benefits from growth?
Nonetheless, mining has remained the dominant sector for foreign direct investments, according to UN trade organisation UNCTAD. And whether this can generate broader employment opportunities and improve livelihoods beyond the sector is likely to be one of the defining questions of the election.
However, heavy domestic borrowing to finance public deficit makes diversification difficult as it drives up interest rates, says NAI Senior Researcher Jörgen Levin, who researches macroeconomic developments across Africa. For Levin, Zambia's challenge is to lower the cost of borrowing for entrepreneurs and farmers, the majority of the population, so that they are able to invest and increase their incomes – particularly in rural areas where poverty remains entrenched.
“Relative poverty has been going down in most Africa countries but not in Zambia. Rural poverty has remained above 75 percent for over 15 years,” explains Levin.
“You do need to diversify the economy with value addition and Zambia can do that with copper. But although it creates a lot of revenue for the government, it does not necessarily benefit the poor in terms of improving incomes. It also only represents about 15 percent of GDP,” he adds.
“The rest of the economy, the other 85 percent, is where most people are working and where you need to expand investments – particularly in agriculture where productivity is extremely low.”
Ultimately, the election may become less a referendum on Zambia's macroeconomic recovery than on whether voters believe they are better off now compared to when President Hichilema took power.
While international partners may point to stronger public finances, increased investment and renewed economic credibility, voters will more likely judge his performance on jobs, public services and the price of food.
The politics of maize
The votes of Zambian farmers will be crucial to the government's bid for re-election, not least because of the enduring impacts of the 2024–25 drought, the worst in more than 40 years, which devastated maize production, triggered prolonged hydro-electricity shortages and left millions in need of humanitarian assistance.
“Governments know that they cannot be elected unless the farmers are happy,” says Dr. Bridget Bwalya at the University of Zambia’s School of Natural and Applied Sciences, adding that the success of a new subsidy scheme and price setting for the staple crop maize can decide the farming vote.
The government has introduced a long-planned voucher system providing farmers with subsidised inputs, including seeds and fertilisers via private dealerships, replacing an earlier practice of farm deliveries. Bwalya sees its potential to improve efficiency and provide greater choice to farmers, including seeds tailored to specific regions and climatic conditions. Opposition parties criticise the change, pointing to transport costs that can impact the poorest farmers in remote locations.
In June, President Hichilema called on the national Food Reserve Agency to announce the guaranteed price which the government will pay for maize, underlining the crop’s central role in the election.
“I expect that they will announce a high price and there will be promises that farmers will be paid quickly. If that happens, then it will work in the government’s favour. If it does not, then the opposition can capitalise on it,” says Bwalya.
“If farmers feel they are doing better ahead of the election, they will not want a new government as they can come in and just change everything.”
The influence of the electoral cycle on farming is central to the challenge of raising productivity and diversifying away from over-dependence on maize, argues Bwalya.
“We know what needs to change to reduce poverty. Our research shows that we need to build the resilience of farmers and systems. But we’re not investing in early warning systems, selecting the right crops, or building roads and bridges where they are needed,” she says.
“There is more emphasis on humanitarian aid … We wait until something happens and then the state steps in and gives assistance, not really addressing root problems. They try something for five years and then it’s election time and they change to something completely different.”
Text: Tom Sullivan