As Ethiopia heads to elections in June, amid conflicts and internal tension, questions grow over participation and legitimacy. NAI researcher Redie Bereketeab warns the vote risks deepening divisions and straining the country’s fragile federal system.

Ethiopia will hold a general election on 1 June, amid multiple internal armed conflicts and rising tensions with neighbouring Eritrea.

As Africa’s second most populous country and a key regional actor in the Horn of Africa, developments in Ethiopia have far-reaching implications beyond its borders. Instability risks reverberating across the strategically vital region, linked to Red Sea trade routes, migration flows and regional security dynamics, making the election a key moment not only for Ethiopia but also for the wider continent.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed faces the election with strong prospects of extending his eight-year rule. But the result will not necessarily indicate broad political inclusion, given widespread restrictions on opposition parties, as documented by United States-based political rights and civil liberties watchdog Freedom House and others.

Insecurity is also expected to limit voting in large parts of the country, with some areas already designated as unfit for polling, according to media reports, and residents reporting that ongoing violence is deterring them from participating.

Entrenched divisions

“It’s kind of a catch-22 situation. The government needs to hold elections to demonstrate its legitimacy, but full participation will not be possible in Tigray, Amhara, or in major parts of Oromia [regions], meaning people there may question its legitimacy,” says Redie Bereketeab, whose research focuses on conflict and state building in the Horn of Africa.

“The central question will not be who wins, but how much of the country can realistically participate. Holding elections while waging war will marginalise and isolate people and deepen and entrench divisions in a society that is already fractured,” he adds.

“If you don’t hold elections for those three major regions and ethnic groups then the election loses legitimacy.”

Ethiopia’s multi-ethnic federal system was designed to accommodate diversity, but in practice it has also sharpened struggles over territory, autonomy and access to power. Today those unresolved tensions are visible in the insurgency in the north-western region of Amhara, the conflict in Oromia to the south and the fragile post-war order in the northern region of Tigray, making the coming election as much a test of state cohesion as of electoral administration.

Rather than resolving competing claims, the federal system has in many cases institutionalised them, turning identity into a central axis of political competition, widely documented by international and academic observers.

Tigray tensions

Millions of people were displaced during the two-year war with Tigray. The 2022 Pretoria Agreement, which ended the conflict, left core issues unresolved, including the status of contested territories and the future of Tigray’s political representation.

This fragile post-war electoral context has been further complicated by the Ethiopian federal government excluding the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) – long considered the dominant political force in the region – from the election. Meanwhile, tensions within the TPLF have led to the emergence of rival factions, including one aligned more closely with the federal government.

“If the government holds elections only contested by a marginal Tigrayan group, the legitimacy of the result could be questioned. The Tigrayans have had a strong affiliation with the TPLF for the past 50 years,” says Bereketeab.

Ethiopian officials have also accused Eritrean forces of maintaining a military presence inside Tigray despite the Pretoria Agreement, adding further strain to an already fragile post-war political environment.

Reinforcing fault-lines

Ahead of the general election, the situation remains fragile and there is a growing need for international actors to encourage dialogue between warring factions.

Bereketeab points to opposition calls for an inclusive multi-ethnic transitional government and postponement of the election until internal conflicts can be resolved.

“It makes sense to first resolve the conflicts and then convene an election where the entire population can participate,” he says.

According to Bereketeab, the European Union and the US could exert pressure on the Ethiopian government given their strong economic, military and diplomatic ties, and their weight in international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

While there are few signs of any such moves, in the absence of broad participation and political inclusion, the upcoming electoral process risks deepening existing fault-lines between Ethiopia’s diverse regions and peoples instead of bridging the gaps. Without progress on these underlying issues, the elections risk becoming another arena for conflict rather than a means of resolving it.