The 2026 Mining Indaba, themed “Stronger Together: Progress Through Partnerships,” underscored a structural shift in how mining is framed in Africa. No longer presented merely as an export-oriented extractive activity, mining was positioned as a potential driver of industrialisation, regional integration, and energy transition. Yet discussions revealed significant tensions between rhetoric and reality, particularly regarding geopolitics, energy constraints, mineral beneficiation, and the contested meaning of “criticality.”

By Grasian Mkodzongi

In his keynote address, Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema framed copper and other critical minerals as engines of economic transformation for Zambia and other resource-rich African states. The expectation that mineral demand - driven by the global energy transition - will catalyse economic growth was widely shared. However, the assumption that mineral endowments will automatically translate into structural transformation remains contingent on infrastructure, energy availability, governance stability, and bargaining power in global markets. The conference discussions implicitly acknowledged these constraints.

Geopolitics: Competition Without Decoupling

Geopolitical competition over critical mineral supply chains was central to the Indaba. Western policymakers emphasised diversification away from Chinese dominance, particularly in refining and processing. However, examples presented during the conference revealed that capital flows do not neatly follow geopolitical alignments.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Chinese and Western firms remain deeply intertwined. Zijin Mining’s 49.5% stake in Ivanhoe’s Kamoa mine illustrates the persistence of cross-bloc corporate collaboration. Similarly, Chinese rare earth firm Shenghe has acquired stakes in Energy Transition Minerals’ Kvanefjeld project in Greenland and in the US-based MP Minerals at Mountain Pass. These cases demonstrate that global mining investments remain commercially pragmatic rather than geopolitically segregated.

This creates a contradiction between Western political rhetoric about “de-risking” from China and the operational realities of global mining finance. It also challenges infrastructure narratives such as the Lobito Corridor, which is often presented as an alternative to Chinese-dominated supply routes but partially relies on Chinese-refurbished rail lines.

For African countries, geopolitical competition presents both opportunity and risk. Many governments view US-China rivalry as leverage to diversify export markets and negotiate better terms. Western governments, in turn, increasingly see Africa as central to supply chain security. The Trump administration’s financial backing of the Orion Critical Mineral Consortium - seeking a 40% stake in Glencore’s Mutanda Mining and Kamoto Copper Company in the DRC - signals intensified US engagement.

However, increased geopolitical attention does not automatically translate into local value addition. Without coordinated regional strategies, African states risk remaining sites of extraction within externally structured supply chains. The fragmentation of bargaining positions - especially when countries negotiate individually rather than as blocs - weakens leverage.

The Meaning of “Critical”

The concept of mineral “criticality” emerged as highly contested. South Africa’s Minerals Minister Gwede Mantashe argued that coal is a critical mineral in the South African context because of its role in energy generation. The African Finance Corporation’s presentation identified iron ore and phosphates as strategic to Africa’s industrialisation. These positions reflect differentiated developmental priorities.

This divergence signals a broader rupture in the previously consolidated global discourse around “transition minerals.” The resurgence of coal, gas, and nuclear energy, particularly in the United States, illustrates how energy security concerns and industrial competitiveness are reshaping policy priorities. Rapid expansion of AI-driven data centers has sharply increased electricity demand, reinforcing reliance on dispatchable energy sources. The United States’ energy mix, influenced by policy shifts under the Trump administration, reflects this recalibration.

For African countries, the implications are significant. First, the global decarbonisation consensus appears less stable than previously assumed, reducing predictability for investment in renewable-linked minerals. Second, domestic energy deficits across countries such as South Africa, Zambia, and the DRC constrain industrialisation strategies. In this context, continued reliance on fossil fuels is framed as developmental pragmatism rather than ideological resistance to decarbonisation.

The consequence is a fragmented global energy transition in which mineral criticality is defined less by universal climate targets and more by national industrial strategies. For African producers, this increases uncertainty about long-term demand trajectories while complicating planning for beneficiation and processing.

Localising Value Chains: Aspirations and Structural Constraints

Localisation of mineral value chains was a dominant theme. Gwede Mantashe emphasised regional integration over intra-African competition, highlighting the need for shared infrastructure and coordinated industrial policy. Across the conference, mineral beneficiation was presented as a pathway to capturing value lost through raw exports and as a mechanism for reindustrialisation.

Yet structural barriers were repeatedly acknowledged. Energy shortages remain the most significant constraint. Refineries and processing facilities are energy-intensive, and generation capacity in many resource-rich African countries is inadequate. Without resolving the electricity deficit, beneficiation strategies risk remaining aspirational.

A second constraint is institutional fragmentation. African states frequently compete to attract investment, engaging in what has been described as a “race to the bottom.” The contrast between the European Union negotiating as a bloc and African countries pursuing bilateral arrangements was cited as illustrative of weakened bargaining power. Volatile political transitions further undermine regional agreements, as incoming administrations do not always honor prior commitments.

The absence of a fully functioning continental common market limits economies of scale. Many individual African economies are too small to sustain competitive processing industries independently. Consequently, the ambition to localise value chains depends heavily on effective regional integration, an objective repeatedly endorsed but inconsistently implemented.

Partnerships and the End of Extractivist Legitimacy

The conference theme signaled growing recognition that the traditional extractivist model lacks social legitimacy. President Hakainde Hichilema and industry leaders, including the head of Glencore, acknowledged that mining companies must move beyond “cowboy” approaches toward community-centered engagement.

Governments increasingly require a social licence to operate, and local communities are asserting demands for accountability and environmental safeguards. This reflects a structural shift in governance expectations rather than a temporary reputational adjustment.

However, a contradiction remains: while discourse emphasises partnership and inclusion, infrastructure investments - particularly transport corridors - continue to prioritise export efficiency over domestic industrial linkages. Outward-oriented extraction remains the dominant operational model. The gap between partnership rhetoric and export-led infrastructure design suggests that structural transformation is uneven.

The emphasis on women’s participation in mining, highlighted in President Hichilema’s remarks and multiple workshops, reflects an attempt to broaden inclusion. Yet the sector remains male-dominated, and meaningful demographic change will depend on long-term educational and institutional reforms rather than conference commitments alone.

Technology and the Future of Extraction

Technological innovation was presented as central to the “mine of the future.” Automation, AI-driven exploration, and advanced processing technologies are expected to improve productivity, safety, and sustainability. Reprocessing mine dumps and integrating circular economy principles signal efficiency gains.

For African countries, technological upgrading presents both opportunity and risk. Increased automation may reduce labor absorption in a sector often expected to generate employment. At the same time, digitalisation requires skills development and infrastructure investment, potentially widening gaps between technologically advanced operations and domestic capabilities.

Emerging Trends

Three trends stood out. First, geopolitical competition is intensifying but without clear decoupling, producing complex cross-bloc corporate entanglements. Second, the definition of “critical minerals” is fragmenting along national development priorities, weakening global consensus around decarbonisation pathways. Third, African governments are rhetorically unified around beneficiation and partnership but face structural constraints - especially energy deficits and limited regional coordination - that inhibit implementation.

The 2026 Mining Indaba thus revealed a sector in transition: politically elevated, geopolitically contested, socially scrutinised, and technologically transforming. For African nations, the central challenge is converting heightened global demand and geopolitical attention into durable industrial capacity rather than remaining embedded in reconfigured, but still externally oriented, supply chains.