South Africa’s role and experiences as a member of the Group of Twenty (G20) international forum testifies to shifts in global governance. As a stress test for multilateralism, it illustrates the tectonic turbulence caused by increased multipolarity. This invites reassessment of the positioning of African states. They have a role to play in the remapping of international relations. Geostrategic and economic implications give African actors influence: they can be agenda-setting too. South Africa is a prominent example.

by HENNING MELBER, RESEARCHER AT THE NORDIC AFRICA INSTITUTE

 South Africa is the only African G20 member state. In 2025, it hosted for the first time the annual G20 Summit. The preparatory stages showed the writing on the wall as the theme of “Solidarity, Equality and Sustainability” caused the US administration to boycott the meetings.

Notably, the European Union members and many other states supported the South African G20 framework. The summit adopted a joint leaders’ declaration that underscored their belief in multilateral cooperation to collectively address shared challenges.

The US was absent. As the host for the forthcoming 2026 summit, the US expected a symbolic handover of the chair’s gavel at the closing session to the US chargé d’affaires. This was refused as a breach of protocol. Instead, the gavel had to be collected from the South African foreign ministry.

The David versus Goliath clash culminated in a unilateral demolition of the G20 format: the US declared that South Africa is not invited to the 2026 summit in Florida and will be excluded from all preparatory meetings. President Cyril Ramaphosa responded that as a sovereign constitutional democracy South Africa does not appreciate being insulted by another country. Rather, the G20 members should reaffirm the spirit of multilateralism.

South Africa’s steadfastness signalled that the commitment to multilateralism remains alive and well. The country’s conduct has placed Africa firmly on the geopolitical map, despite Washington’s disruptive policies.

Isolationism, transactionalism and resource power

The vulnerability of international support networks became painfully obvious with the dismantling of the United States Agency for International Development. It has had lethal effects for many programmes, not least those on reproductive rights and HIV/AIDS treatments. Other US agencies have reduced funding too. This has had further negative effects on human welfare and security, such as the downscaling of programmes to remove land mines in former war zones.

By the start of 2026, the US had withdrawn from 31 UN entities and 35 other international bodies. The US exited the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change for a second time. Its exit from the World Health Organization followed.

The 2025 US National Security Strategy (NSS) External link, opens in new window. deals with Africa in the last three paragraphs, which confirm a transactional shift: “The United States should transition from an aid-focused relationship with Africa to a trade- and investment-focused relationship, favoring partnerships with capable, reliable states committed to opening their markets to US goods and services.”

Energy and critical minerals development are identified as “prospects for a good return on investment”. The “development of nuclear energy, liquid petroleum gas, and liquified natural gas technologies can generate profits for US businesses and help us in the competition for critical minerals and other resources.”

But the African continent’s wealth allows room for manoeuvre. It is not any longer a colonial self-service store, with commodities shared among foreign interests. Resources offer negotiating power. Africa has agency through governments, regional bodies and civil society.

The continent has become a centre of gravity in geoeconomics, with substantial assets to bargain over. Rich deposits of critical minerals such as cobalt, bauxite, rare earths, graphite, lithium and manganese are essential for supply chains, and investments in regional transport routes enhance access to global markets.

Uranium depositis, and oil and gas reserves, as well as the huge potential to produce green hydrogen, have weight in the international energy sector. Natural assets, including land for agrobusiness, invite geopolitical hedging. To these, add locations of geostrategic military relevance from a global security perspective.

Competition among hegemonic powers offers opportunities for negotiating deals or providing choices. An example is the decision of Standard Bank, Africa’s largest lender by assets, to integrate with China’s cross-border interbank payment system, which modifies the financial landscape.

South Africa’s precarious position

The NSS proposes to amend the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which expired at the end of September 2025. It had offered 32 African countries duty-free access for many exports to the US market. President Donald Trump has since signed an extension until the end of 2026. The act can include or exclude any African country and might end up in the tariff toolbox as a form of coercion – both carrot and stick.

AGOA’s benefits are a vital component of the South African economy. They secure substantial employment in agriculture and manufacturing industries. Given the punitive trade tariffs of 30 percent the US imposed on South Africa in August 2025, AGOA membership offers for now at least some temporary relief.

As a member of the expanded BRICS+ group of states and since accusing Israel in a case at the International Court of Justice in The Hague of genocide in Gaza, South Africa has not been in the US administration’s good books. The White House’s accusations of the genocide of Afrikaans-speaking White farmers in South Africa did not improve relations. This was evident in May 2025 when Trump staged a tribunal while meeting Ramaphosa in the Oval Office. Following Washington’s boycott of the G20 Summit, South Africa’s AGOA membership hangs in the balance.

The Ramaphosa government remains steadfast in advocating for the UN and the UN Charter as the global normative framework for governing principles at home and abroad. When the military attack by the USA on Venezuela was discussed in the UN Security Council, South Africa argued that a complex future is dependent upon the stability and protection afforded by international law.

When great powers turn their back on multilateralism, those in between are caught in a balancing act. South Africa illustrates the precarious “middle ground” position. For example, President Ramaphosa intervened to prevent Iran from directly participating in a BRICS+ naval exercise in South African waters. Days later, Israel’s chargé d’affaires was declared persona non grata for breaching the Vienna Convention.

What is at stake?

A litmus test will be which among the global middle powers embrace South Africa. How will G20 members respond to the ban issued by the US in blatant violation of the body’s principles? At the World Economic Forum in Davos, South Africa announced it was stepping back from its G20 engagements as a temporary setback during the US G20 presidency.

Middle powers must build an alliance of the willing in support of multilateralism. South Africa must decide how to position itself as an African middle power in a multipolar world. The outcome of both is pending.

The dynamics unfolding will be followed closely. Not least some of the other African middle powers (such as Ethiopia, Egypt, Nigeria, Kenya), face similarly tough choices. To what extent they will be able to make good use of their natural assets as bargaining power remains to be seen.