On 30 August, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as ‘Hemedti’ and head of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), was sworn in as head of a parallel Sudanese government, which calls itself the Foundation Alliance. NAI Senior Researcher Redie Bereketeab says the move has fundamentally changed the nature of the conflict. “The RSF’s alliance with political and armed actors is making the crisis far more complicated,” he says.

The RSF coalition, which calls itself the Foundation Alliance, is made up of armed and political movements from Darfur in the west of Sudan, and the central Kordofan region. The alliance has chosen the south-western city of Nyala, the capital of South Darfur state, as its base.

The RSF’s declaration of a parallel government represents a turning point in the conflict, according to Bereketeab, as it shatters the prevailing narrative of a simple power struggle between two generals.

“The general view has been that this is a conflict between [head of the government forces General Abdel Fattah] al-Burhan and Hemedti. But the creation of two governments changes that image. Political parties such as a faction of the Ummah Party, as well as SPLM [Sudan People’s Liberation Movement]-North, have joined the RSF. This is no longer militia versus army. It is now a coalition of political and armed actors claiming state legitimacy,” he says.

State legitimacy is now contested in multiple ways. “Al-Burhan represents the traditional power centre – the army, which has ruled Sudan since independence. But the RSF coalition also claims legitimacy, because it includes historical parties and movements with constituencies in different areas of Sudan. From a Sudanese domestic perspective, they cannot simply be dismissed as illegitimate,” Bereketeab explains.

Furthermore, the two sides represent different visions of the Sudanese state, according to Bereketeab. Al-Burhan stands for continuity – the same old state structure, often with Islamist leanings. The RSF coalition pitches itself as an anti-Islamist, secular force, which promotes a decentralised state structure.

“So, it is not just a fight over power, but also over the nature of the Sudanese state,” says Bereketeab, whose research focuses on state and nation building in the Horn of Africa.

He says that this ideological clash echoes Sudan’s long history of unresolved nation-building. Since independence in 1956, Sudan has been divided along ethnic, religious, and regional lines. “The north/south divide, the wars in Darfur and the Nuba Mountains, the marginalisation of eastern Sudan – these struggles have revolved around exclusion from power in Khartoum. That history is now repeating itself in the confrontation between al-Burhan and the RSF coalition,” he says.

The Sudanese conflict erupted in April 2023, when fighting broke out between the army and the RSF over the integration of the paramilitary force into the national army. More than two years later, the war has left tens of thousands of people dead and millions displaced. Half of Sudan’s population face extreme hunger and in areas of western Darfur people are dying from famine.

For millions of Sudanese, every day is a struggle for survival: to escape fighting or find water, food and medicine. The parallel claims to government, with competing institutions, could make the humanitarian situation even more chaotic, warns Bereketeab.

“The central function of a government normally is to provide basic services to the people. Now, the main focus of both sides is to fight and defeat the enemy. As long as that is not achieved, all humanitarian, security and economic provision will be a secondary focus for both factions,” Bereketeab says.

The announcement of a parallel government has also sparked fears that the initiative could be a first step towards partition of the Republic of the Sudan, echoing South Sudan’s secession in 2011. Among the Foundation Alliance’s coalition partners are the SPLM-N, an armed group controlling significant areas in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. It is a branch of the SPLM, which was the primary political and military force that led South Sudan to independence 14 years ago.

“The areas represented by the Foundation Alliance – Darfur, Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Eastern Sudan – all have long histories of exclusion from Khartoum, which now create a clear line of division politically and geographically,” says Bereketeab.

Since the war began, international mediators have repeatedly failed to bring the warring parties to the table. With two parallel governments, peace negotiations will be even more complicated.

“While only al-Burhan represents an internationally recognised government, a mediator cannot ignore the RSF coalition, which has legitimate grievances and constituencies,” observes Bereketeab.

For smaller international actors such as the Nordic countries, the scope for direct mediation is limited. “Prevention would have been easier. But once the war has escalated and you have two rival governments, it is very difficult for small countries to play a decisive political role. What they can do is provide humanitarian support, because ordinary people are the ones paying the highest price,” Bereketeab says.

In the longer term, Sudan’s crisis again highlights the absence of an inclusive national identity and representative state institutions. “These failures always come back. They poison politics and create cycles of conflict. Unless Sudanese leaders build a state that represents all of society, the tensions will remain,” Bereketeab concludes.

TEXT: Mattias Sköld