The Nordic Africa Institute

Policy Note

Five incumbents tumbled and one was humbled

Six competitive elections that defied Africa's democratic backslide

A collage of the incumbent presidents and main opposition candidates in the 2024 elections in Mauritius, Senegal, Ghana, Botswana, Somaliland and South Africa.
Date • 6 Feb 2025

Democracy is challenged across the globe. However, summing up the elections held last year across Africa, there are some positive signs. Five countries (Botswana, Ghana, Senegal, Somaliland and Mauritius) held elections that ended with incumbent presidents handing over power peacefully to successful opposition candidates. And one country (South Africa) saw the end of three decades of single-party rule. Altogether, these six elections show proof of democratic resilience in Africa and bring hope of a trend reversal.

Authors' byline portrait

George M. Bob-Milliar, senior scholar at the Nordic Africa Institute

 

What’s new?

The year 2024 was a record-breaking one. A year-long succession of elections across 14 African states led to five transfers of power. This was the most significant power transfer in a single electoral year since the rebirth of African constitutional rule in the early 1990s. Five opposition parties defeated governing parties in landslides and won majorities in the legislative elections. African citizens took a critical view of the performance of their governments and seized the opportunity to vote out non-performing administrations.

Why is it important?

The decline of democratic norms and values globally is of concern to policymakers. The return of authoritarian political systems in Africa calls for a reassessment of democratic practices on the Continent. This policy note focuses on the role of opposition political parties in sustaining Africa’s democratic resilience. How opposition parties contribute to democracy is best understood by how effectively they challenge anti-democratic incumbents. The policy note shows that opposition parties are key to deepening democratic norms and values in Africa.

What should be done and by whom?

Focusing on Nordic democracy-promoting institutions, the foremost policy imperative is to support independent election bodies and improve the environment for the involvement of opposition parties in the model democratic states. Measures to improve political environments are key in less competitive democracies. This includes party reforms to adapt to social changes, and an independent judiciary to uphold the rule of law in election disputes.

 

According to Afrobarometer External link, opens in new window. and V-Dem External link, opens in new window., democracy in Africa is declining. As this policy note shall address, political parties have contributed to the undermining of democratic institutions and practices. Consequently, the number of Africans living in democratic states has decreased, as authoritarian political systems and practices have been revived. In 2024, 18 African states held elections External link, opens in new window., in which 212 million registered voters and 235 political parties participated. The outcomes presented a mixed picture: some produced landslides, resulting from keen competition between incumbents and opposition parties. Others were charades that engaged in widespread political violence to legitimise electoral autocracies. Against the backdrop of the global democratic decline and rising authoritarianism, there was also democratic resilience External link, opens in new window..

On the one hand, the Continent recorded five relatively peaceful transfers of power – a significant achievement for Africa’s democratic growth. Political parties offer meaningful opposition when they mobilise dissatisfied voters to replace the government through the ballot box. And the presidential and parliamentary elections in Senegal, Botswana, Mauritius, Somaliland and Ghana saw opposition parties do just that. In South Africa, the ruling ANC party was humbled when it lost its dominance for the first time in 30 years: it was forced to form a coalition with other, smaller parties. Elsewhere, citizens voted out governing parties that threatened democracy, punishing governing parties such as the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) and Ghana’s New Patriotic Party (NPP) in national elections in October and December.

On the other hand, in elections in Algeria, Tunisia, Chad and Mozambique, the governing parties failed to fulfil essential democratic functions and circumvented electoral accountability. The victory of the governing party SWAPO in Namibia was marred by massive electoral flaws. Nevertheless, Namibia made history when it elected its first female president.


Infographic: In ten years, the share of Africans living in democracies fell from 37 to 16 per cent

Political parties in Africa

Scholars of African politics say the continent’s political parties are contributing to the erosion of the quality of its democracy. The political parties that initiated the transition to multiparty politics have enjoyed incumbency advantages over their opponents. Consequently, many opposition parties, established on weak organisational foundations, have been heavily dependent on the individual founder(s) for their survival. Weak and under-resourced opposition parties have struggled to make an impact in national elections.

While some of these weaknesses persist, African political parties do fulfil a wide range of functions crucial to the survival of any political system – namely, recruitment External link, opens in new window. of personnel for government and state office and socialisation External link, opens in new window. of their members to democratic norms.

The embrace of authoritarian practices by civilian-led administrations in Africa can often be traced to the disproportionate powers leaders wield within their own political party. For example Guinea’s former president, Alpha Condé, was notorious for manipulating independent democratic institutions: Condé’s undemocratic exercise of power narrowed the civil space for meaningful political participation. The recent spate of military coups in West and Central Africa has at least something to do with the inability of opposition parties in those regions’ countries to offer meaningful alternatives by mobilising disgruntled citizens to replace the civilian autocrats through the ballot box.

Nevertheless, as Africa deepens its democratic practices, weak opposition parties are learning External link, opens in new window. with every election cycle External link, opens in new window.. Faced with authoritarian and anti-democratic governing parties, opposition parties and political movements in Botswana, Mauritius, Ghana and Senegal have successfully mobilised pro-democratic forces.

 

Multiparty elections in Africa

The reintroduction of liberal democracy and its practice in Africa puzzles observers. According to Afrobarometer External link, opens in new window., the majority of Africans prefer multiparty democracy. Nevertheless, they question the spirit of liberal democracy in terms of the demographic dividends it can yield. In that context, many Africans are dissatisfied with democracy’s performance. Daily realities include chronic youth unemployment, lack of industrialisation and poor social services. At the same time, partisan politics has enriched the political elites at the expense of a larger segment of society. In this respect, liberalism delegitimises itself in Africa.

Parties are the vehicles for accessing political power. The conduct of elections enables citizens to judge the performance of ruling regimes. The challenge in Africa’s democratic journey is to play down the mystique of multiparty elections and start treating them as something normal. States on the continent democratise through elections. Countries with competitive multiparty systems have witnessed political power alternation: the transfer of power from incumbents to opposition parties now appears common in some democratic states with an institutionalised party system. By contrast, African states with a weakly institutionalised party system conduct elections in an atmosphere characterised by exclusion, intimidation and violence.

Generally speaking, there is a trend for programmatic politics to take root across the continent: electoral campaigns are now more informed by well-articulated policy positions. Party election manifestos are seen as a ‘social contract’ between the voters and the parties as they canvass for votes. As democracy deepens, critical citizens now ask questions about a political party’s programme. The issue of when and how a party intends to implement its election campaign promises are reality checks for citizens. More well-resourced political parties have solicited citizens’ direct input in preparing and validating election campaign manifestos. These party–citizen engagements have improved the quality of party election programmes.


The 2024 elections in Africa

National elections were planned in 19 African states in 2024. Some of those were, however, postponed due to security concerns in the Sahel. The ‘year of elections’ in Africa began with a presidential election in the Comoros in January and ended with Ghana’s general elections in December. Altogether, more than 250 political parties entered the electoral fray. Several governing parties had been in power since independence or the end of apartheid. But many of the them struggled to retain power. The economic downturn, in particular, energised thousands of youths, who mobilised as activists and voters. Based on democratic performance, this policy note divides the elections into three main categories – competitive elections, moderately competitive elections and staged elections.

 

Infographic on Africa's 2024 elections: Six competitive  and five staged

Competitive elections

The peaceful transfer of power within a political system signifies a healthy democracy. The common denominator across African states was the health of the national economies.

Senegal. Here is a country that typifies the resilience of opposition parties and independent institutions in withstanding civilian authoritarianism. The incumbent president attempts at extra-constitutional manipulation were countered by a combination of opposition mobilisation and the independence of the judiciary, with street protests adding to the pressure on President Macky Sall’s administration. In the run-up to the election, President Sall’s administration deployed various tactics to block the popular youth movement (African Patriots of Senegal for Work, Ethics and Fraternity – PASTEF) led by the opposition leader, Ousmane Sonko. The imprisonment of youth activists, for example Sonko himself and Bassirou Faye, and the attempt to delay the elections marked a turning point in Senegal’s drive toward a deeper democracy. The authoritarian tactics of President Sall and his governing coalition weakened the democratic institutions. Nevertheless, the constitutional court resisted the government’s overreach and ruled against Sall’s attempts to delay the elections. Based on an amnesty legislation, the government released the jailed PASTEF leaders on 14 March. The Senegalese voted overwhelmingly for PASTEF in the election on 24 March. Faye secured 54 per cent of the first-round vote, defeating Sall’s handpicked successor, Amadou Ba, who got 36 per cent. The transfer of power from the incumbent to the opposition in Senegal signalled the country’s resilience.

South Africa. The outcome of the election in May shocked the political elites, as the opposition parties humbled the governing ANC. Though there was no transfer of power at the presidential level, there was a transition in parliament: for the first time in 30 years, President Cyril Ramaphosa and the governing ANC were forced into a coalition so that they could govern. The ANC was obliged to trade 12 cabinet positions to gain the support of smaller opposition parties.

Botswana. The results of the election in Botswana were even more notable. The coalition of opposition parties under the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC) defeated the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), which had governed the country uninterrupted for 58 years. The BDP was reduced to being a minor opposition party with just four of the 61 directly elected seats in the 69-member parliament. By contrast, the Duma Boko-led UDC more than doubled its share of seats – from 15 to 36. Against the backdrop of an economic downturn (caused largely by a slump in income from vital diamond exports), the BDP’s longevity and President Mokgweetsi Masisi’s governance style angered young voters. The main campaign issues included the economy, unemployment, the minimum wage and the provision of social services.

Mauritius. This small island state recorded a remarkable electoral achievement. The governing coalition was wiped out in what is being called the ‘60-0 phenomenon’. The Alliance du Changement (ADC) coalition won 62 per cent of the popular vote, while the incumbent L’Alliance Lepep got 27 per cent. The coalition of opposition parties led by Navin Ramgoolam won all 60 competitive parliamentary seats on offer, while four seats were allocated to other, smaller parties on a non-competitive basis. Incumbent Prime Minister Pravind Jugnauth and his Lepep received two allocated seats, compared to the 42 seats it had won in the 2019 election. This was the third time in Mauritius’ modern history that a governing party wipeout had occurred (the previous occasions being in 1982 and 1995). As elsewhere, difficulties with the cost of living informed the choices of the voters. The ADC promised to create a fund to support vulnerable families, provide universal public transport, increase pensions, reduce fuel prices and improve governance.

Somaliland. This self-declared republic on the war-torn Horn of Africa held peaceful elections which reinforced its claims to be a stable democratic entity. The ruling party, Kulmiye – in power since 2010 and led by President Muse Bihi Abdi since 2017 – was up against the main opposition party Waddani, whose leader Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi won 64 per cent of the vote to become Somaliland’s sixth president. Incumbent Muse Bihi Abdi took 35 per cent of the vote. Economic difficulties, geopolitics and paternalistic politics made it difficult for the incumbent party to convince voters to renew its mandate. Waddani’s victory shows Somaliland’s democratic resilience.

Ghana. The ‘Year of elections’ concluded with Ghana, in December. That country’s democracy has been touted as a model in a region where democracy has declined. The incumbent NPP struggled to adjust to the fiscal imbalances and debts of recent years. A combination of political and environmental crises served as the backdrop for the election campaign. A former president, John Dramani Mahama, led the main opposition party NDC. Meanwhile Vice President Mahamudu Bawumia led the governing party. The two dominant parties fought the elections on the basis of their track records in government. With a collapsed economy, widespread youth unemployment and inflation, the opposition NDC capitalised on the crisis to win an absolute majority in parliament (183 seats against the NPP’s 88).

 

Moderately competitive elections

In other African states, the elections were neither free nor fair. There was no popular participation in the political process, as the pre-election environment did not promote inclusivity.

Rwanda. Paul Kagame won in a landslide with no serious challengers. However, critics have questioned Kagame’s model of democracy and its practices. The centralisation of political power, hostility towards political opposition, limited civil liberties, the absence of independent civil society organisations and limited press freedom have all reinforced authoritarianism in Rwanda.

Namibia. Liberation pride was severely bruised in the election in November. The polls were marred by poor conduct and procedural flaws, leading to allegations of voter suppression. The opposition parties disputed the results declared by the election management body. Even though there was no power transfer in Namibia, democratic accountability was tested and on show in the polls.

 

Staged elections

In authoritarian states, governing parties won staged elections and democracy suffered.

Comoros. In the presidential election in January, the incumbent, President Azali Assoumani, was running for a fourth term, aided by a controversial constitutional amendment approved in a 2018 referendum, in which opposition groups resisted the removal of presidential term limits. Assoumani’s constitutional re-engineering ended the democratic progress previously chalked up. The 2018 constitution centralised power in the executive and ended the rotational power-sharing system between the three main islands. Assoumani’s administration is notorious for its crackdowns on dissent, and opposition party members are regularly threatened and detained: the opposition Juwa party member and former president Ahmed Abdallah Sambi has been in prison since 2022. Critics of the government view his prosecution as having been politically motivated, designed to remove an opponent from competing in the 2024 election. In the event, six candidates contested the presidential election. Assoumani won with 62 per cent. The opposition alleged that ballot boxes had been stuffed, and their supporters took to the streets in protest. The opposition candidates petitioned the Supreme Court to annul the result, but instead the court revised Assoumani’s votes downward, to 57.2 per cent. Assoumani’s authoritarianism fits a pattern of civilian leaders using extraconstitutional means to gain more power. These actions have contributed to a democratic decline in Comoros.

Mozambique. The ruling party Frelimo rigged the elections in October. The presidential poll was a two-horse race between 47-year-old Daniel Chapo – Frelimo's candidate – and Venâncio Mondlane, whose independent candidacy was backed by the opposition party Podemos, a small anti-establishment party founded by Frelimo defectors. However, the election did not meet the required standards. The rigged election and the murder of two opposition party members triggered violence. Voters’ disaffection with the governing party stems from poor governance and lack of development.

Tunisia. President Kais Saied was re-elected with over 90 per cent of the vote. There was an absence of a ‘level playing field’ as opposition politicians were harassed and disqualified from seeking office.


Conclusions

Democracy has encountered strong headwinds across the globe. The behaviour of political elites and political parties has played a role in this crisis. The unchecked powers of civilian leaders have contributed to democratic backsliding External link, opens in new window. in many African states. Yet, opposition parties are still able to hold governments accountable.

Africans still prefer democracy to other political systems. At the same time, most Africans are dissatisfied with the performance of multiparty politics. To many African voters, the functionality of democracy should be measured in outcomes that can be understood as democratic dividends. But across Africa, these dividends remain limited, despite decades of democratisation. The significance of the 2024 elections cannot be overemphasised. They demonstrate the resilience of African democracy. Voters rejected incumbents who failed to deliver public goods.

 

Policy recommendations

First and foremost, the policy imperative is to sustain Africa’s democratic gains in future elections. The future of African democracy and development is inextricably linked to the proper conduct of elections. Proponents of liberal democracy must invest in strengthening the organisation of opposition parties. To accomplish this, African governments, civil society organisations and the proponents of good governance should take the following steps:

  • Nordic institutions should maintain their support for truly independent and autonomous election management bodies and improve the environment for the involvement of opposition parties in the model democratic states.
  • The political environment in the non-competitive electoral democracies should be improved, to encourage participation: opposition parties are key to deepening democratic norms and values.
  • Reforms should be instituted to strengthen political party organisations and help them cope with social changes, such as the youth bulge, the decline in party membership and the impact of social media.
  • The rule of law should be strengthened on the basis of an independent judiciary capable of dealing – without fear or favour – with contested and disputed election results brought to the courts.

Research-based policy advice

The NAI policy notes series is based on academic research. For further reading on this topic, we recommend the following titles:

 

NAI Policy Notes is a series of research-based briefs on relevant topics, intended for strategists and decision makers in foreign policy, aid and development. It aims to inform and generate input to the public debate and to policymaking. The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute. The quality of the series is assured by internal peer-reviewing processes.

About the author

  • George M. Bob-Milliar is an Associate Professor at the Department of History and Political Studies at Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology in Kumasi, Ghana. His research focuses on electoral politics, informal institutions, and social/political history, among others. In 2024-2025, he is a Senior Scholar at the Nordic Africa Institute.

How to refer to this policy note:

Bob-Milliar, George M (2025). Five incumbents tumbled and one was humbled : Six competitive elections that defied Africa's democratic backslide (NAI Policy Notes, 2025:1). Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:nai:diva-3025 External link, opens in new window.