Cities like Addis Ababa, Nairobi, and Kampala demonstrate how urbanisation can drive economic progress but also exacerbate communal violence and resource competition. Research on these cities reveals diverse patterns of violence influenced by local political dynamics, ethnic grievances, and migration pressures, underscoring the importance of tailored, inclusive policies to manage urban growth and prevent conflict.

BY Emma Elfversson, Kristine Höglund, Angela Muvumba Sellström and Camille Pellerin

In September 2024, the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN) agency Habitat and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) convened the Africa Urban Forum External link, opens in new window. (AUF), hosted by the government of Ethiopia. With an average annual urban growth rate of 3.5 per cent over the past 20 years, Africa has seen the greatest urbanisation in the developing world. Urbanisation holds out great promises External link, opens in new window. for economic and sustainable development. However, most city-dwellers External link, opens in new window., particularly migrants, continue to live in slums and to work in the informal sector.

In our research External link, opens in new window. on Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Nairobi (Kenya) and Kampala (Uganda), we observe the complex challenges discussed at the forum. Addis Ababa and Nairobi have metropolitan populations of approximately External link, opens in new window. 5.7 and 5.5 million, respectively, while Kampala’s is estimated External link, opens in new window. to be just over 4 million. Many of these urban residents are migrants from the countryside and refugees from other parts of the Horn of Africa and Central and Eastern Africa. Fast-growing cities can put a strain on relations within and between groups and intensify competition for power. In-migration from rural areas to cities can cause ethnic tension and resource competition. Meanwhile, spatial growth may disrupt local governance and create land disputes. These issues suggest that conflict prevention in rapidly growing cities depends on policies that address in-migration and ethnic grievances, as well as the increased demands placed on city infrastructure, housing and services.

Different patterns of communal violence

In our research, we explore the dynamics at play in urban growth and the factors that could generate or curb violence External link, opens in new window., drawing on examples from Addis Ababa, Nairobi and Kampala. These three cities display different patterns of communal violence External link, opens in new window. (violent conflict between non-state groups) and coexistence. Moreover, the states in question – Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda – adopt different strategies to address urban growth challenges and potential conflict.

We chose to study these cities because over recent decades they have seen different levels and dynamics of violent conflict. More specifically, communal violence has been prevalent in Nairobi but rare in Kampala, while Addis Ababa has remained relatively unscathed, despite conflict affecting other parts of Ethiopia. Our approach has been to examine the processes linking urban growth to communal violence.

Nairobi

Kenya has experienced a large number of violent communal conflicts, particularly in Nairobi, where competition for urban land rights External link, opens in new window. and the mobilisation by political elites of group-based grievances have contributed to the prevalence of communal violence.

For instance, in Kibera – the largest slum settlement in Nairobi, which has experienced rapid growth since Kenya’s independence in the 1960s – politically connected groups have, over time, been able to acquire landlord status, while people belonging to opposition groups have become tenants. This has led to land conflict and ethnic clashes External link, opens in new window. along macro-political lines, particularly during elections, when political candidates have used existing grievances to mobilise voter support.

Kawangware is another low-income area of Nairobi that has also been affected by rapid growth. Historically, Kawangware was Kikuyu dominated and electorally aligned with the political incumbents. However, a changing population composition has led the political opposition to gain the upper hand in Kawangware and to a subdivision of the constituency serving it. This political shift has strained relations between groups and has led to politically motivated violence and attacks on property.

However, there have also been positive examples of attempts to mitigate the negative effects of Nairobi’s rapid growth. Such efforts can damp down intergroup grievances. For example, slum upgrading has improved security in Korogocho, one of Nairobi’s major slum settlements. A programme was launched in response to the post-2007 election violence that tore through the country, including Korogocho’s ethnically mixed population. The programme included improvements to infrastructure and basic services, such as roads, electricity and sewerage, and it also set up a new playground and sports field. The success of this programme can be gauged by comparing developments in Korogocho with those in other slum settlements, where uneven development continues to create tension. However, recent developments in Korogocho, including forced evictions, have been highly contentious.

Addis Ababa

While formally located in Oromia regional state, under the constitution Addis Ababa enjoys special status and the right to govern itself. Addis Ababa is also the capital of the federal state and the seat of the Oromia regional administration. The city is a hub for the country’s economic and political resources, and therefore a key arena of contestation between political and economic elites from different administrative levels.

Despite attempts to introduce colonial zoning during the very brief Italian occupation in the 1930s, the capital has been characterised by a mixing of the different ethnic groups and classes. Given its multi-ethnic makeup, ethnicity has not historically been a driving factor behind political mobilisation in the capital. Moreover, the suppression of anti-government activism and political mobilisation along ethnic or other identity lines for nearly three decades (from 1991 to 2019) by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) further prevented intergroup conflict and violence.

Nevertheless, communal violence has become more frequent since 2018 External link, opens in new window., owing to a combination of latent ethnic grievances, demographic change and political reforms. While the overrepresentation of ethnic Amhara in Addis Ababa External link, opens in new window. has constituted a longstanding grievance of the Oromo, it is only recently that this has sparked violent conflict in the capital – a violence that primarily pitted Oromo from outside the capital against Addis Ababa’s multi-ethnic population. However, there has also been intergroup conflict within the capital.

Changes in the demographic balance of the capital (such as the in-migration of Oromo into the suburbs) and the political reforms of 2018 have led to a surge in interethnic animosities. The city’s spatial expansion into the surrounding Oromia regional state has also fuelled (sometimes violent) conflict over land between Addis Ababa residents, the federal and regional states, and the Oromo living in the areas bordering the capital.

The decreased centralisation of power and the ‘ethnicisation’ of politics in the post-2018 political era have encouraged intergroup conflict and have reduced the incentives for and the capacity of state actors to mitigate or prevent such conflicts.

Lastly, urban-rural conflict linkages have also triggered communal tension in the city. The outbreak in the Tigray regional state of armed conflict in November 2020 between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the ruling Prosperity Party resulted in the targeting and persecution of Tigrayans in Addis Ababa and in rising communal tension.

Kampala

Ethnicity does not feature as starkly in Kampala’s political dynamics. Like Nairobi and Addis Ababa, Kampala is the centre of urban in-migration. Its rapid expansion has intensified demands for infrastructure, land and services. It is also an opposition stronghold. Still, Uganda’s ruling political party, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) is not mobilised along ethnic dimensions.

Kampala’s position as the seat of the Buganda kingdom, home to the Baganda ethnic group, has nevertheless contributed to communal tension. For many years, the NRM accommodated the kingdom elite’s control over vast swathes of land and resources in the city. Eventually, state intervention had a negative impact on Baganda indigenous claims – most decidedly in 2007, when a land amendment External link, opens in new window. led to grievances and accusations that the NRM was seeking to benefit the non-Baganda. In 2009, Baganda youth protested against the government for preventing their king, the Kabaka, from visiting a breakaway group. The demonstrations External link, opens in new window. became riots, with the ethnic targeting of non-Baganda and with the use of lethal force by the police.

Kampala is also an example of how state reform can be used to weaken ethnic claims to power and potentially manage the risks of communal violence. In 2010, a government act established a cabinet-level position of ‘minister for Kampala’ and created a corporate entity to run the city, the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCAA). It manages health services, waste management, education and community development. Despite the NRM’s declining electoral support, the KCAA enables central government to control the city.

Emerging socioeconomic issues have sparked new political movements. Bobi Wine, a musician-turned-politician, won over 70 per cent of Kampala’s vote in 2021. From Buganda, Wine has used his ethnicity to gain support – a development suggesting that Kampala’s ethnic divisions may become more politicised and eventually lead to communal conflict.

The politics of violence prevention

Urban growth can both increase the risk of communal violence and foster coexistence. In Nairobi, Addis Ababa and Kampala, urban expansion has triggered different dynamics, due to the varied political contexts. For example, government interventions in Kampala illustrate how different strategies to control the city can either suppress or stoke conflict, and how this can become politically costly. In Addis Ababa, conflicts often arise in peri-urban areas, where rural and urban zones meet; meanwhile in Nairobi, much of the violence occurs in the urban core, particularly in slums near the city centre.

Our case studies also underscore the fact that state interventions aimed at reducing communal tension – as seen in the efforts to improve conditions, services and security in Nairobi’s Korogocho, following the post-election violence of 2007 – are likewise important mechanisms to mitigate some of the risks of rapid urban growth.

Policymakers and public-sector workers may not be aware of how state responses and different political contexts interact with the pressures of urban growth. We call for more attention to be paid to how political processes have consequences for the development of effective urban violence prevention.

• Emma Elfversson External link, opens in new window., Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden
• Kristine Höglund External link, opens in new window., Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University
• Angela Muvumba Sellström, Nordic Africa Institute, Sweden
• Camille Pellerin External link, opens in new window., Department of Government, Uppsala University