The Nordic Africa Institute

Commentary

A new era of engagement: Gulf countries and the Horn of Africa

Prince Mohamed bin Zayed, President of the United Arab Emirates meets with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Photo WAM agency

Prince Mohamed bin Zayed, President of the United Arab Emirates meets with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Photo WAM agency

Date • 20 Sep 2024

The Horn of Africa, a region that includes Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti, has long been a focal point of international interest due to its strategic location at the crossroads of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. The proximity of this region to the Arabian Peninsula has historically attracted the attention of Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar.

Historically, the relationship between the Gulf states and the Horn of Africa has been rooted in trade, cultural exchanges, and religious connections. The Red Sea acted as a bridge between the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn, facilitating the exchange of goods and ideas. Islamic expansion during the medieval period further cemented ties between the regions.

As Saudi Arabia and the UAE grew into wealthy petro-states their ambitions expanded beyond their borders, bringing the Horn of Africa into their sphere of influence.

With the inevitable decline of petroleum, Gulf states are seeking to diversify their economies and secure strategic assets like ports and agricultural land. The 2008 global financial crisis acted as a catalyst, pushing Gulf states to invest heavily in the Horn of Africa as part of their economic diversification strategies. This period also saw a shift from mere economic involvement to more direct political and military engagement, as Gulf states began establishing military bases and brokering peace deals in the region.

Today, the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, often dubbed a "sibling rivalry," contributes to shaping the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa. While both countries share a common interest in countering Iranian influence and securing maritime routes, their approaches and long-term goals can sometimes be at odds. Qatar, aligned with Turkey, has further complicated this rivalry by supporting different factions and governments within the Horn

As Gulf states continue to invest in infrastructure, ports, and military bases across the Horn of Africa, the region's nations find themselves navigating a delicate balance. On the one hand, they welcome the economic benefits brought by Gulf investments; on the other, they are wary of becoming entangled in the broader geopolitical rivalries of their wealthy neighbors.

This historical backdrop of Gulf rivalry in the Horn of Africa sets the stage for understanding the current geopolitical dynamics in the region, as we will explore in a two-article series.

Gulf Ambitions and the Horn of Africa: A geopolitical tug of war in the Red Sea

Redie Berekteab

Redie Berekteab. Photo: Mattias Sköld

 

The Gulf States' ambition to translate economic power to diplomatic, political, and military power is increasing their influence in the Horn of Africa, says Redie Bereketeab, Senior Researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute.

The Bab El Mandeb Strait, outside the coast of Eritrea, connects the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.

“The Horn’s crucial strategic location is what makes it of interest to outside actors,” he says.

Bereketeab explains that the rivalry which plays out in the Horn of Africa manifests in different approaches and objectives.

Saudi Arabia’s strategy in the Red Sea region is primarily driven by its broader regional goals, focusing on security and stability. Bereketeab explains this as being “In alignment with its broader goal of securing the Red Sea against threats, notably from Iran.” This approach has seen Riyadh engage in diplomatic and military initiatives, such as signing a military and defense agreement with Djibouti in 2017 and brokering the 2018 peace pact between Ethiopia and Eritrea. These moves not only enhance regional stability but also bolster Saudi Arabia’s image as a key mediator in the region. Additionally, Saudi Arabia's role in establishing the Council of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden in 2020 underscores its commitment to regional cooperation on security matters.

The UAE, on the other hand, has taken a more assertive stance, establishing a robust military and economic presence across the Horn of Africa. Over the past decade, the UAE has built military bases in Eritrea, Somalia, and Ethiopia, with its airbase in Assab, Eritrea, symbolizing its intent to establish a permanent foothold in the region. Although this base was later dismantled, the UAE’s strategic acquisition of port rights in Mukalla, Aden, and Berbera highlights its ambition to dominate maritime routes and assert influence across the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

Gulf Map

Map of Horn of Africa cities, ports and proximity to Gulf countries

The rivalry extends beyond Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with other Gulf states like Qatar and regional powers like Turkey playing significant roles. Qatar, often aligned with Turkey, has focused on counterbalancing Saudi and Emirati influence by bolstering its presence in Somalia and other parts of the Horn of Africa. Turkey’s involvement in Somalia, including establishing its largest overseas military base in Mogadishu, presents a substantial challenge to Saudi and Emirati ambitions. “Turkey's involvement in Somalia is perceived positively by many Somalis as it is seen as a counterbalance to Western interference in the region”, Bereketeab explains.

Turkey’s latest mediation efforts, such as hosting talks between Ethiopia and Somalia in early August of this year, have positioned it as a key diplomatic player in the region. Ethiopia's desire for a coastal port led it to sign a deal with Somaliland, a self-declared independent state that Somalia disputes. This angered Somalia, which views the deal as an infringement on its sovereignty. There has been no clear resolution of the disagreement yet but could have longterm consequences for the whole region.

The involvement of these external powers in the Horn of Africa presents both opportunities and challenges for the region's nations. Nations in the region are scrambling to reposition themselves for strategic advantage. Landlocked Ethiopia, for example, has embarked on an ambitious project to diversify its trade routes, reducing its reliance on Djibouti's port. By investing in transport corridors to other regional ports like Berbera, Port Sudan, and Mombasa, Ethiopia aims to strengthen its economic autonomy and geopolitical leverage.

Somalia, too, has been caught in the crossfire of regional power struggles. Its government has strategically aligned with various Middle Eastern powers to bolster its domestic position against powerful individuals and groups. These alliances have provided Somalia with much-needed support, but they have also exposed it to the risks of external interference.

On one hand, countries like Djibouti, Somalia, and Eritrea benefit from the influx of capital, infrastructure development, and enhanced security provided by Gulf investments. On the other hand, the increased militarization and the alignment of different Horn of Africa countries with rival Gulf powers raise concerns about political polarization and the potential for exacerbating existing conflicts, as seen in Somalia.As the geopolitical landscape in the Horn of Africa continues to evolve, the rivalry between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Turkey will likely contribute to shaping the region's future. While the Gulf states’ involvement brings economic benefits, it also carries significant risks, including the potential for increased instability and the erosion of sovereignty among Horn of Africa nations.