The Horn of Africa, a region that includes Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti, has long been a focal point of international interest due to its strategic location at the crossroads of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. The proximity of this region to the Arabian Peninsula has historically attracted the attention of Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar.

Historically, the relationship between the Gulf states and the Horn of Africa has been rooted in trade, cultural exchanges, and religious connections. The Red Sea acted as a bridge between the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn, facilitating the exchange of goods and ideas. Islamic expansion during the medieval period further cemented ties between the regions.

As Saudi Arabia and the UAE grew into wealthy petro-states their ambitions expanded beyond their borders, bringing the Horn of Africa into their sphere of influence.

With the inevitable decline of petroleum, Gulf states are seeking to diversify their economies and secure strategic assets like ports and agricultural land. The 2008 global financial crisis acted as a catalyst, pushing Gulf states to invest heavily in the Horn of Africa as part of their economic diversification strategies. This period also saw a shift from mere economic involvement to more direct political and military engagement, as Gulf states began establishing military bases and brokering peace deals in the region.

Today, the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, often dubbed a "sibling rivalry," contributes to shaping the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa. While both countries share a common interest in countering Iranian influence and securing maritime routes, their approaches and long-term goals can sometimes be at odds. Qatar, aligned with Turkey, has further complicated this rivalry by supporting different factions and governments within the Horn

As Gulf states continue to invest in infrastructure, ports, and military bases across the Horn of Africa, the region's nations find themselves navigating a delicate balance. On the one hand, they welcome the economic benefits brought by Gulf investments; on the other, they are wary of becoming entangled in the broader geopolitical rivalries of their wealthy neighbors.

This historical backdrop of Gulf rivalry in the Horn of Africa sets the stage for understanding the current geopolitical dynamics in the region, as we will explore in a two-article series.

Gulf Ambitions and the Horn of Africa: A geopolitical tug of war in the Red Sea

 

The Gulf States' ambition to translate economic power to diplomatic, political, and military power is increasing their influence in the Horn of Africa, says Redie Bereketeab, Senior Researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute.

The Bab El Mandeb Strait, outside the coast of Eritrea, connects the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.

“The Horn’s crucial strategic location is what makes it of interest to outside actors,” he says.

Bereketeab explains that the rivalry which plays out in the Horn of Africa manifests in different approaches and objectives.

Saudi Arabia’s strategy in the Red Sea region is primarily driven by its broader regional goals, focusing on security and stability. Bereketeab explains this as being “In alignment with its broader goal of securing the Red Sea against threats, notably from Iran.” This approach has seen Riyadh engage in diplomatic and military initiatives, such as signing a military and defense agreement with Djibouti in 2017 and brokering the 2018 peace pact between Ethiopia and Eritrea. These moves not only enhance regional stability but also bolster Saudi Arabia’s image as a key mediator in the region. Additionally, Saudi Arabia's role in establishing the Council of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden in 2020 underscores its commitment to regional cooperation on security matters.

The UAE, on the other hand, has taken a more assertive stance, establishing a robust military and economic presence across the Horn of Africa. Over the past decade, the UAE has built military bases in Eritrea, Somalia, and Ethiopia, with its airbase in Assab, Eritrea, symbolizing its intent to establish a permanent foothold in the region. Although this base was later dismantled, the UAE’s strategic acquisition of port rights in Mukalla, Aden, and Berbera highlights its ambition to dominate maritime routes and assert influence across the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

The rivalry extends beyond Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with other Gulf states like Qatar and regional powers like Turkey playing significant roles. Qatar, often aligned with Turkey, has focused on counterbalancing Saudi and Emirati influence by bolstering its presence in Somalia and other parts of the Horn of Africa. Turkey’s involvement in Somalia, including establishing its largest overseas military base in Mogadishu, presents a substantial challenge to Saudi and Emirati ambitions. “Turkey's involvement in Somalia is perceived positively by many Somalis as it is seen as a counterbalance to Western interference in the region”, Bereketeab explains.

Turkey’s latest mediation efforts, such as hosting talks between Ethiopia and Somalia in early August of this year, have positioned it as a key diplomatic player in the region. Ethiopia's desire for a coastal port led it to sign a deal with Somaliland, a self-declared independent state that Somalia disputes. This angered Somalia, which views the deal as an infringement on its sovereignty. There has been no clear resolution of the disagreement yet but could have longterm consequences for the whole region.

The involvement of these external powers in the Horn of Africa presents both opportunities and challenges for the region's nations. Nations in the region are scrambling to reposition themselves for strategic advantage. Landlocked Ethiopia, for example, has embarked on an ambitious project to diversify its trade routes, reducing its reliance on Djibouti's port. By investing in transport corridors to other regional ports like Berbera, Port Sudan, and Mombasa, Ethiopia aims to strengthen its economic autonomy and geopolitical leverage.

Somalia, too, has been caught in the crossfire of regional power struggles. Its government has strategically aligned with various Middle Eastern powers to bolster its domestic position against powerful individuals and groups. These alliances have provided Somalia with much-needed support, but they have also exposed it to the risks of external interference.

On one hand, countries like Djibouti, Somalia, and Eritrea benefit from the influx of capital, infrastructure development, and enhanced security provided by Gulf investments. On the other hand, the increased militarization and the alignment of different Horn of Africa countries with rival Gulf powers raise concerns about political polarization and the potential for exacerbating existing conflicts, as seen in Somalia.As the geopolitical landscape in the Horn of Africa continues to evolve, the rivalry between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Turkey will likely contribute to shaping the region's future. While the Gulf states’ involvement brings economic benefits, it also carries significant risks, including the potential for increased instability and the erosion of sovereignty among Horn of Africa nations.

Balancing act: the benefits and challenges of Gulf investments in the Horn of Africa

Gulf states have emerged as formidable players in the Horn of Africa, leveraging their vast financial resources and deep historical ties, and outpacing other international actors in influencing the region’s development. As these states grow their involvement, the nations of the Horn of Africa find themselves at a critical juncture, balancing the promise of economic growth with the need to protect their own interests.

The Horn of Africa nations have a nuanced view of the Gulf states’ increasing involvement in the region, characterised by a mix of optimism and apprehension. On one hand, countries such as Djibouti, Eritrea and Somalia see the Gulf states’ investments in infrastructure, ports and military bases as opportunities for economic development and enhanced security.

“These investments bring much-needed capital, creating jobs and modernising critical infrastructure. There is mutual benefit for both the Horn of Africa states and the Gulf”, explains Redie Bereketeab, Senior Researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI).

“China is slowly decreasing its investments, and the Gulf countries are stepping in to take its place. Similar to China, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states often navigate complex bureaucracies more swiftly than Western nations, allowing for faster project implementation. This agility can be particularly attractive to Horn of Africa nations seeking rapid development”, NAI Senior Researcher Liisa Laakso notes.

The region’s potential for large-scale agricultural production and its proximity to the Gulf states make it attractive as a source of essential staple foods. “The Horn of Africa plays a vital role in the food security of the Gulf states due to its fertile land and established trade routes. With a growing population and limited domestic agricultural capacity due to the climate, the Gulf region is heavily reliant on food imports, procuring 85 percent of its basic food supplies from abroad”, Bereketeab says. This reliance leaves the region vulnerable to fluctuations in the global food market.

But while investment deals are lucrative for Horn of Africa nations, they are not without their critics. Arrangements often displace local communities, erode food security and exacerbate existing tensions over land. For example, local people set fire to foreign investors’ buildings in Ethiopia in 2016 in response to “land grabs”.

Horn of Africa nations have to balance their need for investment with good governance and the needs of local communities”, says Liisa Laakso, Senior Researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute.

NAI Senior Researcher Assem Abu Hatab agrees, emphasising the multifaceted interests of Gulf states, particularly in agriculture. “Gulf countries, even the smallest among them, have budget surpluses that they need to invest to finance their economic diversification strategies. For them, investing in African agriculture to secure their food supplies makes sense, given their reliance on food imports due to arid conditions at home”, he notes. “The contributions to local food security are often debated, as many projects prioritise exports over local food needs. While there are potential economic benefits for the region, including employment and infrastructure development, the impact on food security in the Horn of Africa can be limited as local consumption is not a priority”.

However, these investments have raised concerns about land-grabbing in the Horn of Africa, where local communities may be displaced or deprived of resources, Abu Hatab points out. In addition, environmental sustainability is a key concern regarding GCC agricultural investments in the region. “The large-scale and unsustainable use of land and water resources for agriculture can lead to over-extraction of water, soil degradation and loss of biodiversity”, Abu Hatab continues. “If not managed sustainably, such investments may harm local ecosystems and exacerbate environmental issues in the Horn, thus impacting both long-term food security and the livelihoods of local communities”.

The awareness of local populations about GCC investments and their terms varies, often depending on the transparency of agreements between governments and investors. In many cases, local communities may not be fully informed or involved in decision-making processes regarding land leases or the conditions of these investments. This lack of transparency can lead to social tensions, as communities may feel excluded or be displaced without adequate compensation or participation. This can also lead to adverse implications including potential loss of livelihoods, reduced access to resources and social unrest.

An interesting dynamic is the “sibling rivalry” that exists between Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. “These countries operate in a competitive yet cooperative fashion. It’s a quasi-friendly rivalry. While they are careful not to encroach on each other’s strategic interests, they carve out different zones of influence”, Abu Hatab says.

The Gulf states are motivated by geopolitical as well as economic goals, he continues. “By investing abroad, these countries can extend their geopolitical reach, gaining influence.”

The division of countries such as Ethiopia and Sudan, in particular, into zones of influence allows the Gulf states to avoid direct competition.

Rather than stepping on each other’s toes, the Gulf states seem to have an unspoken agreement to dominate different sectors or regions”, says Assem Abu Hatab, Senior Researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute.

This dynamic prevents overt conflicts, but can also lead to inefficiencies due to a lack of coordination in investments, which can sometimes hinder long-term benefits, he warns. “While they avoid direct competition, the absence of cooperation can result in missed opportunities for ensuring that these investments bring the best possible outcomes for local populations”, Abu Hatab concludes.

The Gulf states are perceived differently from traditional colonial powers, Abu Hatab acknowledges. “They are not seen as colonial powers or purely resource-extractive players like China or Russia, which gives them a unique advantage. The local populations tend to view Gulf investors more favourably”, he explains.

The nations of the Horn of Africa continue to navigate the complex interplay of economic opportunities, environmental sustainability and geopolitical influence as Gulf investments contribute to reshaping the regional landscape both literally and figuratively. The challenge is for nations to leverage partnerships to their advantage, while mitigating social and environmental costs.

Text: Heba Habib