Chapter 4 – Zimbabwe

Since gaining independence 1980, Zimbabwe has experienced both direct and structural violence during elections, often with devastating consequences for individuals and communities. In particular, local security services and state-funded militias have emerged as key drivers of community-level violence.

Although there has been a decline in interparty violence since the 2008 elections, intensifying factionalism within Zimbabwe’s main political parties has led to intra-party violence being used to intimidate political competitors, secure votes and promote patriarchal dominance. This extends to arson attacks; threats and intimidation; arrests; beatings; torture; rape; starvation; abductions; and in some instances murder.

The violence is also gendered, with women in politics facing intimidation and threats during party primaries, campaign events and elections. Many have been sexually harassed in-person or online, and some have received death threats aimed at deterring them from running for office.

A disconnect exists between Zimbabwe’s constitutional commitments to gender equality and the practical implementation of women’s political participation. As the August 2023 harmonised elections illuminate, women’s representation in Zimbabwe’s decision-making spaces remains disproportionately low, reflecting a political environment that is not conducive to gender parity (see infographic on page 53). This is notwithstanding strenuous efforts by NGOs, CSOs, and regional and international actors. By contrast, political parties have demonstrated very little genuine commitment to advancing gender equality through participation.

Against the above backdrop, this section analyses the nature and impact of GEV in Zimbabwe, spotlighting the experiences of women running for local government seats in the 2023 elections.

Zimbabwe’s post-independence national elections and the impact of the 2013 Constitution

The 2023 harmonised elections which took place in 12,370 polling stations across 19 districts, representing all ten of the country’s provinces revealed a number of entrenched gendered and structural inequalities. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) faced criticism for institutional bias, irregularities and diminished public trust, exacerbated by political violence and exclusionary practices. Beyond administrative shortcomings, gendered exclusion was reinforced by patriarchal governance structures. For instance, the National Council of Chiefs central to rural governance failed to elect any female chiefs in the 2023 contests, with the consensus-based selection processes privileging male-dominated networks. Elsewhere, the absence of gender-segregated sanitation facilities at polling stations heightened vulnerabilities to GBV and harassment.

Historically, elections in Zimbabwe have been characterised by hostility, violence and a prevailing culture of impunity. The electoral violence seen in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2008 exemplifies this pattern, further marginalising women attempting to participate in the political sphere.

Going back to when Zimbabwe gained independence, the Lancaster House Agreement, on which the newly liberated country based its constitution, strategically excluded any meaningful political empowerment of women. Women were excluded in Lancaster House Agreement negotiations. The agreement is neutral on the participation of vulnerable groups that include women. Since then, women’s participation in politics has remained erratic. In 1980, women constituted 9 percent of Zimbabwe’s parliamentary membership, dropping to 8 percent in 1985. This figure rose to 14 percent for both the 1990 and 1995 elections. The figure dropped again to 9.3 percent in 2000 and stood at 18% in 2008. These fluctuations reflect a persistent lack of political will towards increasing women’s representation. Though erratic women’s representation increased in the next three elections (as seen in the graph below) due to the introduction of the gender quota in 2013.

Sustained internal advocacy and external pressure, culminated in Zimbabwe adopting the 2013 Constitution, which sought to redress gender disparities across all levels of governance through transformative legislative provisions. Section 17(1) mandates that women should occupy at least half the country’s decision-making positions (including all commissions and other elective and appointed governmental bodies). For the Parliament (National Assembly and Senate) the constitution establishes a gender quota that functions at two levels. It stipulates those 60 seats are to be reserved for women in the National Assembly (lower house) which are to be allocated through proportional representation. The lower house is composed of 280 members and of the remaining seats, 210 are constituency seats and 10 seats are reserved for the youth quota. The second provision relates to the Senate (upper house) and states that 60 of the house’s 80 senators be elected through a proportional representation system “in which male and female candidates are listed alternatively, every list being headed by a female candidate”. This list appoints six senators from each of Zimbabwe’s 10 provinces. Combined, these mechanisms are meant to ensure women’s representation in the full Parliament (upper and lower house) remains above 30 percent.

Despite the provisions set out in the 2013 Constitution, implementation has proven to be inconsistent and often arbitrary. In fact, the number of women being nominated as candidates for FPTP constituency seats has declined, subsequently the number of women who have been elected to parliament through FPTP elections has declined since the introduction of the quota. More specifically, the number of women contesting National Assembly seats fell from 105 in 2008 to 90 in the 2013 elections according to scholar Lihiru.

Furthermore, many of the incoming women are under the patronage of or connected to leading largely male figures within the political parties, severely undermines the drive to meaningful representation. Political parties also stand accused of using the quota to elect mediocre women politicians to maintain patriarchal dominance.

In addition, the constitutional youth quota for the National Assembly has yielded limited outcomes from a gender perspective, with only three of the ten reserved seats currently filled by young women. More generally, the overwhelming majority of the 35 young people who won National Assembly seats in the 2023 elections (through direct election, youth quota, or women’s quota) are men. Of the 35 young people 22 are men while women are 13.

In sum, structural barriers, including political violence and systemic exclusion, continue to undermine women’s representation. Women’s participation in political decision-making remains well below the constitutionally mandated 50 percent threshold, highlighting the disjunction between formal legal provisions and practical implementation.

Despite these various shortcomings, the proportional representation mechanism underpinning the national quota has at least served to prevent the complete marginalisation of women from legislative processes.

Navigating local governance

Zimbabwe’s local government framework operates within a constitutionally mandated three-tier system comprising: 1) the national government; 2) provincial/metropolitan councils; and 3) local authorities. Local authorities are in turn classified into urban councils and rural district councils, with the latter overseeing designated rural districts, often in conjunction with district administrators.

Provincial and metropolitan councils covering provinces and metropolitan areas such as Harare and Bulawayo function at the intermediate level. Although traditional leadership structures, including chiefs and headmen, do not always align with administrative boundaries, they remain influential in rural governance. The framework established under the 2013 Constitution sets out a national provincial/metropolitan–local authority system that grants varying degrees of autonomy to the lower rungs of authority. Urban councils can choose from a variety of governance models, including council–mayor, mayor–council, commissions, and representative town meetings.

Taking its cue from the national-level quota, the 2021 Constitutional Amendment No. 2 introduced a 30 percent quota for women in local authorities, marking a progressive step toward gender parity at the sub-national level. Although this led to women’s representation in local government increasing from 13 percent in 2018 to 32 percent in 2023, it still falls far short of the legislation’s prescriptions.

While gender quotas exist as a strategy to enhance female participation, their implementation is inconsistent and often arbitrary. Structural barriers, including political violence and systemic exclusion, continue to undermine women’s significant representation. Notwithstanding the existence of the robust legal framework promoting gender equality in electoral processes, significant challenges persist, as evidenced by the enduring gender disparities in political representation in Zimbabwe. Women’s participation in political decision-making remains below the 50 percent threshold, highlighting the disjunction between formal legal provisions and their practical implementation. Despite the notable increase of women politicians through the gender quota (14 percent in 2008 to 32 percent in 2013), scholars such as Tshuma point to the adverse effects of quota concerning the nomination and election process. All this underscores the need for comprehensive strategies aimed at ensuring equitable gender representation, while taking into account intersecting identities.

Political parties and gendered electoral violence

The research project Making Politics Safer interviewed 52 Zimbabwean women of various ages and political affiliations, from three different provinces, who had participated at local authority elections in 2023.

The vast majority of the interviewed women had run for office under a political party, in most cases either Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) or Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC).

When it comes to women accessing political office, Zimbabwe’s political parties are crucial gatekeepers. Here, the parties’ candidate selection processes reveal strongly gendered dimensions. In the 2023 elections, both main parties disproportionately nominated women as candidates in constituencies where victory was less likely. Despite this structural disadvantage, general statistical evidence indicates that women managed to perform competitively.

A 52-year CCC councillor observed that during party primaries, when competing against a male rival, the top leadership tends to promote the man’s candidature, in much the same way boys are accorded greater importance than girls in many African families: ‘If you are a woman, things don’t come easy. When you try to raise your head, something will come up to make sure you remain oppressed’. In a similar vein, a 43-year-old ZANU-PF councillor observed, ‘Party politics sometimes requires people who are experienced yet we as women have never been exposed to all this. So basically, we are screened from the onset by virtue of being a woman’.

Internal party processes exacerbate these inequalities. Intra-party gendered violence was reported as being particularly pronounced during the primary elections. Despite this, the complaints of women candidates were generally dismissed by senior party members. A 41-year-old ZANU-PF councillor remarked that when women report misconduct, the party leadership tends to respond with ‘Dzatungana dzemudanga’, which translates as ‘They are fighting from the same kraal’ in other words, it is an in-house dispute. This extends to issues of sexual harassment, with a 37-year-old ZANU-PF councillor asserting, ‘it was because I am a woman, like I mentioned earlier my competitor was a man, who had been in power for quite a long time … Like I mentioned of sexual violence, certainly if I was a man, I would not have faced those sexual offers’. As a result of such attitudes, several respondents mentioned they did not even bother reporting abuses, as they anticipated the party leadership would merely trivialise their complaints.

Over 70 percent of respondents had faced significant resistance when entering politics. Moreover, candidates from both main parties reported having to navigate purges, dismissals and political marginalisation, with CCC women further constrained by institutional instability in the wake of Nelson Chamisa’s withdrawal from parliament as CCC leader and the factional recalls initiated by Sengezo Tshabangu the Secretary General for CCC who assumed leadership of the CCC party after Chamisa’s withdrawal. Female mayors in Masvingo, Mutare and Epworth were targeted by Tshabangu, and at least four female councillors were recalled, undermining women’s visibility and participation in local governance. Subsequent by-elections have disproportionately replaced women with men, further diluting the former’s presence in elected office.

Local women leaders frequently face psychological and semiotic violence, encompassing intimidation, insults, blackmail, false rumours and bullying. In many cases, this leads to diminished confidence and credibility. Half the interviewees reported having been stigmatised through misinformation and misogynistic language, including being labelled a ‘prostitute’. A 43-year-old ZANU-PF councillor described how ‘A certain youth I was contesting with for the harmonised elections said I am a prostitute. Plus, a wrong footage of my interview was circulated on social media, went viral and people had nothing but nasty comments to share’. Meanwhile, a 57-year-old CCC councillor related: ‘I have encountered them a lot from political party groups, so they were using those groups to humiliate me and insult me. You can imagine maybe there are five hundred to six hundred members but someone is insulting you day and night there’.

Female candidates are particularly susceptible to online violence, including gendered disinformation, derogatory remarks and sexualised threats that serve to delegitimise and discourage women’s participation in politics. One 37-year-old ZANU-PF councillor lamented that, ‘I faced online attacks, and verbal utterances, name-calling, referred to as prostitute. I could find my pictures posted on social media’.

During the 2023 elections, both married and unmarried female candidates faced widespread slut-shaming. Victims rarely reported abuses due to fear of stigma; lack of trust in justice systems; and the normalisation of misogynistic insults as an everyday part of political participation. Again, when confronting such abuse, women are often denied protection by their own parties, as well as state institutions such as the police, which are widely perceived as failing to provide effective redress. In some cases, men team up with women in the party in order to abuse female rivals. This was confirmed by a 52-year-old ZANU-PF councillor: ‘It is unfortunate that some of the insults are hurled by my fellow females and supporting males hurling insults at me’.

Women’s participation is also undermined by economic exclusion, particularly when attempting to compete in resource-intensive primaries and campaign processes amid an already tottering economy. Most of the informants struggled to finance their campaigns, with a 37-year-old ZANU-PF councillor reporting:

As you know in our culture there is a phrase ‘ukama igasva hunozadziswa nekudya’. This is to say there is need for tangible things for relations established to prosper, so similarly in politics there is need for financial activities, where as a contester you are expected to finance people. The challenge then comes with financial constraints, and that is when offers from men who have financial muscle start to be reconsidered. The dilemma will then be between using your body in exchange of money so as to fulfil populace`s wishes or keep to your morals.

Despite parties receiving state funding, women are systematically excluded from financial support, with resources largely confined to male elites and presidential campaigns. A 52-year-old interviewee indicated that, ‘If you do not have the money to finance yourself during election period then you don’t get through. We are labelled prostitutes’.

Exorbitant nomination fees and the absence of gender-sensitive political finance regulations have entrenched women’s marginalisation, contravening constitutional provisions on gender equality (sections 17 and 56). Consequently, in the 2023 elections, women comprised just 11 percent of candidates for the contested National Assembly seats and 15 percent of local government candidates. This resulted in a drop in representation compared to the 2018 elections, potentially deterring future political participation by women.

Finally, physical violence, though less prevalent during the 2023 harmonised elections, remains a significant deterrent. Tactics include public assaults, private targeting, property vandalism, youth-led disruption of campaigns, and intimidation by informal groups such as Forever Associates Zimbabwe. About 18 percent of respondents had personally experienced a physical assault. A 57-year-old CCC councillor, whose husband had been a politician for the Movement for Democratic Change, was attacked at home by a perpetrator yelling: ‘You think if your husband was a politician, you can also be one. We will teach you a good lesson if you don’t step down. Power is not sexually transmitted’.

Collectively, these intersecting forms of violence, exacerbated by entrenched patriarchal attitudes and party structures, create a hostile environment for Zimbabwean women looking to participate in politics. These factors have also worked to limit the number of women nominated by the political parties as candidates in competitive elections. Instead, there is a heavy reliance on gender quota provisions. Women elected through quota systems often struggle against a perceived lack of legitimacy compared to candidates who have won open seats. The overall impact is to discourage women from entering or remaining in politics, with negative implications for Zimbabwe’s democratic sphere and gender equality more broadly.

Ensuring safer elections

In terms of the country’s national legal framework, Section 5 of the 2004 Electoral Act proscribes violence by political parties, members and supporters, while Section 6 outlaws abusive behaviours, slander and the spreading of fake news. Section 133G indicates that every office-bearer of a political party contesting an election, as well as every candidate and election agent, ‘shall take all appropriate measures to prevent politically motivated violence and any electoral malpractices before, during and after the election period’. Furthermore, it states that party leaders must ‘take effective steps to discipline all members of the party who engage in politically motivated violence or … electoral malpractice’. Towards these ends, parties and candidates are bound by the Code of Conduct set out in the act. In addition, the act allows for the establishment of Multi-Party Liaison Committees. These committees, convened by the ZEC, are tasked with managing local and national campaign-period conflicts, and implementing the Code of Conduct.

Zimbabwe’s ten-year National GBV Strategy (2023–2030) is supported by the UN Population Fund, which has worked with the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, universities, Police Victim Friendly Units (VFUs) and CSOs such as Musasa Project to capacitate them in combatting GBV. In particular, the VFUs have been tasked with providing support to people at risk of or suffering from GBV during elections. More generally, both UN Women and UNDP have been involved in training and workshops for women, as well as promoting women’s political participation, gender-responsive budgeting, and GBV prevention. Here, it is worth mentioning the UN’s Spotlight Initiative, launched in Zimbabwe in 2019 and designed to respond to all forms of violence against women and girls. Furthermore, UNDP has helped train Zimbabwean police officers on how best to handle GBV issues.

Turning to measures and initiatives put in place for the 2023 elections that hold promise for the future, Zimbabwe’s political parties signed peace pledges beforehand promising to adhere to the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission’s Elections Peace Strategy, which sought to maintain peace and discourage violence during the electoral period. These pledges were initiated by the Zimbabwe Heads of Christian Denominations, a coalition of faith-based bodies. The initiatives were instrumental in ensuring lower levels of registered violence in the 2023 election in comparison to previous elections.

Zimbabwe’s constitution established a number of commissions, including the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission and the Zimbabwe Gender Commission, which are tasked with putting in place independent oversight structures. The latter set up the Gender Observatory to monitor the March–August 2023 election period, the aim being to document women’s experiences, establish call-and-command centres dealing with GBV issues, mitigate other gender-related risks, and provide recommendations to policymakers.

The Women’s Academy for Leadership and Political Excellence (WALPE) conducted a multi-party women’s forum in the build-up to the 2023 elections to discuss how best to maintain peace, regardless of party affiliation. In addition, WALPE in collaboration with Swedish faith-based development organisation Diakonia conducted citizen journalism and community protection training sessions for female candidates. Meanwhile, Musasa Project, working alongside the Women’s Coalition of Zimbabwe, set up survivor services and hotlines that offered legal aid, shelter and referrals during the pre-election and election period.

Also of note is the work of NGOs such as the Women in Politics Support Unit, which seeks to increase women’s participation in Zimbabwean politics, and the Zimbabwe Election Support Network, which focuses on activities related to the promotion of democratic processes, particularly elections.

In terms of church engagement, the Zimbabwe Heads of Christian Denomination published ‘The Elections We Want’ prior to the 2023 elections, setting out a proposed framework for ensuring peaceful campaigning and voting processes. More generally, the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC) has launched various initiatives promoting non-violence and voter education, including establishing local- and national-level peace committees. Working alongside Act for Peace, the ZCC has also established a nation-building and protection programme focused on community resilience and preventing violence. The Catholic Church in particular has been instrumental in a number of peace, reconciliation and voter education initiatives, including via the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe.

Most recently, the ZEC has launched its 2025–2029 strategic plan, which includes various gender and disability inclusion measures designed to ensure safer, more accessible polling and improved candidate processes.