Making politics safer
Chapter 3 – Kenya
Previous chapter: Chapter 2 Ghana

Nakuru, Kenya, August 2022. Political leader Susan Kihika speaks to her supporters moments after she was declared Nakuru County Governor elect. Photo: James Wakibia, SOPA Images/Sipa USA.
Since gaining independence from British colonial rule in 1963, the Republic of Kenya has maintained a reputation as a stable nation-state, albeit with an inconsistent democratic record. Under Jomo Kenyatta’s leadership, the country functioned as a de facto one-party state, before multi-party politics was formally banned in 1982 under Daniel Arap Moi. This was reversed in 1991, with space finally given for a pluralistic democratic politics to take root. Subsequent years saw greater political competition, increased economic growth, improved access to healthcare and education, and a strengthening of grassroots activism. Despite these positive developments, the number of women in Kenya’s parliament remained very low: just two were elected to the 200-member house during 1988–1992, increasing only marginally to six in 1992–1997. Throughout this period the dominance of ‘big-man politics’ and gendered prejudices created a hostile and exclusionary political environment for women leaders.
Ethnic-based political divisions have also posed persistent challenges to Kenya’s stability. Although efforts were made to dismantle the ethnically divisive taxation and labour system installed by the country’s colonial leaders, ethnicity continued to indirectly affect access to land, jobs, and key services such as healthcare, education and housing. As a result, ethnic-based political violence became a key feature of Kenya’s election landscape. The most significant instance since the turn of the century occurred in 2007 following the fiercely contested election between Raila Odinga and incumbent president Mwai Kibaki. Intense post-election violence (PEV) resulted in 1,133 deaths, 3,561 injuries, over 900 cases of sexual and gender-based violence (GBV), and an estimated 600,000 people being internally displaced. The violence was characterised by both spontaneous and organised physical attacks, murders, maiming, torture and rape.
While much attention has been paid to the ethnic dimensions of Kenya’s political violence, the gendered dimensions have not been adequately researched. Scholar Lyn Ossome argues that the current literature does not sufficiently explain the contrasting ways in which women and men experience Kenya’s political violence. Her research shows that, in addition to ethnic-based violence, Kenyan women are at greater risk of sexual violence when election-related violence occurs. Perpetrators of political violence against women are also less likely to be prosecuted for such crimes.
Women political candidates face targeted attacks as a result of their political aspirations. In the lead-up to the 2022 elections, multiple media outlets reported that women running for office were being physically assaulted, stalked, sexually harassed and intimidated (both in-person and online) by political opponents and members of their own party. According to the Kenya Women Parliamentary Association (KEWOPA), women are targeted irrespective of their political affiliation, with perpetrators aware that violence deters all but the most determined women from contesting elections. Gendered electoral violence is deliberately deployed to maintain male hegemony in Kenya’s political system.

Kenya’s local government structure.
The gender quota and devolved government system
In the wake of the 2007 PEV, the Kenyan government established a commission of enquiry to investigate and prosecute those responsible, as well as oversee the drafting of a new constitution. The 2010 Constitution of Kenya duly introduced measures limiting executive power; establishing a devolved government system; and introducing quota mechanisms to address the underrepresentation of ethnic minorities, women and other vulnerable groups.
The basis for devolution is set out in Article 6 of the constitution, which adds an additional county-level branch of government intended to operate concurrently with national government. In practice, the national power previously administered via eight national provinces has been devolved to 47 political and administrative counties. Each county is governed by a county assembly, which functions as its legislative representative body, and a county executive, which functions as its administrative authority. In terms of composition, the County Assembly is composed of elected and nominated representatives: Members of County Assembly (MCA). The County Executive is composed of the County Governor and Deputy Governor who are elected into office, while the remainder of the executive is composed of members appointed to the executive by the Governor, with approval from the Assembly.
The constitution’s devolution provisions are complimented by the ‘two-thirds gender rule’, which sets requirements for women’s representation in parliament (National Assembly and Senate) and county assemblies. The first provision appears in Article 81(b), which states that no more than two-thirds of an elective public body’s members should be of the same gender. Articles 97 and 98 refer specifically to the National Assembly and Senate, while Articles 175, 177 and 197 extend the rule to county assemblies. In addition to the single-member constituency seats, 47 women representatives (one from each county) are to be elected to the National Assembly, and 16 women are nominated to the Senate.
The constitution also stipulates that – in addition to its elected members – a county assembly be composed of nominated members selected through proportional representation, thereby ensuring compliance with the gender rule and the inclusion of special interest groups. If fully adhered to, the two-thirds gender rule would mean at least 33 percent of Kenya’s national and county representative bodies are composed of women.
The two-thirds gender rule was first implemented in 2013. Since then, Kenya has seen progressive increases in women’s representation, particularly at the county level, with the most significant gains recorded in the 2022 elections – Nakuru County stood out in particular, recording the highest number of elected women (15), including a governor, senator and eight county assembly members. Even so, six counties failed to elect a single woman to their county assemblies.

Women’s representation in Kenya’s parliament and county assemblies. Sources: Rift Valley Institute, UN Women, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, and National Democratic Institute (NDI).
As shown in the table above, the county system has maintained women’s representation at or above 33 percent since being introduced. By contrast, the national level has consistently fallen short of the two-thirds requirement. This has led to multiple petitions being filed in court demanding Kenya’s judiciary enforce gender compliance in parliament. Given the gender rule is laid out in the constitution, petitioners have argued that every sitting of parliament since 2013 has been unconstitutional. This is echoed by Kenyan legal expert, Muthomi Thiankolu, who warns that Kenya is ‘courting a constitutional crisis’ by repeatedly failing to comply with the gender rule.
The failure to comply with the two-thirds gender rule is informed by a desire among elites to maintain the political status quo, as well as prevailing patriarchal beliefs that present men as being more legitimate political actors. Consequently, politically active women are often subject to harassment, intimidation and violence when running for political office. This violence is designed to push women out of politics or limit their electoral success.

Women’s representation in the Parliament of Kenya after the 2022 election.
Gendered electoral violence in county assembly elections
The Making Politics Safer study conducted post-election interviews with 45 women political candidates from Nairobi County, Nakuru County and Uasin Gishu County. Political party diversity, ethnic demographics, level of women’s political participation, and size of county government were considered in selecting these sites. Each interviewee had participated in one or more elections under the umbrella of a political party or as an independent candidate. The women interviewed varied in age: 17 percent were younger than 35 (youth); 56 percent were 35–50; and the remaining 28 percent were over 50 years of age. In terms of ethnicity, more than half the women were of Kikuyu and Kalenjin origin, with the remainder of Luhya, Luo, Meru and Nubian descent.
Although incidents of physical violence against women political candidates reportedly declined in the 2022 election, 63 percent of interviewees indicated they had experienced some form of physical attack during their political campaign. Examples included being physically intimidated (pushed/touched/restricted) by ‘goons’ while campaigning; being pursued on foot or by motorbike; being physically restrained/barricaded in a room or vehicle; or being threatened with weapons. Such physical violence went largely unreported, whether perpetrated by individuals from opposing parties, or by rivals and their supporters from within the candidate’s own party.

While some women make use of private security, this is an expense many women running for county seats cannot afford. A county assembly candidate in Nakuru shared how her car was surrounded by supporters of a rival party: ‘they sent their supporters to harass us … they would lift my car and drop it down and we were inside, and it was really scary’. Another candidate described her experience as an Orange Democratic Party member running in Uasin Gishu – a stronghold for President Ruto and the United Democratic Alliance (UDA): ‘they told me I betrayed my people [Kalenjins] … because I was Odinga I was beaten, my car was attacked and I had to start sleeping at a different homestead’.
In Nakuru and Uasin Gishu, violence was mainly confined to the primary elections, driven by the intense intra-party competition taking place within the UDA. In Uasin Gishu, it was assumed that whoever gained the UDA candidacy was guaranteed to win the elective seat, further intensifying internal rivalries. Women seeking to represent the party in county assemblies experienced intimidation and coercion, with many pressured into stepping aside for male candidates. Some were promised quota seat nominations for doing so, which often failed to materialise. In several cases, women suffered domestic violence due to their political aspirations. A candidate in Nakuru related how her spouse beat her for running as an independent candidate having been ordered to make way for a male candidate in her party. She believes her husband was disciplining her on behalf of the big men in her party.
A third of the women interviewed reported some form of sexual violence – encompassing sexual coercion, groping, unwanted sexual attention and sexual harassment – at the hands of members of their own parties, political opponents or the electorate. Younger candidates aged 18–35 in particular reported being solicited for sex in exchange for a place on the ballot or nomination to the county’s gender or youth quotas. Sex was also sought as payment for protection, campaign materials or political endorsements. A 33-year-old married candidate from the Azimio coalition received persistent text messages threatening rape, and as a result came to fear campaign events, media interviews and evening outings. She reported the text messages to her party but no action was taken. Meanwhile, a 24-year-old unmarried independent woman candidate described being groped on the campaign trail, threatened with rape, and propositioned by senior political figures asking for sex in exchange for campaign resources. This same candidate faced significant online sexual harassment, with one tweet claiming that raping her would not be a crime as she was ‘free meat’ (unmarried).
In most cases, the threats and coercion described also constitute psychological and/or semiotic violence, provoking fear, social withdrawal, trauma and depression in those targeted. Among the Kenyan interviewees, an overwhelming majority (93 percent) reported experiencing psychological violence as a consequence of running for public office, whether this be verbal harassment; threats of harm; shaming; malicious rumours; or online attacks and disinformation campaigns. Such violence was mostly perpetrated online on platforms such as Facebook, X and WhatsApp.
A candidate from Nakuru reported being subject to significant cyber-attacks, including fake nude pictures forwarded via WhatsApp groups. This caused her significant psychological trauma and depression. Although she reported the crime to police, the repercussions were difficult to contain: ‘people in the village do not know about Photoshop, so convincing them that that was not you, it is not easy … the damage will have been done.’ A 24-year-old unmarried county assembly candidate in Uasin Gishu described being repeatedly solicited for sex and threatened with sexual violence online, with one X user likening her to ‘a cow on heat’ who was using the campaign trail to search for a spouse.
In the most extreme cases women are threatened face-to-face with rape and death. One Nairobi-based county assembly candidate explained: ‘I got threats that they would kill me and that I was becoming an obstacle. It was the worst experience’. Another candidate, also from Nairobi, said: ‘They said that if I didn’t step down, they were going to do something to me … they are going to rape [me]’. In both instances, the women reported the situation to party officials. Although the death threat reported by the former candidate was taken seriously and pursued by Kenya’s Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA), the rape threat recounted by the latter was dismissed. Instead, she was told to toughen up or leave politics. The impacts of psychological violence are far reaching and extend beyond women being forced to withdraw from politics: one respondent indicated she had turned to alcohol to cope, while another had considered suicide.
Collectively, the violence described above has led some women to restrict their campaigning to ‘safe zones’, hire private security and/or relocate their families. Others chose simply to pull out of the election in order to avoid further violence. Even so, more than half the women interviewed indicated they would run for another election. Some are emboldened by their election success, while others are driven by their commitment to their community. As one woman commented: ‘I won’t leave politics until I am allowed to bring in the change that this community needs, however small it is, I am determined’. Across the board, women indicated that greater police protection would enable them to compete more actively in elections. They also pointed to the need for gender-sensitive civic education aimed at addressing negative social norms and GEV.
Mitigating gendered electoral violence
A number of actors – most prominently, the national government – are working to mitigate and prevent GEV in Kenya. The Election Offences Act of 2016 prohibits various forms of violence during election periods. Section 10, for instance, states it is a criminal offence to – either directly or on behalf of another – use or threaten to use violence (including sexual violence) as a means of compelling someone to refrain from becoming a candidate, withdraw their candidacy, or impede them from being nominated as a candidate. Section 11 goes on to outlaw any form of violence being used to compel an individual to vote for, or refrain from voting for, a specific person or political party. Next, Section 13 makes it an offence for anyone to interfere with an election by ‘using language which is threatening, abusive or insulting or engages in any kind of action which may advocate hatred, incite violence or influence the voters on grounds of ethnicity, race, religion, gender or any other ground of discrimination’.
Offences committed under the Election Offences Act can be punished by financial penalties and/or a jail sentence. While there is no standalone law that criminalises violence against women politicians, the current legal framework has been effectively used to prosecute identified perpetrators of GEV. Similarly, while there is also no law that specifically protects women politicians from online attacks or misinformation campaigns, the 2018 Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act and the 2019 Data Protection Act offer a means of holding individuals, journalists and news companies accountable for attacks on women politicians.
The government also has a number of institutions that can offer assistance to women in politics. Kenya’s Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) has a clear mandate to ensure elections are violence-free and meet the two-thirds gender rule. Towards this end, the IEBC has the power to bar any individual found guilty of contravening the Elections Offences Act from being nominated or elected into public office. Although interviewees indicated that the county IEBC took allegations of violence seriously, the organisation’s lack of prosecution powers meant it could not guarantee that reports would result in arrests.
Another key government institution is the National Gender and Equality Commission, which works to address gender discrimination across sectors. According to Paul Kuria, its head of research, the commission is invested with reporting and oversight authority, allowing it to respond to violence and harassment against women political candidates. Again, however, this authority is limited by the institution’s lack of prosecution or enforcement powers.
Lastly, Kenya’s national police have been trained to respond to election violence generally and GEV specifically. In the lead-up to the 2022 elections, UN Women and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights developed gender-specific training materials for the police and the National Election Security Operation Plan. As detailed in a 2022 UN Women Kenya report, 141 police commanders were trained in gender-specific election security management, while 846 officers across 12 potentially violent counties were trained in preventing and responding to GEV. County police forces were also given assistance in developing County Election Security Operation Plans that included gender-responsive elements.
Kenya is host to an expansive network of civil society organisations (CSOs) working to support various elements of women’s political representation, including UN Women, the Kenya Women Parliamentary Association (KEWOPA), FIDA Kenya, the Centre for Multiparty Democracy, Maendeleo Ya Wanawake, Mzalendo Trust and Badili Africa. Among other activities, these organisations provide candidate training, capacity building and media training, and help prepare elected leaders for political office. In addition, they provide women candidates with training on how to safeguard themselves and their staff during election seasons, and provide legal assistance to victims of election violence. These organisations enjoy good working relationships with key government decision-makers, using this to exert influence regarding women’s safety during elections and in politics more generally. The CSOs also work with political parties, encouraging them to develop appropriate codes of conduct, as well as establish internal reporting mechanisms for dealing with GEV.
Kenya’s political parties have a very significant role to play in mitigating and preventing GEV. While many have pledged to take strong action against perpetrators, this has rarely been followed up by concrete action. Numerous interviewees indicated they had reported their experiences to party officials only for no action to be taken. In some instances, the reluctance to act was down to the perpetrator being a male member of the same party (or among a male rival’s staff or followers). In many cases, particularly those involving younger candidates, the woman’s experiences were dismissed as trivial or ‘part of politics’.
Kenya’s political parties are dominated by men, who act as gatekeepers for women in the party seeking protection or justice. Women at the county level face significant barriers from party officials when reporting harassment or violence, as they usually lack significant political or financial capital. At the same time, going outside the party to report a party member to the police or IEBC can lead to retribution or re-victimisation. As a result, when violations are dismissed by their own party, women have no alternative forum to gain redress.
Next chapter: Chapter 4 – Zimbabwe
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About the book series
Current African Issues (CAI) is a policy dialogue series intended for policy makers and similar audicenses. The series offers research-based analyses and in-depth knowledge on current topics.
