

Nordiska Afrikainstitutet
The Nordic Africa Institute



Policy Dialogue on RECs and Peacebuilding in Africa

Date: September 1- 2, 2016

**Venue: Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution,
IPCR, Abuja, Nigeria**

Abstracts

Keynote by Dr. Kayode Fayemi, Honourable Minister for Solid Minerals, Federal Republic of Nigeria, Keynote title: 'Two and a Half Decades of ECOWAS' Peace Interventions in West Africa: An Insider-Outsider Perspective'.

ABSTRACTS

1. ECOWAS and the limits of peace-making in West Africa

Author: Amadu Sesay, Centre for Peace and Strategic Studies, University of Ilorin, Nigeria
sesaymadu@gmail.com

Abstract: ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States, celebrated its 41st 'birthday' in June 2016 but the occasion was rather low-key. In fact some of the major activities that had been proposed to show-case its achievements as part of the celebrations like the publication and public presentation of a Book and its companion documentary titled; **Fighting Bush Fires: ECOWAS and Peace-Making in West Africa** had to be deferred. Yet, it cannot be denied that the organization has made significant progress in the areas of conflict prevention, management, peace-making, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement in West Africa. The most famous example are the 'restoration of the State', and in particular the restoration of relative peace and stability in Liberia and Sierra Leone after more than a decade of violent conflict, banditry and 'uncivil wars', which culminated in the deaths of thousands of innocent citizens and massive internal displacements of people and refugees. ECOWAS' venture into the realm of peace-making and peace support operations is in many ways fortuitous, having been conceived in the classical functionalist mould; to promote economic cooperation and create prosperity among Members States, through the progressive removal of artificial and non-artificial barriers to trade leading to the eventual establishment of a Common Market. ECOWAS can rightly be described as a relatively successful security community with a large measure of justification but failed to promote economic development in the Member States. This failure has grave implications for its ability to broker peace and enhance the stability of the region. The paper traced the genesis of this discrepancy and its effects on ECOWAS's capacity to undertake 'lethal' peace support operations in the region, the threats and challenges to peace, its continuing relevance and proffered new policy and institutional directions that could enhance its peace-making roles in the region.

2. Peace Building in Africa: Popular Progressive versus Neoliberal Peace Building

Author: Dr. Redie Bereketeab, The Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden redie.bereketeab@nai.uu.se

Abstract: This paper seeks to examine two strands of peace building: popular progressive and neoliberal. The popular progressive peace building is historical, contemporary and futurist simultaneously. In this trajectory and synthetic constellation there exist a continuum knotting a time horizon of past, present and future. It represents a process of continuity, evolution and metamorphosis in time and space. It also represents space where historical-legal, socio-economic, politico-cultural idiosyncrasies and edifices play decisive roles. In this sense it concern with profound the project of society construction: nation and state formation in an evolutionary and gradualist process. Nation and state formation is place and time bounded for its idiosyncratic specificities. The neoliberal peace-building project could therefore be construed as a subset, filling the temporal knot of the contemporary in the continuum, if it assumes any space at all.

Peace building as theoretical and empirical notion has assumed growing prominence following the collapse of Cold War. The reason for the growing prominence of peace building is related to the rise of neoliberal interventionist ideology that replaced Cold War world order. Neoliberal triumphalist disposition embarked on a proselytising mission of humanity along neoliberal values and norms. Western values and norms were elevated to universal one where every member of humanity should strive to achieve. This proselytization drive propelled an aggressive interventionist approach to peace building. Peace building not tuned along neoliberal ideology was perceived not only untenable but also a danger to world peace. A worrying disposition of the neoliberal peace building drive is the easily resort to distraction of illiberal societies in order to rebuild them from scratch: Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Somalia are such examples of the experimentation.

Peace building intervention offered an excellent opportunity of converting societies under stress into liberal societies geared along Western model. The source of their stress was viewed as a lack of sufficient dose of the "universal" value and norm.

The remedy for the dysfunctionality of fragile societies was therefore perceived by the neoliberal regime, heavy-handed intervention with the intention of restructuring them along neoliberal values and norms.

Neoliberal peace building is unsustainable and dysfunctional as it is an alien imposition and fails to cohere with specific realities of the particular society. Functional and sustainable peace building need to rest on the culture, history, social and political structures and forces of respective society. It should draw on domestic institutions, mechanism and authorities. This paper seeks to examine the theoretical frame of peace building. It focuses on two dimensions. The first is on short-term peace building that follow a bloody war. The second is long-term peace building that pertain to gradual evolutionary pacification of society and emancipation of state. These two notions concern with the protracted state and society formation. Deriving from critical analysis, this paper seeks to advance progressive peace building as an alternative to neoliberal peace building in Africa.

3. Peacebuilding initiatives in the context of Ethiopia-IGAD relations

Author: Kassahun Berhanu, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia kassahunal@yahoo.com

Abstract: This article examines the relations between Ethiopia and IGAD by focusing on their partnership in peace building in the sub-region. IGAD was revitalized in 1996 with extended mandate (covering security, peace building, and socio-economic development) by superseding the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) established a decade earlier. In addition to being one of the founding members of IGAD, Ethiopia also plays a leading and at times dominant role in the organization, which is perceived by some as aimed at promoting the country's self-interest to the detriment of others. This is exemplified by its assumption of the position of chair of IGAD and its executive council during the last several years. This is further compounded by the fact that IGAD's peace and security Division was successively headed by Ethiopian nationals and other organs like CEWARN, the IGAD Facilitator's Office for Somalia, and the IGAD Parliamentary Union, among others, are housed in Addis Ababa. It is also worth mentioning that Ethiopia's ex-foreign minister was appointed as IGAD's Special Envoy to lead the mediation between South Sudan's warring factions following the crisis that unfolded in the country in 2013. All these gave Ethiopia the leverage to exert considerable influence as regards regional security matters including peacebuilding within the framework of the organization.

Ethiopia's military action in 2006 aimed at ousting the UIC and its subsequent fight against Al-Shabab in Somalia demonstrate that it harbors an undeclared ambition of posing as a regional hegemon by deploying peacekeepers to troubled spots in the Horn of Africa (Somalia, the Abyei area between the two Sudans, Darfur in Sudan...) under the auspices of either international or continental (UN and AU) and sub-regional (IGAD) initiatives. These imply that Ethiopia continues to be a central and influential player in IGAD's peacebuilding efforts by making use of its multifaceted comparative advantages that include sizeable population, military prowess and relative internal stability, track record of fast economic growth, and regional and international recognition as a reliable actor in the sub-region and the continent at large.

With the foregoing as backdrop and based on desk research, this article attempts to address the following issues that are in line with the proposed theme by:

- Describing the role played by Ethiopia in IGAD's formation and revitalization that led to the broadening of its mandate covering peacebuilding and security;
- Identifying Ethiopia's contribution in boosting IGAD's peacebuilding efforts in Sudan including Darfur, Somalia, and South Sudan;
- Discerning Ethiopia's role in overcoming potential and actual challenges militating against IGAD's peacebuilding efforts resulting from divergent interests of member states and internal political dynamics within each (Sudan vs South Sudan, Ethiopia vs Eritrea, Djibouti vs Eritrea...);
- Exploring means and ways through which Ethiopia can ensure trust and acceptance by potential competitors poised against its quest for dominance and proactive involvement in the workings of IGAD's peacebuilding initiatives.

4. RECS and peace building in Africa: Analysis of legal frameworks and concerns for international law

Authors: Olugbemi Jaiyebo, EurAfrica Research Associates, Ibadan, Nigeria ojaiyebo@gmail.com and Victor Adetula, The Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden victor.adetula@nai.uu.se

Abstract: Chapter Eight of the United Nations Charter recognizes the option of regional institutions taking appropriate action over matters relating to international peace and security, provided such institutions and/or their activities are consistent with the purpose and principles of the UN. Africa since the end of the Cold War has recorded increased involvement of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in the peacebuilding process. Many issues however present themselves in peace-building process and other related interventions by external actors such as regional organizations. For example, the realm of domestic affairs of the affected country to be unilaterally controlled by external actors can pose some difficulties. Dealing with these require that the peacebuilding process be guided by definite legal frameworks and clear normative standards. Many of the existing RECs had their original mandates tilted towards economic goals and objectives and less of attention to their new roles in peacebuilding. What are the legal frameworks for their new roles, and what is the extent of compliance with international norms and respect for the rule of international law? More so that adherence to international law is a vital precondition for generating political and moral legitimacy. How adequate is international law in ensuring successful peace building generally and particularly through the intervention of the RECs?

Two decades ago ECOWAS blazed the trail of RECs in constituting and deploying ECOMOG as a peacekeeping force to the crisis in Liberia. Since then the African Union (AU) and other African RECs have scaled up their involvement in peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. However whenever the mission cycle revolves to peace building, the limitations of the legal and institutional frameworks of the process become glaring. In some instances the AU and African RECs have sidestepped to the fringes and deferred the core space to the UN and other global powers. This as well has not resolved the complex situation. Peace building involves establishment of safety and security recovery and reconstruction, establishing or strengthening constitutional governance, promoting economic justice and growth, and strengthening justice and reconciliation.

International mechanisms and protocols regulating RECs involvement in peace building are pretty much untested. This paper explores the legal impetus supranationality gives to the African Union and other RECs in furtherance of the peace building mandate. It demonstrates how the existing legal infrastructure puts African RECs at an advantage over United Nation agencies and other external actors on right of access into the theatre of conflict, enforcement of ceasefire agreements, implementation of prevention and counter violent extremism strategies, discipline and effective oversight of international personnel. It concludes that the future of peace building in Africa depends on the transformation of Africans RECs from paper tigers to functional supranational institutions.

5. ECOWAS and triangular cooperation for peace building in West Africa: Challenges and prospects from the Liberian and Sierra-Leonean experiences

Author: Kehinde Olayode (Ph.D)Department of International Relations, Faculty of Administration, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Osun State, Nigeria. kennyode@yahoo.com

Abstract: Against the backdrop of Liberian and Sierra-Leonean experiences and using the framework of South-South and Triangular Cooperation, the paper examines the lessons, challenges and prospects of South-South Triangular cooperation framework (both multilateral and bilateral) for peace building in West Africa. Specifically, the paper attempts to explore the following questions: (i) what are the political and economic constraints that hampered ECOWAS initiatives in peace building and post-conflict reconstruction projects in West Africa; (ii) what are the lessons that can be derived from the Liberian and Sierra-Leonean experiences of ECOWAS and Triangular cooperation for building sustainable peace in West Africa; and (iii) Can South-South Triangular cooperation (multilateral and bilateral) be instituted as permanent framework for peace building in West Africa.

The paper argues that the capacity of regional initiatives was limited and over-stretched in Liberia and Sierra-Leone to undertake post-conflict reconstruction and peace building, without external support from the North. The Triangular South-South Cooperation between the UN, ECOWAS, AU, France, UK and other stakeholders in Liberia and Sierra Leone has

established a framework for peace building and post-conflict reconstruction in West Africa. Despite the problems of co-ordination, logistics and differences in mandate and culture, the co-operation between the UN and ECOWAS allowed each organisation to maximise its comparative advantage whilst working together to resolve the conflicts. Lessons learned in these missions have provided a blueprint for how the UN and regional organisations can work together (Kabila, 2011, pp. 2-4). The emerging framework is anchored on sub-regional peacekeepers to stabilise a volatile situation as witnessed in Liberia and Sierra Leone to pave way for deployment of larger UN mission in multiple peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction responsibilities.

6. Human security without borders in ECOWAS and IGAD

Author: Victor O. Okorie (PhD), Obafemi Awolowo University, Nigeria, vicokoria@yahoo.com

Abstract: The complexities of contemporary conflicts have inaugurated a new regime of social chaos aptly described by pundits as “violence with borders”. It is characterized by the dynamic and transgressive mobility of both legitimate and illegitimate violence that uniquely blurred the old borders between combatants and civilians and unreservedly endorsed the production of peace through the argon of violence. In doing so, the regime demands managers of (in) security emergency to war and/or work at the speed of light. Given that Africa is a notorious host to violence without borders, this paper interrogates some actions and inactions of regional human security managers in West and East Africa. It compares how ECOWAS and IGAD have engaged the ideals of human security in their various operations in theory and practice. The paper begins by mapping the shifting landscape of peace and security beginning from the end of WWI to date, paying attention to changes and continuities in global ideals and in local realities. It then compares how ECOWAS and IGAD are configured to respond to human security issues to ways in which they have addressed the issues in Liberia and Sierra Leone (for ECOWAS) and Sudan and Somalia (for IGAD). In doing this, the paper identifies strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats in the RECs’ structure and strategies, draws out lessons, and outlines some policy considerations for future engagements.

7. Civil Society Organisations and ECOWAS Peace and Security Agenda in West Africa

Author: Chukwuemeka B. Eze, Executive Director WANEP, (West Africa Network for Peacebuilding) ceze@wanep.org

Abstract: The current context of peace and security in West Africa is interwoven with the most significant challenge of the West Africa region comprising some of the poorest countries in the world with a large population living in poverty.¹ The economic potentials of the region are hugely undermined by instability and violent conflict. The region is still grappling with the devastating effects of violent conflicts in Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea and the North Eastern and Niger Delta regions of Nigeria among others. The region remains unstable with insecure borders coupled with issues relating to socio-economic problems, youth unemployment, systematic ethnic discrimination, and non-respect in some countries of human rights, disputes over political participation and land as well as other natural resources. Deep-seated resentments are still embedded in the fabric of societies across West Africa considering social, economic and political inequalities.

In addition to these challenges are new and emerging threats. Violent extremism has become manifest and spreading since the crisis that engulfed Libya in 2011 leading to the end of the Gadhafi regime. The consequence of violent implosion in Libya accelerated the proliferation of weapons with trained and well equipped but illegal armed Tuareg rebels overrunning the northern half of Mali in March 2012. Preceding these events, Boko Haram was already pillaging the north-eastern region of Nigeria since 2009. The armed insurgency of the Tuareg rebels exposed the security vulnerability of the Sahelian region of West Africa. Extremists’ jihadists immediately exploited the security vacuum that was created recruiting vulnerable youths, mostly the unemployed, the unemployable and former combatants. The attempts by these extremists’ insurgent groups to expand southwards and take hold of the whole of Mali with clear intentions to spread across the entire Sahel belt from the

¹ In the 2014 UNDP Human Development Report, six West African Countries are at the bottom of the least developed countries of the world.

west in Mauritania and link up with Al Shabaab in the Horn of Africa exposed the real security nightmare and emerging threat confronting West Africa.

While the responsibility of peace and security resides with governments, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have demonstrated their capacity to complement government's efforts and Political leadership across the world has come to realize the strength of CSOs in anticipating, preventing and resolving conflicts.

The ECOWAS Vision 2020, which seeks to deliver meaningful development and promote an 'ECOWAS of the peoples', provides even a greater impetus to engage CSOs in issues of human security to ensure the protection of civilians in the region.

This paper assesses the contributions of CSOs to the ECOWAS peace and security agenda.

8. Gendering the discourse on conflict and peace building in Africa

Author: Ms Julie Sanda, National Defence College, Abuja, Nigeria. juliesanda@yahoo.com

Abstract: The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has recorded significant success in managing conflicts in West Africa through its conflict prevention framework - ECPF along with its Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security (10 December 1999) and The Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (21 Dec 2001). These together constitute the normative framework for dealing with conflict and peacebuilding. Notwithstanding the loadable accomplishments of ECOWAS, we argue in this paper that its framework for peace-building is largely gender-blind in conceptualization and that it addresses gender concerns only superficially. Yet the differential impact of conflicts on women and men, boys and girls is too real to be ignored. Thus, sustainable peace-building system must necessarily take into account these differences. This paper reviews the ECOWAS framework through a gender lens and assess the extent to which it disaggregates and differentiates the problematic in terms of its implications for men and women, boys and girls. Out point of departure in this paper acknowledges that many of the challenges women face are the power dynamics between men and women (and within gender groups) that exist at all levels of peace and conflict. In this sense we probe the extent to which peacebuilding is gendered in the ECOWAS framework for peace building and we emphasize the role of women in peacebuilding and peacemaking, their participation in political and decision-making, as well as the need to ensure the protection of women and other marginalized groups in conflict-affected areas. We conclude that the framework for the prevention and resolution of conflicts must necessarily be gender sensitive by helping women and other marginalized gender categories to overcome barriers to political participation, promote their integration in peace building processes.

9. Transnational actors and regional peace and security in West and Horn of Africa

Author: Asebe Regassa Debelo, Postdoctoral Fellow, University of Zürich. asebe.debelo@geo.uzh.ch, aseberegassa@yahoo.com

Abstract: Questions of peace and security in Africa have become defining features of the continent in the post-independence period. While most of the conflicts in the continent have local causes, Africa's connection to broader economic and political networks makes conflicts, peace-building processes and security issues more complicated. Within the context of interconnections between regional and transnational actors, global networks and local phenomenon, it becomes illusive to comprehend peace and security issues without nuanced analysis of actors, their interests and networks so as to develop comprehensive policy frameworks. By taking transnational actors including religious movements, human rights organizations, 'development' organizations, rebel groups and civil society organizations, this paper attempts to assess how these actors enhance or deter practices of peace and security in the West and Horn of Africa. Understanding transnational actors, their interests and networks helps for a nuanced analysis of how local conflicts escalate to regional crisis, and also how local initiatives for peace and security can be strengthened. Since few years ago, extremist movements such as Al-Shabab in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria have extended their allegiance to transnational organizations such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda, and have posed significant threats to the regions' peace and security. Conversely, civil society organization working on

promotion of human rights operate within transnational contexts connecting local circumstances to global networks and strive to contribute for peace and security in the regions. Therefore, regional economic communities such as ECOWAS and IGAD operate within such contradictory realms and should be adequately informed to design effective policy frameworks. This paper, therefore, contributes towards this aim.

10. Regional peacebuilding through community participation: ECOWAS Vision 2020 experience and lessons for IGAD

Author: Remi Ajibewa, Director of Political Affairs, ECOWAS Commission ajibewaremi@gmail.com

Abstract: Debates about long-term initiatives which recognize institutional and structural approaches to peacebuilding has evolved to include actions aimed at building social relationships and participation of the people in the governance process. The role of civil society increasingly recognized as achieving transforming participatory processes in regional economic communities (REC) from the top down to the bottom up approach. ECOWAS in furtherance of its human security and strategic objectives has also adopted this approach in the ECOWAS Vision 2020 which seeks to transform the region from an ECOWAS of States to an ECOWAS of people.

This article seeks to take the debate further by highlighting the challenges in the ECOWAS experience in achieving its vision 2020 objectives and prescribing alternatives for improving civil society partnerships in peacebuilding. Some of the reflections and recommendations will provide useful guidance on how IGAD can integrate community approaches to further its peacebuilding strategies.

Thus the article starts by reviewing the literature on institutional and structural architectures in regional peacebuilding, before moving on to discuss the ECOWAS experience in regional peacebuilding through community participation, highlighting the challenges faced and the way forward in addressing the challenges. It then provides reflections for IGAD in improving her institutions and structures for peacebuilding.

11. A diagnostic commentary on Nigeria's exertions in peace and security in the ECOWAS region

Author: Prof Oshita O. Oshita, Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) Abuja, Nigeria
oshita_oshita@yahoo.co.uk

Abstract: Established in 1975, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has no doubt played noteworthy roles in peace and security in the West African region. ECOWAS has achieved remarkable success in fulfilling its mandate by containing violent conflicts in the region and carrying out conflict prevention interventions through preventive diplomacy; fact-finding missions, quiet diplomacy, diplomatic pressure and mediation. In the same vein, member states of ECOWAS have contributed in varying degrees to the success in peace and security that is often attributed to ECOWAS as a regional economic community. One aspect that Nigeria has invested heavily is in regional peace support operations in West Africa. Unfortunately, some contend that as a regional hegemon, Nigeria can be more strategic in the way she exerts herself, including in the deployment of preventive diplomacy, use of mediation, good offices and deterrence to resolve conflicts in the region. Such voices argue, among other things, that dwindling resources in Nigeria mean that the country can no longer bear the financial burden of running a bloated bureaucracy called ECOWAS. In this Paper, the contributions of Nigeria to ECOWAS peace and security will be highlighted with particular focus on Nigeria's role in ECOWAS peace support operations. The paper begins with a background to peace operations in the region and evaluates some of the arguments for and against Nigeria's exertions in ECOWAS peace support operations. The analysis will be complemented by a set of recommendations aimed at making Nigeria's engagement in ECOWAS more productive and efficient, particularly, in times of national economic austerity and declining oil revenues.

12. Kenya's diplomacy and international relations with IGAD on peace and security matters: Growth, development and prospects

Author: Kizito Sabala, IGAD, Juba Liaison Office, Juba South Sudan sabala1966@gmail.com

Abstract: Overall since independence in 1963, Kenya's engagement with the outside world has been influenced by among others five interrelated factors. These are colonialism, cold war international environment, the principles of non-interference in affairs of other states and good neighborliness. Others are; the emerging globalization and the post-cold war political climate and finally the idiosyncratic belief of the political leadership of the country since 1963. The country's foreign relations can be traced back to pre-colonial days which have laid the foundation upon which the country's diplomatic and international relations is built. With the globalization that has turned the hitherto expansive global sphere into a small village; the country has continued to forge its international relations with the rest of the world in pursuit of its national interest. As a member of the global community of Nations, Kenya has continued to play its role in the world either bilaterally or multilaterally through regional and international organizations. This paper is about the engagement of Kenya with Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) but specifically on matters of conflict resolution and peace building.

13. The Patron - Client relationship between Somalia and IGAD

Author: Mohamed Haji Ingiriis, University of Oxford, United Kingdom ingiriis@yahoo.com

Abstract: Ever since the collapse of the Somali State institutions in the early 1990s, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has decided to be part of the reconciliation process in Post-Cold War Somalia. Since the last four years (2012-2016), IGAD has played a leading role in the facilitation of state formation process in South-Central Somalia. During the Cold War, the role of IGAD in Somalia was limited to the development sector, but since the collapse it has expanded its role to the political aspect. However, the name of IGAD has not been used in the contemporary military interventions in Somalia. Using interviews with senior Somali government officials and IGAD sources, this article attempts to examine the changing relationship between Somalia and IGAD from a new perspective. The article explores the interplay between peace-building and the politics of military intervention. Drawing on an ethnographic research observation (between May 2015 and May 2016), the article addresses the role of IGAD in contributing to peace and reconciliation in Somalia. In line with the international relations and political science theories suggesting that 'shared sovereignty' is necessary for the reconstruction of post-conflict countries, it is shown that the relationship between Somalia and IGAD has recently transformed itself into a patron-client relationship.

14. Uganda and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

Author: Kasaija Phillip Apuuli (DPhil) Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Makerere University, P.O. Box 7062 Kampala, Uganda apuulik@gmail.com

Abstract: Uganda is a founder member of IGAD. The organization has run programmes like the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) in the Karamoja Cluster thus helping to stem the problem of livestock rustling that have perennially afflicted the region. Also, through IGAD Uganda has been able to participate in the peace processes in the Sudan and Somalia. Nevertheless, the country has adopted an ambivalent stance towards the organization. IGAD was absent in resolving the numerous internal conflicts that rocked Uganda after President Museveni took over power in 1986, especially the long Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency in the north of the country. Uganda has not paid its membership contributions for several years thus accumulating membership arrears running in millions of US dollars. The stance of Uganda towards IGAD can be explained by President Museveni's view that the organization is saddled with Ethiopia-Eritrea quarrels which Uganda should not be part of, and that Uganda should concentrate on building the East African Community (EAC). On this latter point, it is rumored that Museveni wants an integrated East African region because he wants to lead it.

15. 'You don't own peace': The Coward State, South Sudan and IGAD relations

Author: Jacob D. Chol, Lecturer and Head, Department of Political Science, University of Juba and Executive Director, Centre for Democracy and International Analysis, Juba, Republic of South Sudan. dutsenior@yahoo.com

Abstract: On 19th December 2013, the IGAD Council of Ministers flew to Juba, the capital of South Sudan for an emergency three-day visit in order to have a first-hand impression of the political crisis and violence that rocked up the country from the night of 15th December 2013. The move led to the subsequent meeting of IGAD Head of States and Governments in Nairobi on 27th December 2013 culminating into the establishment of South Sudan IGAD peace mediation. Amb. Seyoum Mesfin of Ethiopia, Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo of Kenya and Amb. Gen. Mohammed Ahmed El-Dabi of Sudan got nominated as IGAD envoys. Given the complexity and tiring mediation process with missing of 5th March 2015 deadline, the IGAD Head of States and Governments consented and expanded the IGAD to IGAD-Plus to include the African Union Commission, China, the European Union, Norway, the UK, US and UN. With regional and international pressures, the IGAD-Plus convinced the conflicting parties to sign the Agreement of the Resolution of the Conflict in Republic of South Sudan (ARCISS) on 17th and 26th August 2015 respectively.

Yet, the relation between South Sudan and IGAD has been characterized by tension and cordiality. South Sudan appreciates some IGAD members States such as Uganda for the military intervention during the peak of the rebellions and chaos. Nevertheless, it blames some other IGAD-plus members states for imposing peace agreement, particularly, Trioka countries. This affair has been a sweet-bitter puzzle in consolidation of peace and security in South Sudan. The paper offers a close examination of the relation between South Sudan and IGAD as far as peace is concern. It argues that the relation is pigeonholed on the cowardice motion. South Sudan, the coward state, represented by the Government blames IGAD for bringing all the stakeholders to ARCISS. Nonetheless, it pronounces the need to implement the agreement in later and spirit. This "catch 22" situation has made the relation between IGAD and South Sudan as ambiguous, convenient, suspicious, blame game and sneaky.

The paper used secondary sources (empirical literature) in tapping the relationship between South Sudan and IGAD. It combines processing tracing and case study method to contextualize and validate causal chains and casual processes. Furthermore, the paper advanced the concept of coward State and neo-liberal peace theory to analyze the relationship between South Sudan and IGAD regional bloc in tandem to peace and security consolidation in the nascent State. Finally, the paper draws conclusion and offers policy recommendations to improve South Sudan-IGAD relations.

16. The IGAD-Eritrea impasse vis-à-vis the improving AU-Eritrea relationship: Future prospects in light of recent developments

Author: Senai W. Andemariam, School of Law, College of Arts and Social Sciences, Asmara, Eritrea

Abstract: On 27 April 2007 Eritrea notified the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) of its decision to "temporarily suspend its membership" and "freeze its activities" in IGAD principally because of IGAD's stance on the situation in Somalia particularly the 13 April 2005 IGAD Council of Ministers resolution to support Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia. Similarly, In November 2009, Eritrea recalled its AU ambassador in protest at the AU's failure to condemn Ethiopia's violations of the Algiers peace agreement by failing to be bound by the decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission.

In January 2011, Eritrea decided to reopen its Permanent Mission to the African Union (AU) and Dr Jean Ping, the then chair of the AU Commission, positively reacted to the decision. Eritrea was then, immediately and without any precondition, allowed to resume its participation in the organization. Seven months later, in July 2011, Eritrea notified IGAD of its decision to "reactivate its membership" and Eng. Mahboub Maalim, IGAD Executive Secretary, positively reacted to the decision. However, a month later, on 24 August 2011, Eritrea's representative to the IGAD Council of Ministers meeting in Addis Ababa was informed that he could not sit in the meeting and was escorted out. Eritrea's representatives have not since attended IGAD meetings. Eritrea's participation in these two organizations continues to be diametrically opposite since the summer of 2011: whereas Eritrea continues to fully participate in AU's activities, it has not yet been allowed to participate in IGAD's

activities. This paper is a follow-up of an article which the author published on Eritrea's current status of membership and participation in IGAD. It will examine two issues.

Firstly, it will, mainly from international law point of view, examine the opposite reactions of these two African organizations which, *mutatis mutandis*, pursue a number of integrated objectives. The basis for the need, and the consequences of the delay, of a promised formal decision of IGAD's Assembly of Heads of State and Government to welcome Eritrea back will be particularly scrutinized.

Secondly, during Eritrea's absence from IGAD, the organization played a crucial role in the series of events that led to the imposition of a United Nations sanction against in Eritrea authorized in December 2009. Currently, a Monitoring Group continues to be in active relationship with IGAD and its members as part of the preparation of an annual report on Eritrea. More importantly, Eritrea the occurrence of gross violations of human rights in Eritrea is under investigation by a UN-mandated Commission of Inquiry which is expected to issue its second, more impactful, report in June 2016. The author will discuss the roles that IGAD and AU can, in view of their current relations with Eritrea, play should the Commission find that systemic violations of human rights occurred in Eritrea.

17. Sudan and the Inter-Governmental Authority of Development (IGAD)

Author: Dr. Nureldin Satti, Senior regional advisor, Conflict Management Initiative, (CMI) Helsinki, Finland.

sattinureldin@gmail.com

Abstract: Sudan is a founding member of IGADD (Intergovernmental Authority for Drought and Desertification), the earlier version of IGAD established in 1985 as a regional cooperation framework to combat drought and desertification and the ecological disasters that befell the countries of the region in the seventies and eighties of last century.

In 1992, the IGADD member countries (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda) agreed to expand the mandate of the organization and henceforth transformed it into a regional development agency with wider political and socioeconomic prerogatives. Sudan fully played its part in that process.

In this paper we attempt to assess the circumstances that led to IGAD's involvement in the Sudanese problem, how that involvement was conducted, what challenges were encountered and how they were dealt with, with what results and consequences for Sudan and, later, for South Sudan.

Our objective is not to set up a tribunal of history but rather try to help better understand the various facets of IGAD's involvement including, the Geopolitical context; the roles and positions of the IGAD member states, depending on their relations with Sudan, or their reading of the conflict at that time; how IGAD mediation was structured and in what circumstances and how it was conducted to achieve the declared, or sometimes undeclared objectives; what was the dynamic of the interactions between the two belligerents, the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A and how that interaction affected the evolution and the conclusion of the peace process; the role of international actors, particularly the United States and other members of the "Troika Plus", namely the US, the UK, Norway and Italy; how the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (1) was negotiated and concluded; and, finally, what were the pitfalls of the implementation process and the reasons that led to a truncated implementation of the agreement, which led to the secession/independence of South Sudan.

Whoever is writing on the peace process in Sudan in the present circumstances of what some observers see as the imminent collapse of South Sudan, would be tempted to make an "after the event" judgement of the CPA. We shall resist that nagging temptation and try to make as objective as possible an assessment of the CPA that some had hailed as one of the successes of "African solution for African problems". The ongoing conflict in South Sudan which started in 15 December 2013, has brought to the fore a host of questions as to whether that was the right solution to a problem, which in some form or the other exists in many African countries, particularly all those confronted with the conundrum of managing their multiple diversities and the daunting challenges of nation and state building. In hind-sight, greater Sudan seems to have been singled out for a special treatment that turned out to be at the end of the day a form of failed national excision or a self-inflicted congenital mutilation.

18. Regional powers, regional economic communities and peace building in Africa

Author: Moges Demissie, PhD Candidate, Addis Ababa University, PhD Reserch Fellow at Makerere University, Uganda
modem972005@gmail.com

Abstract: The experiences and lessons from peacekeeping and peacemaking in Southern and Eastern Africa reveal that Regional Economic Communities (RECs), viz. SADC and IGAD, can play a decisive role in peace building initiatives. Though the two RECs started as economic cooperation schemes they have come to embrace regional peace and security as one of their major objectives. Considered as an important component of peace and security, peace building, is affected by the interplay between regional powers and RECs. In Southern Africa for example, where South Africa dominates the SADC platform, its regional economic and military hegemony status has allowed for a successful military intervention and peacemaking, though progress in peace building remains relatively weaker. In the case of Eastern Africa various factors such as, lack of capacity, absence of regional hegemon as well as divergence of regional states interests have forced IGAD to be a weak regional forum for aggregating global interests regarding peacemaking and peacekeeping largely overlooking peace building. For instance, in the recent attempt to mediate the South Sudan conflict IGAD was forced to heavily depend on the international community both in terms of the normative as well as financial support and approval. The focus of the two RECs in this regard is on the short to medium term peace initiatives. As such, by employing different case comparative study this paper attempts to reveal how the presence or lack there off of regional powers affects RECs performance regarding peace building in the two sub-regions. The paper also ventures to shed some light on how regional powers strive to use RECs forums and mechanisms to either advance their national interests or their collective regional interests.

19. Regional organizations, public goods, and the re-conceptualization of peace building in Africa

Author: Victor A.O. Adetula, PhD, The Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden. Victor.adetula@nai.uu.se

Abstract: The post-Westaphilian international system introduced new challenges that have implications for global peace and stability generally, and for the most vulnerable regions of the world in particular. Multilateral system is not working at its best in spite of the rhetoric by states on their commitment to support global cooperative responses. Neither the formal Bretton Woods-United Nation system nor the informal plurilateral bodies such as the Group of Eight (G8) and G20 Leaders' Summits have demonstrated any potential or actual capacity to help Africa and other vulnerable regions overcome the constraining effects of global pressures. These developments provided opportunities for regional actors to become more engaged with development and expand their roles with respect to conflict management and maintenance of regional security. The strengthening of regional organizations and the emergence of new regional networks are important features of the post-Cold War system. Regional institutions are increasingly becoming prominent in contemporary international relations. The complexity of security challenges in the post-bipolar world is such that requires greater cooperation and coordination among states within a region. Current waves of globalization are already provoking consensus formation and international coordination on regional basis. The inability of many national governments to effectively address problems that have cross-border dimensions such as pest attack, desertification, droughts, climate change, HIV/AIDS, drug and human trafficking has further encouraged many states to embrace regionalist approach. Both in the areas of economic development and security many states are now in favor of using regional organizations and other forms of alliances. Regional organizations have become more associated with the task and responsibilities of maintenance of world peace. In this paper I examine the performance of Africa's regional organizations in ensuring peace and security on the continent. In doing this I draw attention to the need for national and regional actors to see peace-building as an integrated process whose elements include the prevention and resolution of violent conflicts. This conception emphasizes commitment to "positive peace" which in addition to the absence of violence seeks for socio-economic security, equity, and participation in post-conflict situation. It is within this context that political and social dimensions of peace processes are seen as complimentary with each depending on the other to make peace a lasting outcome.

20. Strengthening human security architecture in Africa through the fourteen components of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework

Authors: Professor Oshita O. Oshita, Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution, oshita_oshita@yahoo.co.uk Thomas O. Kidzu, Gerald Okafor, Chiotu Nnamdi

Abstract: The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (2008) remains one of the most revolutionary and practical efforts at making ECOWAS visible in the lives of citizens of member states. The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) was adopted by the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council (MSC) in January 2008 and contributes to the already existing Security Frameworks in the ECOWAS region (1999 Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance). The aim of the ECPF is to provide a framework to strengthen the human security architecture in the region through the protection of human and democratic rights, as well as the promotion of sustainable human development. It has as one of its key objectives to transform ECOWAS from that of states to that of the peoples of member states.

The implementation of the ECPF requires enhanced synergies between existing departments at the ECOWAS Commission, as well as cooperation with various other stakeholders, including ECOWAS agencies, Member States, Civil Society, and Development Partners. The ECPF is made up of practical guidelines in the form of fourteen thematic components, namely: 1. Early Warning; 2. Preventive Diplomacy; 3. Democracy and Political Governance; 4. Human Rights and the Rule of Law; 5. Media; 6. Natural Resource Governance; 7. Cross-Border Initiatives; 8. Security Governance; 9. Practical Disarmament; 10. Women, Peace and Security; 11. Youth Empowerment; 12. ECOWAS Standby Force; 13. Humanitarian Assistance; 14. Peace Education (Culture of Peace).

In this Paper, we argue that the fourteen components of the ECPF practical agenda are critical to the strengthening of human security architecture in ECOWAS member states and the African continent as a whole. It is argued that regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa should focus on implementing programmes around these pillars if the sustainable development goals (SDGs) are to be attained in Africa. The Paper stresses the importance of looking inward for funding in programming around these important pillars of peace and security as donor funding will continue to dwindle in the coming years. The Paper concludes with a set of broad-based recommendations for stakeholders of peace and security in Africa.

21. Countering violent extremism through peacebuilding: Lessons from peace support operations in Mali in the wake of the Arab Spring

Author: C. Nna-Emeka Okereke Senior Research Fellow with the Centre for Strategic Research and Studies, National Defence College Abuja Nigeria. emekaokereke@gmail.com

Abstract: Prior to the Arab Spring, Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in West Africa especially Liberia and Sierra Leone were geared at restoring order between the state and secular armed groups engaged in civil war. The belligerent forces were driven by the quest for regime change along secular lines to address perceived and obvious cases of economic hardships, dictatorships and political exclusion along class and ethnic identities. In both cases, there were neither demands for secession nor forced proselytization along religious lines. The engagement of the ECOWAS and international community was therefore primarily concerned with securing a truce and rebuilding the war torn countries along clear democratic principles that enhance political inclusiveness.

In the wake of the Arab Spring, the context of PSOs in West Africa became redefined by irredentist nationalism and the challenge of violent extremism. In Mali, the quest for an independent state of Azawad based on Islamic theocracy by the Islamic Movement for Azawad (IMA) and Mouvement Nationale pour la libération de l'Azaoud (MNLA) erupted again following the violent overthrow of the Ghadaffi regime in Libya. Various Al Qaeda linked groups such as the Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb, Iyad al Ghali's Ansar ul Dine, Al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad or Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Belmokhtar's Signed-in-Blood Battalion (SBB) which later merged with MUJAO as the Al Mourabitoum exploited the accompanying instability to hijack the Azawad struggle and sought to overthrow the government of Mali. Growing apprehension with the dangers posed by these extremists to regional and global security led to international intervention through PSO in Mali which marked a departure from the experiences in Liberia and Sierra Leone where the objectives of

peacekeeping operations were focused on separating armed belligerents engaged in civil war against the state and rebuilding the war torn societies.

This paper examines how the peace-building processes adopted by the international community in Mali since the PSOs began in 2012 have contributed to countering violent extremism in the wake of the Arab Spring. It seeks to identify and proffer recommendations that could mitigate the challenges encountered in the processes with a view to drawing lessons for Regional Economic Communities in Africa such as the ECOWAS, IGAD and the ECCAS which are confronted by the challenges of violent extremism in PSOs especially in Mali, Somalia and Central African Republic.

22. Regional peace and security: Can ECOWAS and IGAD contain the mutating and emerging threats?

Author: Kenneth Chukwuemeka Nwoko, Ph.D. Department of History & International Studies, McPherson University, Seriki-Sotayo, Abeokuta, Ogun State, Nigeria nwokokeneth@gmail.com,

Abstract: The roles of ECOWAS and IGAD in relation to regional peace and security in West and the Horn of Africa can only be understood and evaluated within the context of their mandate and contemporary structures. Contemporary peace and security challenges in Africa and in particular, the West and Horn of Africa encouraged the strengthening of these bodies. New and emerging security threats appeared not to have been adequately covered by the peace and security architecture of these Regional Economic Communities or at best too loose to capture adequately the emerging threats such as cyber threats, terrorism, insurgency, piracy, desertification and in recent times pandemics. The reality is that only conventional armed conflicts appeared to have been fully covered, thus allowing only the military aspects to dominate the security strategies of the RECs. This study therefore, investigates the mandate of both ECOWAS and IGAD in relations to the changing nature of peace and security in Africa. It examines the character of regional security in West and the Horn of Africa, the security architecture of the two RECs as well as the capability of the two RECs to effectively deploy the military and non-military components of the peace and security architecture under their extant mandate to deal with unconventional threats. It recommends the resolution of most of these threats within the formal security framework of the RECs. The work also recommends ways and means to strengthen the REC's capacity to deal with these issues.