

# **Counter-terrorism Partnership in a Crowded Field: A Case Study of the EU, AU, and IGAD**

Paper submitted to the workshop on “African Security and unbridled militarization? New approaches to African peace and security governance

Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, November 22 and 23, 2017

Dawit Yohannes (PhD)

[dawiyohalv@gmail.com](mailto:dawiyohalv@gmail.com)

# **Counter-terrorism Partnership in a Crowded Field: A Case Study of the EU, AU, and IGAD**

## **I. Introduction**

One of the most recurrent themes in contemporary political and security discourses has been the changing nature of international peace and security landscape, especially since the end of the Cold War. Despite the contentions surrounding the novelty of some of these changes, this narrative has gradually established itself and is serving as a basis not just for understanding the existing threats but also for the quest for the requisite remedies thereof. One of the enduring implications of these changes has been a re-examination of existing global peace and security structures and norms. A key dimension of this re-examination has been the growing roles of the United Nations and regional organizations in managing crises either on their own or in collaboration with one another.<sup>1</sup> The latter constituted the gradually evolving but unmistakable trend of increasing cooperation among these organizations to deal with different forms of security threats globally, but more so in the case of the African continent.

Taking this established narrative as its starting point, this paper examines the state of multilateral counter-terrorism cooperation among the EU, AU, and IGAD and furthers the following arguments. As much as terrorism, as an enduring security threat, has contributed to the changing discourse and praxis of African peace and security, counter-terrorism partnership or cooperation has not advanced in comparison to other policy aspects/areas of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Though the EU has been a major actor in supporting African peace and security in the broader sense, its explicit contribution to enhancing the AU's and IGAD's counter-terrorism efforts has been limited. Notwithstanding the presence of a number of programmatic and individual support configurations, counter-terrorism cooperation among the EU, AU and IGAD has not been sufficiently streamlined; and the complementarity and coherence of these actors has not been sufficiently utilized. This is attributed to a number of factors, particularly to the ineffective and unsustainable counter-terrorism efforts of African actors; the absence of multilateral counter-terrorism cooperation platform in the continent; shifting priorities and commitments of partners; as well as divergence in the norms, capabilities and practices of these

---

<sup>1</sup> cf. Buzan1997; Kistersky 1996.

actors. In addition, the prevailing complex counter-terrorism environment depicted above adversely impacts the nature and impacts of ongoing and potential cooperation platforms as things stand in their current state.

Nevertheless, these arguments are not conclusive study findings but preliminary observations which are drawn from a literature review conducted for a research project on “Challenges of Security ‘Regime Complexes’ in Africa”.<sup>2</sup> As such the author recognizes the need for subjecting the above insights to further scrutiny and inquiry based on a field research which is envisaged to be undertaken following the approval and commencement of the research project.

The paper is structured as follows. The first part offers an overview of the existing African counter-terrorism cooperation frameworks. To this end, part one focuses on the evolution of the counter-terrorism policy and institutional frameworks of the AU and IGAD respectively. Part two delves deeper into some of the critical challenges of implementing Africa’s regional and sub-regional counter-terrorism frameworks. This is driven by the assumption that there is a need to go beyond agreed upon organizational policies and pronouncements and critically examine the workings of the diverse forms of counter-terrorism efforts in practice, which foster or curtail multilateral cooperation among the different actors. Part three situates the EU’s counter-terrorism efforts in Africa’s regional context focusing on the various initiatives and supports to the AU and IGAD respectively. The final part offers a synopsis of the key observations on the state of counter-terrorism partnership among these actors.

## **1. Overview of African Counter-terrorism Policy and Institutional Frameworks**

### **AU Counter-terrorism Frameworks**

Though the post 9-11 era is touted as an important landmark in the fight against terrorism, global and regional counter-terrorism efforts actually date back to a much earlier era. Contrary to this

---

<sup>2</sup> The project document, which is currently under review, analyses some of the gaps in the literature regarding the challenges of security regime complexes in Africa regarding the coherence and diffusion of norms and policies between actors, decision making of actors, and effectiveness of aid and interventions. The project will be hosted by OBSERVARE – Observatory of Foreign Relations, Autonomous University of Lisbon, Portugal.

prevailing assumption, various legislations and institutional frameworks have been developed to address different forms of terrorism at the global level starting from the 1960's. The international community adopted about 12 conventions dealing with different aspects of terrorism between 1963 and 1999 which are still serving as some of the key universal instruments to date.<sup>3</sup> In the context of the African continent, attempts at collective efforts of addressing the threat of terrorism in Africa already took place at the beginning of the 1990's. As early as 1992, the OAU passed a "Resolution on the Strengthening of Cooperation and Coordination among African States". As one of the earliest counter-terrorism policy frameworks, this Resolution called upon, among other things, to strengthen cooperation and coordination among the African countries in order to [tackle] the phenomenon of extremism and terrorism. This was considered as one of the initial pledges to fight the phenomena of extremism and terrorism.<sup>4</sup> In addition, in June 1994, the OAU adopted the Declaration on the Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations [AHG/Del.2 (XXX)], in which it rejected all forms of extremism and terrorism, whether under the pretext of sectarianism, tribalism, ethnicity or religion.<sup>5</sup> The OAU passed the Organization of African Unity Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa which in 1999.<sup>6</sup>

The OAU convention, which built on existing global initiatives and measures arguably came in the immediate wake of specific terrorist incidences namely the US Embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998. In apparent reflection of these and other incidences, the OAU Convention made specific reference to the gravity of the concern and scope of terrorism and to the danger it poses to the stability and security. The Convention also stated the need for strengthening cooperation among member states to forestall and combat terrorism.<sup>7</sup> The Convention has particular normative relevance in various ways, particularly in offering an operational definition of what counts as "terrorist acts" and identifications of areas of cooperation among states.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore the Convention which entered into force in December 2002 and to date was ratified by 40 AU member States, established state jurisdiction over terrorist acts, and provides a legal

---

<sup>3</sup> Ford 2011.

<sup>4</sup> OAU 1992.

<sup>5</sup> AU PSD, 2015.

<sup>6</sup> OAU, 1999.

<sup>7</sup> OAU, 1999: 1.

<sup>8</sup> See OAU, 1999: Article 3 for definition of terrorist acts and Article 4 and 5 for areas of cooperation among the OAU Member States.

framework for extradition as well as extra-territorial investigations and mutual legal assistance.<sup>9</sup> The Convention required the signatories to undertake a number of measures to countering terrorism in the continent including:

- Review national laws and establish criminal offences for terrorist acts and make them punishable by appropriate penalties;
- Signing, ratification and accession to pertinent international instruments of CT;
- The implementation of the actions indicated within the various international instruments that the states ratified and acceded to as stated above, including making those acts punishable by appropriate penalties;
- Timely reporting of the legislative measures and penalties imposed on terrorist acts to the OAU Secretariat.<sup>10</sup>

Inter-state cooperation was a vital aspect of the Convention. The latter took various dimension including refraining from participation in and providing any form of support to terrorist acts; to adoption of any legitimate measures to prevent the use of their territories for terrorist purposes; developing and strengthening methods of monitoring and detecting plans related to committing terrorist acts; developing and strengthening border control; strengthening the protection and security of specific entities and individuals against terrorist acts; promotion of the exchange of information and expertise on terrorist acts and establishment of data bases and for the collection and analyses of information and data on terrorist elements, groups, movements, and organizations; arrest, try, and/or extradite perpetrators of terrorist acts, to mention just a few.<sup>11</sup>

The Convention foreshadowed a vital continental development in the realm of the continent's peace and security, namely the establishment of the AU and its overarching peace and security framework, APSA. As we are to see later, counter-terrorism assumed a key part of the AU's peace and security architecture from the outset, not least under the due formative influence of "the specter of terrorism and shaped by the 1999 Algiers Convention as well as the reality of international terrorism in Africa after the 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania"<sup>12</sup>. In the latter

---

<sup>9</sup> AU PSD, 2015.

<sup>10</sup> OAU, 1999: Article 2.

<sup>11</sup> OAU, 1999: Article 4.

<sup>12</sup> Ford, 2011: 30.

sense, the AU PSC Protocol, in its Preamble, made a specific reference, *inter alia*, to the commitment of AU Member States to the OAU's Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism.<sup>13</sup> Within the constellation of institutional frameworks that emerged out of the PSC Protocol, the PSC, in conjunction with the AU Commission, was given important roles regarding counter-terrorism. Reflecting its coordination and norm setting role, the PSC was particularly tasked "to co-ordinate and harmonize continental efforts in the prevention and combating of international terrorism in all its aspects" as well as to ensure the implementation of the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and other relevant international, continental and regional conventions.<sup>14</sup>

As further elaboration of its counter-terrorism strategy, the AU adopted in 2002 the (AU) Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism as well as the 2004 Supplementary Protocol. The Plan of Action identified a number of common objectives Member States should pursue, particularly in terms of exchange of information among Member States on the activities and movements of terrorist groups in Africa; mutual legal assistance; exchange of research and expertise; and the mobilization of technical assistance and cooperation, both within Africa and internationally, to upgrade the scientific, technical and operational capacity of Member States.<sup>15</sup> More importantly, the Plan of Action adopted a number of practical CT measures that substantially address Africa's security challenges, including measures in areas such as police and border control, legislative and judicial measures, financing of terrorism and exchange of information.<sup>16</sup>

With a view to ensure the implementation of the Algiers Plan of Action, the AU established the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT). The establishment of ACSRT was based on the decision of the AU High-Level Inter-Governmental Meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in African which adopted the Algiers Plan of Action.<sup>17</sup> As a structure of the African Union Commission, the Center aims to contribute to strengthen the capacity of the African Union to deal with issues relating to the prevention and combatting of terrorism in Africa, with the ultimate objective of eliminating the threat posed by terrorism to peace, security, stability

---

<sup>13</sup> AU PSC 2002: 2.

<sup>14</sup> AU PSC 2002: Article 3 (d); Article 7(i).

<sup>15</sup> AU PSD 2015.

<sup>16</sup> AU PSD 2015.

<sup>17</sup> OAU, 1999: Article 19-21.

and development in Africa.<sup>18</sup> ACSRT seeks to carry out these major objectives by conducting research and studies on terrorism, maintaining database of information, analyses, and studies on terrorism and terrorist groups, and building the counter-terrorism capacity in Member States, through training programs and packages.

Since its establishment the ACSRT has been undertaking a number of tasks in counter-terrorism including the mobilization of support for the continent to fight the scourge of terrorism, assess the situation in various Member States and identify, with the concerned national authorities, priority security issues to be addressed as well as the adoption of the African Model Law on Counter Terrorism. The latter was developed to assist Member States in implementing the provisions contained in the various continental and international counterterrorism instruments, including the 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and its related Protocol.<sup>19</sup> Through its network of 47 national Focal Points and 7 regional Focal Points , and in close cooperation with the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and the Fusion and Liaison Unit (UFL) that brings together relevant services of countries of the Sahelo-Saharan region, it has established a platform for CT interaction, debate and cooperation among Member States and the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RECs/RMs).<sup>20</sup> Currently, counter-terrorism is included in the 2016-2020 APSA Roadmap as one of the strategic issues to be addressed by the different APSA stakeholders.

## **IGAD Counter-terrorism Frameworks**

Arguably, IGAD has been lauded as pioneering counter-terrorism cooperation in the sub-region. Reflecting this, the Task Force on Legal Cooperation against Terrorism in the IGAD Sub-region, convened by the IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP) and the Center on Global Counterterrorism

---

<sup>18</sup> African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) 2017.

<sup>19</sup> AU PSF 2015.

<sup>20</sup> For more information on the work of ASCRT and other issues related to African counter-terrorism efforts, see Report of the Chairperson of the Commission's Report on Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa (AU PSC 2015).

Cooperation (CGCC), characterized the sub-regional institution as one that has taken “a more proactive role in strengthening cooperation against terrorism and transnational organized crime in East Africa and the Horn”<sup>21</sup>. The IGAD’s role as a fore-runner in CT cooperation is similarly presented in a relative perspective as “more proactive in comparison with other sub-regional organisations”<sup>22</sup>. As Jolyon Ford argued, through its Capacity Building Programme against Terrorism (ICPAT), IGAD has led the way among sub-regional organisations on counter-terrorism strategy since June 2003.<sup>23</sup>

What helps in explaining IGAD’s role in counter terrorism is the prevalence and gravity of terrorism in the region, along with other major security threats such as transnational organized crime and existing inter- and intra-state conflicts. Since 1993 Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda have encountered terrorist attacks emanating from radical organizations based in Somalia.<sup>24</sup> In the pre-9/11 era, two of Africa’s landmark terrorist attacks, symbolized by the US Embassy bombings (in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam) took place in the heartland of the sub-region in Kenya and in its adjacent neighbourhood Tanzania. More importantly, the political vacuum and long-standing insecurity in Somalia has enabled various forms of terrorist and extremist elements to thrive in the country. These terrorist elements have increasingly projected regional vulnerability and threats to most of the countries in the IGAD region, enmeshing a complex interplay among the regional aspirations of some of these groups and the historical, political and security dynamics of some of the countries in the sub-region. Accordingly most of IGAD’s Member State, namely Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda have faced terrorist attacks from different terrorist groups primarily Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujahidden (Al Shabaab) and to a lesser extent from the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) operating in Uganda and South Sudan.<sup>25</sup>

Driven by the gravity of these threats and other sources of vulnerabilities, IGAD has developed a number of legal and institutional frameworks for addressing terrorism in the region as early as 2002. IGAD developed the IGAD Plan of Action for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in 2002. Among other things, the Plan of Action recognized the need for cross-border law

---

<sup>21</sup> CGGC and ISSP 2012: 12.

<sup>22</sup> Ford 2011: 32.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> IGAD 2016: 71.

<sup>25</sup> ISSP and Sahan Foundation 2016: 4.

enforcement and criminal justice activity to be placed within a robust legal framework.<sup>26</sup> In 2006, IGAD launched the IGAD Capacity Building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT), a four-year program funded by EU and other donors.<sup>27</sup> ICPAT had its primary focus on capacity building and confidence building among the member states, and targeted the following five areas of counter-terrorism (a) enhancing judicial measures; (b) working to promote greater inter-agency coordination on counterterrorism within individual IGAD member states; (c) enhancing border control; (d) providing training, sharing information and best practices; and (e) promoting strategic cooperation.<sup>28</sup> In 2009, the Ministers of justice of IGAD member states agreed on two draft conventions on extradition and mutual legal assistance. These conventions, which have been ratified so far by two member states, provide “a strengthened framework for legal cooperation against terrorism in the sub-region”.<sup>29</sup>

In October 2011, IGAD’s main counter-terrorism organ ICPAT, having a limited mandate of building national capacity to resist terrorism and promoting regional securing cooperation, was restructured into IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP). This transformation was born out of the wide ranging nature of the sub-region’s security threats and the ensuing demand for concerted, holistic, regional approach and collaboration among IGAD’s member states.<sup>30</sup> Within ISSP, Counter-terrorism has been embedded as one pillar, among other components namely Transnational Organized Crime, Maritime Security, and Security Institutions Capacity Building. This pillar has the central objective of building national and regional capacity of the Horn of Africa countries in the fight against terrorism, radicalization and extremists’ violence.<sup>31</sup>

IGAD has recently launched the IGAD Centre of Excellence in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (ICEPCVE), based in Djibouti, with the main objective of promoting regional sharing of good practices and lessons learnt in preventing and countering violent extremism initiatives and bringing together actors involved in P/CVE work in the region to ensure an inclusive and holistic approach.<sup>32</sup> Over and above these current institutional and legal frameworks, IGAD and its member states also participate in various forms of counter-terrorism activities such as in peace

---

<sup>26</sup> CGGC and ISSP 2012: 2.

<sup>27</sup> Kimunguy 2010.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> CGGC & ISSP 2012: 2.

<sup>30</sup> ISSP 2017a.

<sup>31</sup> ISSP 2017b

<sup>32</sup> ICEPCVE 2017.

operations such as AMISOM which has emerged as a critical element of fighting terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia.

## **2. Beyond Institutional and Legal Frameworks: Preliminary Observation on Critical Implementation Challenges**

As the previous section illustrated, African regional and sub-regional organizations have sought to establish different mechanisms of addressing the threat of terrorism in the form of legislations, norms, institutions, etc. Largely epitomes of earlier responses to a growing global threat, the mere presence of these elaborate mechanisms, however, should not mask the critical challenge of practically implementing these measures in the broader continental efforts of countering terrorism. To a large extent, the challenges of implementing these counter-terrorism mechanisms showcases the difficulties of implementing APSA in the wider sense and offer some explanation also for the latter's securitization and militarization.

Primarily, the threats and vulnerabilities arising from terrorism outweigh any of the existing frameworks and the capacities of many of the Member States or that of their regional or sub-regional organizations.<sup>33</sup> The prevalence of these threats is further compounded with poor social, political, security, and economic conditions of most African states rife with unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, etc. Pockets of limited or “ungoverned spaces” in different corners of the continent create the enabling environment for breeding, training, and mobilization of terrorist groups. Furthermore, weak state capacities in these environments hamper counter-terrorism initiatives.<sup>34</sup> The prevailing crises in certain parts of the continent create an additional layer of insecurity as in the case of Sahel-Sahara belt and Somalia. These complex crises, which have their own domino effects beyond the national borders, project serious security challenges to their wider neighbourhood.<sup>35</sup>

As shown in the previous section, legal and policy instruments constitute the crux of counter-terrorism efforts in the continent. However, African states, both in continental and sub-regional

---

<sup>33</sup> AU PSC 2014: 17.

<sup>34</sup> Okereke, Iheanacho and Okafor 2016.

<sup>35</sup> Widespread use of internet fosters communication between terrorists. The search for terror related information (ex. Bomb making formulae) have also become readily available on internet, In addition, terrorist have increasingly used the internet to publicize terror activities and demands (Okereke, Iheanacho and Okafor, 2016:101).

contexts, have failed to ratify some of the major protocols and conventions, resulting in a “generally poor and uneven pattern of ratification of counter-terrorism instruments”.<sup>36</sup> This can be illustrated, for example, by looking at the slow ratification of the 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism Convention and its 2004 Protocol. As stated in the 2014 Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa, while forty one Member States, out of fifty signatories, are parties to the Convention, “only 15 countries have to date ratified the Protocol, and it took a decade to reach this figure.”<sup>37</sup> Similarly, there is lack of progress towards ratification of pertinent the IGAD treaties<sup>38</sup> as well as slow domestication of protocols and policies.<sup>39</sup> Cases in point are the slow ratification of IGAD’s convention on mutual legal assistance and extradition which were drafted in 2009 and only ratified by two countries by 2017.

The above also speaks and relates to a perennial problem of failure to implement the numerous conventions both at the continental and regional level. In the case of the AU, while it plays an important coordinating role both as a catalyst and interface with the global counter-terrorism system as well as a clearing house for norm advancement, one of its major challenges remain its inability to fully and effectively convert into reality the commitment and ideals of its member states *vis-a-vis* the continental and international instruments.<sup>40</sup> A similar challenge also exists in the case IGAD, where its member states have more or less lagged behind in terms of implementing the various instruments.<sup>41</sup> Given the disparity among its member states to implement these instruments, “much of the security cooperation instead takes place on a bilateral and largely ad hoc basis” in the IGAD region.<sup>42</sup>

States that have not ratified the key legal instruments, namely the Protocol on the Algiers Convention (shaded)<sup>43</sup>

---

<sup>36</sup> Ford, 2011:16.

<sup>37</sup> AU PSC, 2014: 17.

<sup>38</sup> IGAD 2017.

<sup>39</sup> CGGC & ISSP 2012; IGAD 2017.

<sup>40</sup> Ewi and Aning 2006

<sup>41</sup> Such as relevant UN and AU conventions, the IGAD Plan of Action for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, and the 2009 IGAD conventions on Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition (CGGC & ISSP 2012).

<sup>42</sup> ISSP and Sahan Foundation, 2016: 51.

<sup>43</sup> Allison 2015: 3.



*Source: Allison 2015.*

The non-implementation these instruments have also an enduring implication in terms of shaping the modalities of counter-terrorism in the sub-region to one which could be characterized as an extralegal, occurring outside the formal legal system, hence unreliable and unpredictable<sup>44</sup>. The Taskforce on Legal Cooperation against Terrorism in the IGAD region succinctly captured the ensuing difficulties as follows:

The result is that much of the cooperation against terrorism in the IGAD sub-region remains informal, based on personal initiatives between political authorities and operational agencies. It is in a sense “extralegal,” occurring outside the formal legal system. This kind of informal cooperation is increasingly seen as counterproductive, however, not only by civil society actors but also, as the consultations of this task force have shown, by politicians and civil servants in the sub-region. It is increasingly viewed as unreliable and unpredictable, eroding support for state action against terrorism by failing adequately to protect human rights.... It will take time to build broad support for the view that rule of law-based cooperation against terrorism, relying on formal MLA and extradition arrangements, is preferable to the existing system of personal initiatives, so-called hot pursuit across borders, and extrajudicial transfers. That effort has not been assisted by the reliance of some major external powers in recent years on non-legal counterterrorism methods. That has served to reinforce

---

<sup>44</sup> CGGC and ISSP 2012.

the erroneous perception that hard power alone will win the struggle against terrorism and related transnational crimes.<sup>45</sup>

Over and above these challenges stated above, both the AU and IGAD face a number of common challenges which hinder the implementation of effective CT strategies. These include the absence of effective criminal justice systems in their Member States; weak border control, coordination challenges (among different institutions and among member states); failure to designate national Focal Points of the ACSRT which is the continental coordinating organ for counter-terrorism.<sup>46</sup> From a more operational or technical point of view, most member states lack the requisite technical capacity and know-how to conduct counter-terrorism effectively. At least in the case of IGAD, most Member States lack “a comprehensive Counter-IED (C-IED) strategy. Information and intelligence sharing between governments has been erratic, and is generally perceived to be inadequate”.<sup>47</sup> Among other things, a prevailing deficit of trust between countries in the sub-region compound the above mentioned challenges. Most importantly, over-reliance on external actors has been a teething problem in counter-terrorism both in the continental and sub-regional context. The combined effect of all these challenges have rendered counter-terrorism efforts in the continent “mainly ineffective and unsustainable”.<sup>48</sup>

Evidently, the discussion above reflect not just the state-of-the-art of counter-terrorism efforts in Africa but also the predicaments of implementing APSA in the wider sense. Extensive donor dependence is an important hurdle to implement APSA, wherein more than 90% of the peace and security budget is financed by external partners with clear implications for the sustainability of APSA and its interventions.<sup>49</sup> Indeed, there is a striking similarity between the challenges of conducting effective counter terrorism in the continent and implementing APSA. As successive APSA Assessment Reports indicated, Africa’s continental peace and security framework is subjected to a broad range of challenges related to the absence of political will to utilize existing instruments, lack of coordination; limited role of CSOs; lack of harmonization of existing legal

---

<sup>45</sup> CGGC and ISSP 2012: 1.

<sup>46</sup> AU PSC, 2014.

<sup>47</sup> ISSP and Sahan Foundation, 2016: 51

<sup>48</sup> AU PSD 2015: 49.

<sup>49</sup> Schmidt 2015.

frameworks and decision making procedures, to mention just a few.<sup>50</sup> While these challenges have multiple implications on the outcome of the responses, two dimensions are worth highlighting, especially in relation to the theme of this workshop. First, as a result of the combined effect of these challenges, most interventions within the context of APSA have become ad hoc, erratic, and unsustainable, the latter due to the gross mismatch between needs and existing resources. To a large extent, military solutions to crises have prevailed over political solutions to most crises. It is within such complex context that African actors have forged a number of partnerships with external players with a view to address some of the prevailing challenges and to share the burden of addressing crises. Against this background, the next section examines the nature of partnership among the AU, IGAD, and EU in the realm of counter-terrorism.

### **3. EU, AU, and IGAD: Counter-terrorism Cooperation in a Complex Setting**

EU's counter-terrorism cooperation with African ROs is a sub-set of the broader EU-Africa partnership, which has peace and security as one of its priority areas. A key aspect of the partnership in the latter context has been increasing cooperation on addressing root causes of conflicts; terrorism, and transnational crime; trafficking humans and arms.<sup>51</sup> The partnership is informed by various policy pronouncements between the EU and Africa. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy recognized as one of the strategic objectives of the partnership the need to promote and sustain a system of effective multilateralism in addressing some of the global challenges including terrorism (JAES). Cooperation in the context of counter-terrorism has a specific place within JAES, which identified particular aspects such as the exchange of information, law enforcement and institutional capacity building and judicial cooperation.<sup>52</sup> Similarly, the Cotonou Agreement, entailed the agreement “to exchange information on terrorist groups and their support networks; and views on means and methods to counter terrorist acts, including in technical fields and training,

---

<sup>50</sup> Limited coordination between the different APSA components on the one side and among the various RECs/RMs; lack of clarity of the subsidiary relation between the AU and the RECs/RM (what role for the AUC and the RECs respectively; the incompatibility of existing APSA structures to deal with emerging security threats and trends; limited cooperation with CSOs; too many overlapping initiatives and processes; lack of harmonization of legal frameworks and decision-making procedures between the AUC, RECs/RMs and Member States in various aspects of the APSA instruments; unclear political decision-making processes; and grossly mismatched with available resources (See AU PSD, 2010; AU PSD 2014).

<sup>51</sup> Africa-EU Partnership 2017.

<sup>52</sup> AU and EU 2007.

and experiences in relation to the prevention of terrorism”.<sup>53</sup> In terms of funding, the Cotonou Agreement highlighted that the financial and technical assistance to counter-terrorism cooperation are to be financed by sources other than those intended for the financing of ACP–EC development cooperation.<sup>54</sup>

The EU has identified a specific policy when it comes to counter-terrorism in the Horn of Africa. The EU Counter-terrorism Action Plan for the Horn of Africa and Yemen embodies this policy and seeks to promote local ownership and security by linking counterterrorism efforts to regional development, while strengthening social and political institutions. This is to be achieved by forging partnership with national governments in the Horn and in Yemen and regional institutions, as well as in coordination with other international actors such as the UN (implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy).<sup>55</sup>

EU’s support to counter-terrorism in Africa assumed a number of dimensions and is based on a range of instruments and mechanisms. Perhaps the most prominent dimension of the cooperation is the support given to different peace support operations, some of them having specific counter-terrorism mandate. The Multinational Joint Taskforce (MNJTF), is established in 2015 to tackle the terrorist threat posed by Boko Haram within the framework of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and with full endorsement and retroactive formal authorization by the AU PSC.<sup>56</sup> The MNJTF was mandated to carry out a number of tasks including “conducting military operations to prevent the expansion of Boko Haram and other terrorist groups’ activities and eliminate their presence”.<sup>57</sup> The EU signed an agreement with the AU to provide 50 million Euros between 2016 and 2018 to strengthen the regional coordination of the response and support the effective coordination and command of MNJTF’s military operations.<sup>58</sup>

---

<sup>53</sup> The Cotonou Agreement is a partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States of the other part. (EU 2014: 27).

<sup>54</sup> Ibid: 212.

<sup>55</sup> EC and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2012.

<sup>56</sup> Assanvo, Abatan, and Sawadogo 2016.

<sup>57</sup> AU PSC 2015.

<sup>58</sup> This aspect of EU’s support to MNJTF specifically aimed at, enhancing the MNJTF’s coordination and command capabilities through the construction and maintenance of MNJTF headquarters in Ndjamena; sector Headquarters in Cameroon and Niger; and transport, communication and medical evacuation capabilities (European Union 2017: 16).

Similarly, the EU has been the major financier of AMISOM. While generally conceived as peacekeeping mission with a wide ranging tasks and objectives, AMISOM has specific counter-terrorism related mandates such as reducing the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; and conducting offensive operations against Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups.<sup>59</sup> Since 2007, the EU has provided more than EUR 1.2 billion to the AU for AMISOM (including EUR 178 million in 2016) making the EU one of AMISOM's biggest donors.<sup>60</sup> The EU recently lent its support to the G-5 Sahel force charged with combatting terrorism and organized crime in the region by providing €50 million (\$59.8 million).<sup>61</sup> This is in addition to the increasing presence of EU missions and member states military activities in areas such as the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin which are considered as key transit points and sources of irregular migration.<sup>62</sup> Besides, the EU has deployed its security and intelligence experts to its missions in the Middle East, North Africa and Nigeria to boost its counter-terrorism efforts and take the fight to countries where many radicals are recruited.<sup>63</sup>

In the Horn of Africa, the EU has increased its security cooperation, including in CT, through various mechanisms. Some of the existing EU missions (ESDP) such as the European Union Training Mission Somalia (EUTM) have the specific objective of supporting the security sector in Somalia. Among other things, the EUTM has been engaged on the provision of individual and specialized training to Somali National Army (SNA) soldiers as well as in enhancing the civilian personnel and parliamentary committees' capacities in executing their functions within the country's security sector.<sup>64</sup> In addition, the EU became one of the key actors in launching the 'Somali National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE)' in September 2016 by providing technical assistance supporting the establishment of the plan and taking the helm of CVE-lead within the S-6, i.e. the six main security supporters in Somalia.<sup>65</sup> Moreover, the EU has provided support in P/CVE through different regional and country specific projects. Some of these P/CVE projects, such as the STRIVE project focused on countries such as Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia. Other projects have a regional dimension on the

---

<sup>59</sup> AMISOM 2017.

<sup>60</sup> European Union 2017: 16.

<sup>61</sup> Walker 2017.

<sup>62</sup> International Crisis Group (ICG) 2017: 10.

<sup>63</sup> De la Baume and Paravicini 2015.

<sup>64</sup> Council of the European Union 2017: 4.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid: 5.

Horn of Africa region and focus on specific issues related to counter-terrorism. Cases in point are two of the EU funded projects on the region namely, “Law Enforcement capacity on counterterrorism in the Greater Horn of Africa and Yemen” and “Countering the financing of terrorism in the Horn of Africa”.<sup>66</sup>

#### **4. Concluding Remarks: Counter-terrorism Partnership in a Crowded Field?**

Clearly, the field of counter-terrorism has emerged as a crowded policy field with many players, some having shifting priorities and competing preferred approaches. Different forms of counter-terrorism cooperation have evolved in Africa through the years, but none achieved the level of effectiveness and coordination among the different actors required to tackle the versatile techniques of the terrorists and their determined commitment. This is also true in the case of the cooperation between the EU on one side and different African regional organizations, including the AU and IGAD, on the other side.

Despite the number of areas of counter-terrorism cooperation mentioned in the previous section, these regional and international players have not sufficiently coordinated their efforts at a continental level in a manner that benefits African states to effectively tackle the threat of terrorism. This is also the case in when it comes to the EU and its member states, as much of their engagement “have been with AU member states, not the commission”.<sup>67</sup> To a large extent this is attributed to the AU’s lack of a coherent plan to combat terrorism. In addition, effective counter-terrorism cooperation among these actors is undercut by other factors such as member states reluctance to cede sovereignty on what they see as an issue of domestic security, and because EU member states’ preference to deal directly with militaries they know well (for example, France and Chad).<sup>68</sup> Within the context of the discussion on multilateral counter-terrorism cooperation, the crux of the problem appears to be the “*non-existence of an all-inclusive continental platform to coordinate counter-terrorism (CT) action among Member States, RECs, donors, and assistance providers.*”<sup>69</sup> These challenges are further exacerbated by the mistrust among some of the member states within such regional arrangements which preclude jointly implementing key counter-

---

<sup>66</sup> Ibid: 11.

<sup>67</sup> International Crisis Group (ICG) 2017: 11

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> AU PSD 2015: 49

terrorism tasks such as the exchange of information on terror related intelligence or judicial cooperation within a regional context.

On the one side, these issues reflect the prevailing state of counter-terrorism efforts in the continent, considered as ineffective and unsustainable as indicated earlier. At the same time, these issues speak also to the challenge of forging multilateral partnership in such contexts, where external actors such as the EU find it difficult to position themselves *vis-à-vis* their African counter-parts. This would not come as a surprise as the latter have too many priorities and lack the political will and capacity to implement some of the policies and decisions related to counter-terrorism in the continent. In addition, the AU and RECs themselves lack synergy and coordination on counter-terrorism and they have not yet formulated a holistic framework to guide the development of strategies to cover the entire continent.<sup>70</sup>

But the above observation does not completely absolve the EU as an external actor for an existing state of counter-terrorism cooperation, especially using multilateral platforms. To an extent, the EU overlooked the provision of streamlined support to institutions such as the ACSRT which has the potential of enhancing complementarities and coherence among key regional players such as the AU and IGAD as well as their member states. Compared to EU's support to African peace support operations, admittedly some having explicit counter-terrorism mandate, the EU's support to ACSRT remains very modest. Evidently, counter-terrorism as a key aspect of addressing peace and security has not yet attained its vital position within relevant EU instruments such as the Africa Peace Facility (APF). For instance, the 2016 official APF Report makes very little explicit reference to the EU's support to counter-terrorism in Africa. It is reflecting this oversight that the 2014 APSA Assessment underscored that "APF funding could be used to support the AU's efforts in addressing emerging and cross-cutting peace and security issues such as counter-terrorism, maritime security and transnational organized crime."<sup>71</sup> The same report highlighted the need for the EU, supported by its African partners, to enhance coherence and complementarities in the support provided to peace and security activities in Africa, irrespective of the source of funding

---

<sup>70</sup> AU PSD 2014: 20-23.

<sup>71</sup> AU PSD 2014: 20-23.

(e.g. APF, Regional Indicative Programs, etc.)<sup>72</sup> and this could typically apply to the case of supporting multilateral counter-terrorism platforms in Africa.

At the same time, one cannot rule out also the divergence in the norms and practices of these actors. To a large extent, the EU's much touted comprehensive approach to counter-terrorism, covering the broad spectrum of "prevent, protect, pursue, and respond",<sup>73</sup> is not matched by a similar normative approach and practices in the African context where much of the CT efforts are extra-legal, piecemeal, ad hoc, and disjointed to say the least. From practical and realpolitik considerations, the obvious imbalance in terms of finances and other capabilities between these actors also put to question whose priorities and which issues eventually prevail in the field of security cooperation in the continent. The EU's sudden shift of focus on migration issues at the cost of some of the ongoing peace and security efforts, mainly AMISOM, underscore this point. Moreover, national interest driven consideration of some member states at times undercut certain prominent African counter-terrorism initiatives and efforts. For example, the deployment of African troops as a part of AFISMA to undertake key counter-terrorism tasks in Mali was shortchanged for a national interest driven and untimely transformation of the mission into a UN operation (MINUSMA). As shown in the ensuing years, MINUSMA both as a matter of normative positioning and institutional design is not a perfect fit for handling counter-terrorism in the specific case of Mali.

In the final analysis, one can argue that streamlined counter-terrorism cooperation among the EU, AU and IGAD has not been achieved due to the various factors highlighted earlier. While complementarity and coherence among these actors are critical elements required for effective counter-terrorism efforts, the respective comparative advantage and resources have not been effectively harnessed to tackle the enduring threat of terrorism in the region. To the latter end, it is worth investigating the potential contribution of each actor within a coordinated platform and in the specific context of key counter-terrorism tasks and activities such as intelligence gathering and sharing, cooperation in the justice sector, building the capacity of law enforcement and security personnel, or preventing and countering of violent extremism (P/CVE). From a theoretical point of view, the increasingly crowded field of counter-terrorism is a fertile ground for testing and

---

<sup>72</sup> Ibid: 113.

<sup>73</sup> Council of the European Union 2005.

subsequently enriching some of the assumptions of the theory of inter-organizationalism which focuses on the interaction between international organizations.<sup>74</sup> Among other things, one can observe how domain similarity and overlap in the field of counter-terrorism has engendered not only cooperation but also instigated rivalry over and/or duplication of mandates, tasks, and resources among organizations, each competing for relative relevance. The envisaged research project will focus on these practical and theoretical dimensions addressing the complex aspects of multilateral counter-terrorism cooperation among the EU, AU, IGAD, and their respective Member States.

---

<sup>74</sup> Besides expounding the rationale of IO cooperation, Biermann (2008) also highlighted other relevant aspects of inter-organizational interactions. These include the different discouraging and enabling factors (resource dependency; issue density or causal factors); phases of inter-organization interactions (from embryonic to maturity); its relevance in terms of policy outcomes (synergy, avoiding dependence and asymmetry) as well as categories of cooperation (information sharing, coordination, and joint decision-making).maturity); its relevance in terms of policy outcomes (synergy, avoiding dependence and asymmetry) as well as categories of cooperation (information sharing, coordination, and joint decision-making).

## Bibliography

1. African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT). ACSRT Background. Available on < <http://caert.org.dz/About%20us.pdf>>. Checked on November 15, 2017.
2. Africa-EU Partnership: Peace and Security. Available on <http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/priority-areas/peace-and-security>. Checked on November 11, 2017.
3. African Union. Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, Addis Ababa: African Union, 2004.
4. African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). AMISOM Mandate. Available on <http://amisom-au.org/amisom-mandate/>. Checked on November 14, 2017.
5. Allison, S. Good talk, not enough action: The AU's counter-terrorism architecture, and why it matters. *Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Policy Brief* 66, March 2015.
6. Assanvo, William; Abatan, Jeannine Ella A and Wendyam Aristide Sawadogo. Assessing the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram. *Institute for Security Studies West Africa Report*, Issue 19, September 2016.
7. AU-EU. The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy. Available on [http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/documents/eas2007\\_joint\\_strategy\\_en.pdf](http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/documents/eas2007_joint_strategy_en.pdf). Accessed on November 10, 2017.
8. Africa-EU Partnership. Peace and Security: Objectives. Available on <http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/priority-areas/peace-and-security>. Accessed on November 12, 2017.
9. AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC). Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Addis Ababa: AU PSC, 2002).
10. AU PSC. AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC). Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa. 455<sup>th</sup> Meeting at the Level of Heads of State and Government, 2 September, 2014, PSC/AHG/2(CDLV) (Nairobi: AU PSC, 2014).
11. AU PSC. Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Regional and International Efforts to Combat the Boko Haram Terrorist Group and the Way Forward. Peace and Security Council 484<sup>th</sup> Meeting at the Level of Heads of State and Government, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 29 January 2015, PSC/AHG/2, (CDLXX XIV) (Addis Ababa: AU PSC, 2015). Available on <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-484-rpt-boko-haram-29-1-2015.pdf>, checked on November 11, 2017
12. African Union Peace and Security Department (AU PSD). The African Union Counter Terrorism Framework, 2015. Available on< <http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/64-counter-terrorism-ct>>, accessed on November 13, 2017.
13. African Union's Peace and Security Department. African Peace and Security Architecture: 2014 Assessment. Final Report. 16 April 2015.
14. AU Peace and Security Department (AU PSD). African peace and Security Architecture: APSA Roadmap 2016-2020. (Addis Ababa: AU Commission, 2015).

15. Biermann, R. Towards a theory of inter-organizational networking: The Euro-Atlantic security institutions interacting. *Review of International Organizations* (208). 151-177.
16. Buzan, B. Rethinking Security After the Cold War. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 32(1), 5-28. (1997).
17. Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGGC) and IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP). Implementing the IGAD Framework for Legal Cooperation Against Terrorism: Final Report of the Task Force on Legal Cooperation: Against Terrorism in the IGAD Sub-region (New York and Addis Ababa, 2012).
18. Council of the European Union. The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy (Brussels: The European Union: 30 November 2005). Available on <https://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2014469%202005%20REV%204>. Checked on November 15, 2017.
19. Council of the European Union. Annual Report Horn of Africa Regional Action Plan 2015/2016. Joint Staff Working Document. 11 May 2017, Brussels. Available on <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9095-2017-INIT/en/pdf>. Accessed on November 10, 2017.
20. De la Baume, Maia and Paravicini, Giulia. EU takes counter-terrorism campaign to the frontlines. *Politico* (December 12, 2015). Available on <https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-counter-terrorism-campaign-external-action-iraq-turkey-saudi-arabia/>. Accessed on November 14, 2017.
21. European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. EU Counter-terrorism Action Plan for the Horn of Africa and Yemen. Joint Communication to the European Council. 31 August 2012, Brussels. Available on <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52012JC0024>. Accessed on November 10, 2017.
22. European Union. African Peace Facility: Annual Report 2016. (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2017).
23. European Union. The Cotonou Agreement and Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 (Luxembourg: Publication Office of the European Union, 2014)
24. Ewi, M and K Aning. Assessing the role of the African Union in preventing and combating terrorism in Africa, *African Security Review* 15(3) (2006), 33-38.
25. Ford, Jolyon. African counter-terrorism legal frameworks a decade after 2001. *Institute for Security Studies Monograph* 177. (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2011)
26. International Crisis Group (ICG). Time to Reset African Union-European Union Relations. Africa Report N°255, 17 October 2017.
27. Intergovernmental Authority on Development. IGAD Regional Strategy: The Framework. Volume 1 (Djibouti, IGAD Secretariat, 2016).
28. IGAD Center of Excellence in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (ICEPCVE). About Us. ICEPCVE website available on <http://www.icepcve.org/about-us.html>. Accessed on November 10, 2017.

29. ISSP. IGAD Security Sector Program: Background. Available on <<http://igadssp.org/index.php/about-us-main-menu/background>>. Accessed on November 10, 2017.
30. ISSP. IGAD Security Sector Program: Counter Terrorism (CT). Available on <http://igadssp.org/index.php/components-mainmenu/counter-terrorism>. Accessed on November 10, 2017.
31. IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP) and Sahar Foundation. Al-Shabaab as a Transnational Security Threat. March 2016. Available on [www.igadssp.org/index.php/...al-shabaab-as-a-transnational-security-threat/download](http://www.igadssp.org/index.php/...al-shabaab-as-a-transnational-security-threat/download). Accessed on November 1, 2017.
32. Kimunguyi, Patrick. Terrorism and Counter terrorism in East Africa. Available on <http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/radicalisation/files/2013/03/conference-2010-terrorism-counter-terrorism-eafrica-pk.pdf> . Accessed on November 15, 2017.
33. Kistersky. *New Dimensions of the International Security System after the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
34. Organization of African Unity. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its Twenty-eight Ordinary Session in Dakar, Senegal from 29 June to 1 July 1992 AHG/Res. 213 (XXVIII) (Addis Ababa, OAU, 1992).
35. Organization of African Unity (OAU). *OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terror* (Algiers: OAU, 1999).
36. Okereke, C. Nna-Emeka; Iheanacho, Jennifer and Chikaodi Okafor. .Terrorism in Africa: Trends and Dynamics. *African Journal for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism*, Vol 5 N° 1, December 2016 (ACSRT: Algiers, 2016). 70-101.
37. Walker, Harry. EU agrees to hand over £43MILLION to fund new counter-terrorism force in Africa. Express (June 6, 2017). Available on <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/813503/european-union-united-nations-military-force-juncker-sahel-region-africa-brussels>. Checked on November 10, 2017.