

## **African Security and Unbridled Militarism**

### **New approaches to African Peace and Security Governance**

Uppsala 22-24 November 2017

#### Reading List:

##### **African Peace and Security Architecture:**

###### **The African Peace and Security Architecture**

- Malte Brosig (2014)

*This article presents survey data on the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It focuses explicitly on two aspects: the internal constitution and achievements of the APSA; and coordination and cooperation with external actors, such as Regional Economic Communities, the United Nations and the European Union. The survey, conducted between October 2011 and December 2012, targeted 198 security experts in international organisations, think tanks, academia and non-governmental organisations. It reveals the APSA's current stage of development, achievements and challenges*

Link: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2014.922108>

###### **How “African” Is the African Peace and Security Architecture? Conceptual and Practical Constraints of Regional Security Cooperation in Africa**

- Benedikt Franke & Stefan Gänzle (2012)

*With the creation of the African Peace and Security Architecture in 2004, African states were aiming to assume the primary responsibility for peace and security on the continent and establish a structure to assemble the necessary financial and military means. However, despite the constant evocation of “African ownership,” it is non-African actors that call the tune and can define and drive African security. Based on a detailed juxtaposition of rhetoric and empirical evidence, this paper argues that significant conceptual and practical problems constrain the “Africanization” of African security and that it appears increasingly unlikely that the continent's states will be able to achieve the desired primacy in security affairs in the foreseeable future.*

Link: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19392206.2012.682473>

###### **Reflections on the Evolving African Peace and Security Architecture**

- Paul D. Williams (2014)

*In the twenty-first century, African states and a wide range of partners have made considerable progress in constructing the African Peace and Security Architecture—a complex set of interrelated and overlapping institutions with mandates spanning the entire conflict management spectrum from preventive diplomacy to postwar reconstruction. Specifically, as used here, the African Peace and Security Architecture refers to the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, the African Standby Force, the Continental Early Warning System, the Peace Fund, the Panel of the Wise, and the relevant Regional Economic Communities, regional mechanisms, and parts of the African Union Commission involved in these institutions. This article reflects on the evolution of these institutions and highlights some of the main areas of progress as well as the challenges encountered along the way.*

Link: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19392206.2014.939886>

### **Imagining, Implementing, and Integrating the African Peace and Security Architecture: The African Union's Challenges.**

- Ulf Engel & João Gomes Porto (2014)

*In 2002 the African Union embarked on an ambitious plan to develop and operationalize a comprehensive African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Since then, it has become clear that this is truly a journey in uncharted waters, with little in the sense of precedent and off-the-shelf blueprints in Africa or elsewhere. Implementation of APSA continues to take place in a complex institutional environment, driven and at the same time contested by African Union member states, regional organizations, and the African Union Commission with various and changing interests. At the same time, the African continent continues to be plagued by numerous violent conflicts. This article introduces the content of this issue of African Security, which addresses the implementation of APSA from four perspectives: First it takes stock of what has been achieved so far, focusing on eight issue areas where the Union continues to face implementation challenges and which may explain why the APSA is not yet fully operational. Second, it focuses on the use of mediation roadmaps in resolving African conflicts, with a reflection on the strengths and weaknesses of African conflict resolution efforts, here recontextualized in line with the changing landscape of conflicts in Africa. Third, it extends the analysis to consider mediation in the context of other forms of peacemaking and preventive diplomacy by the Union, by focusing on the role of the Panel of the Wise which is often misunderstood as the Union's mediation arm. Finally, this issue introduces maritime security as an emerging—arguably urgent—policy field, discussing the reasons for the lack of policy coordination and harmonization both within the African Union Commission and between the Commission and the Regional Economic Communities.*

Link: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19392206.2014.945379>

### **Promoting Security in Africa through Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the African Union's African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).**

- Peter Arthur (2017)

*The last two decades have seen African countries adopt a new security approach through the activities of regional economic communities (RECs) and the African Union's (AU) African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). This article argues that despite progress in conflict prevention and the promotion of peace, defence and security through the APSA and RECs, challenges do remain. In particular, factors such as financial costs involved, the inadequate funds available for peace and security missions, conflicting interests and lack of agreement, poor co-ordination and inadequate human and logistics capacity have constrained the ability of African countries to achieve their peace and security agenda. Thus, for peace and security efforts being undertaken by the AU and RECs to be effective, the actors involved should have not only the requisite capacity but also political will and commitment, and cooperation among members and with the international community should remain crucial to the process.*

Link: <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0975087816674577>

### **The African Union, the African Peace and Security Architecture, and Maritime Security**

- Ulf Engel (2014)

*The content of African maritime security as an emerging policy field is contested. It can be located anywhere between traditional security politics (related to piracy, maritime terrorism and unregulated fishing), developmental and environmentalist concerns, and efforts to regain economic sovereignty over African territorial and offshore waters. As a result, since approximately 2005 the institutional place of maritime security in continental politics has been in flux. This article traces the origins of the debate on maritime security in Africa. The main concern here is to examine the relationship between the nascent African Peace and Security Architecture on the one hand and maritime security and safety politics on the other from both an institutional and a political perspective. Maritime security represents one of a number of peace and security related policy fields in the making that also allows for insights into the division of labor*

*emerging among various stakeholders, such as the African Union Commission, Regional Economic Communities, and African Union member states, and into the related challenges of policy coordination and harmonization.*

Link: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19392206.2014.939889?journalCode=uafs20>

## **Regional and international communities and security in Africa:**

### **Establishing the Full Operational Capability of the East African Standby Force: Challenges and Opportunities.**

- Apuuli, K. P. (2016).

*In December 2014, countries contributing to the East African Standby Force (EASF) conducted the last exercise to test the validity of the functioning of the force. The exercise heralded the full operationalisation of the force. This article discusses the attainment of full operational capability (FOC) of the EASF, one year before the full operationalisation of the African Standby Force. The main conclusion is that whilst the attainment of FOC of the force should be celebrated with the member states actually validating their troops and equipment contributions, there are outstanding challenges including ongoing crises in the region and lack of resources among others that it must overcome before it can actually be deployed in a conflict situation*

Link: <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0975087815611526>

### **The African Standby Force: The African Union's tool for the maintenance of peace and security.**

- Linda Darkwa (2017)

*Declared operationally ready in 2016, the African Standby Force (ASF) has not been deployed in its originally designed form. This is not for the lack of opportunities but rather a demonstration of the power of the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) – Africa's sub-regional security structures – over matters of peace and security. Experience gathered from its short existence suggests that the ASF may never be deployed in its current form. It may instead evolve into a robust framework, adaptable mainly by the RECs/RMs, for addressing varied security challenges. Four things are critical to enhancing the utility of the ASF: the political willingness of the RECs/RMs, the strategic interest of the member states, predictable and sustainable financing, and clarity on the role of the African Capability for Immediate Response to Crisis, the temporary battlegroup that was created to provide the African Union with a rapid response capability, pending the ASF's operationalization*

Link: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13523260.2017.1342478>

### **Towards a common doctrine for African Standby Force-led peace operations**

- Ann Fitz-Gerald (2017)

*This article considers the military doctrine currently available to the African Standby Force (ASF) for peace operations (PO) on the African continent. In the absence of an updated and relevant doctrine for PO, risks are posed to the harmonization and coordination of multinational missions, as well as to the successful achievement of mission objectives. Despite laudable efforts by both the United Nations (UN) and bilateral donor nations to support the preparatory and continuation training of ASF troops, differences in the national and multinational experiences of this work and the differences in the legal basis of this doctrine do not provide an optimal 'stop gap' measure. The pressing new requirement for African peace missions to deter terrorist and insurgent anti-peace factions exposes the limitations of UN doctrine, which preserves traditional peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality and minimum use of force. UN peace enforcement mandates, and guidance derived from NATO's non-African experiences do not provide adequate guidance for ASF troops preparing to enter these operating environments. A cursory study of the impact of the absence of common*

*doctrine supporting the multinational African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) indicates that different doctrinal approaches impact negatively on AMISOM's ability to achieve its objectives.*

Link: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13533312.2017.1345313>

### **Partnering to Make Peace: The Effectiveness of Joint African and Non-African Mediation Efforts**

- Allard Duursma (2017)

*This article systematically examines the varying effectiveness of African and non-African third parties in mediating civil wars in Africa. Drawing on data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, supplemented with unique data on mediation efforts, which together cover all mediation efforts in civil wars in Africa between 1960 and 2012, this article presents quantitative evidence supporting the effectiveness of African third parties. Compared to non-African third parties, African third parties are far more likely to conclude peace agreements and these peace agreements are more likely to be durable. Most effective, however, are mixed mediation efforts in which there is coordination between African and non-African third parties, but in which African third parties take the lead. The phrase, 'African solutions to African challenges' should thus be understood as a division of labour and responsibilities, rather than an excuse for non-African third parties to ignore Africa's problems or African third parties acting on their own. Indeed, whilst African third parties should take the lead in mediation processes in African civil wars, non-African third parties should support these processes by lending additional strength. Through supplementing each other's comparative advantages, African and non-African third parties can more effectively resolve civil wars in Africa.*

Link: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13533312.2017.1345312>

### **Securitization Initiatives in the Sahara-Sahel Region in the Twenty-first Century**

- Stephen Harmon (2015)

*The Sahara-Sahel region of northwest Africa has become a hotbed of terrorism. With regional countries unable to control their Saharan reaches, other actors have stepped in. This article examines recent securitization initiatives by the United States and France. U.S. efforts concentrated on training national security forces, while France's are largely combat operations. U.S. training failed to prevent Mali from being overrun by terrorists. France's combat operations have scattered but not eliminated the Islamists. These securitization initiatives have not worked, I argue, because they do not address the root causes of terrorism, which are not military but social and economic.*

Link: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19392206.2015.1100503>

### **Disciplinary Power, the UNODC, and the Container Control Programme in Dakar**

- Adam Sandor (2016)

*This article uses the lens of disciplinary power to analyze the North–South relationships in efforts to govern drug trafficking in Senegal. Disciplinary surveillance shapes the activities of anti-trafficking units through repetitive examination, correction, and persuasion. These practices produce forms of resistance to the ways in which interdiction occurs, which implicate elites in the country. The result of constant international correction, and subsidiary actor resistance, is a frustrated law enforcement team. The argument deepens the literature on police reform in Africa, acknowledging the effects of international discipline on policing agents, while maintaining that immediate political settings heavily constrain disciplinary techniques and their internalizing effects.*

Link: <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/629874>

### **AU-EU “Strategic Partnership”: Strengthening Policy Convergence and Regime Efficacy in the African Peace and Security Complex?**

- Annemarie Peen Rodt & Jide Martyns Okeke (2013)

*This article appraises strategic partnership between the African Union (AU) and European Union (EU). It examines the context and nature of AU and EU security relations and explores the conditions under which partnership has a positive impact in this regard. This includes an evaluation of convergence between the two organizations and its effect or lack thereof on African security. The article concludes that events leading up to and initiatives following the 2007 Joint Africa–European Union Strategy have produced a degree of AU and EU convergence, which has had limited impact on the efficacy of the African security regime, the level of which remains mediocre at best.*

Link: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19392206.2013.853587>

### **Counter terrorism in Africa:**

#### **Africa unsecured? The role of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in securing US imperial interests in Africa**

- Keenan, J. H. (2010)

*This paper explains and illustrates how the US Administration of President George W. Bush used the pretext of its global war on terror to justify the launch of a new African, Saharan-Sabelian front in the global war on terror, which in turn justified the creation of a new regional combatant command for Africa (AFRICOM) and the subsequent militarisation of much of Africa to meet and satisfy America's new imperial designs. It also explains why the terrorism that justified the launch of this new front was fabricated by Algeria's military intelligence services working complicity with their US counterparts. The paper illustrates why the Bush Administration's policy towards Africa, so far continued by the Barack Obama presidency, has brought mostly increased repression, unrest and political instability. It concludes that as long as US policy towards Africa remains fundamentally imperialist and conducted through AFRICOM, it is unlikely to deliver peace, security or development*

Link: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17539151003594186>

#### **The African state and the failure of US counterterrorism initiatives in Africa: The cases of Nigeria and Mali.**

- Hussein Solomon (2013)

*Counter-terrorism initiatives are failing across the African continent. A major reason for this failure lies in the state-centric and military-focused nature of many counter-terrorism initiatives. In Africa, the state is often the source of insecurity for ordinary citizens. Any military strengthening of an illegitimate African state by the international community not only serves to bolster a predatory state but also undermines the human security of citizens. More importantly, such an approach conflates sub-state and international terrorism and serves to bolster the latter, thereby undermining regional and international security further. Put simply, current counter-terrorism initiatives are counter-productive. This paper focuses on counter-terrorism efforts in Nigeria and Mali with a special focus on US initiatives to combat terrorism in the region.*

Link: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2013.841804>

#### **Fighting terrorism in Africa by proxy: the USA and the European Union in Somalia and Mali.**

- Gorm Rye Olsen (2014)

*The French intervention in Mali in early 2013 emphasizes that the decision-makers in Paris, Brussels, and Washington considered the establishment of the radical Islamist regime in Northern Mali a threat to their security interests. The widespread instability including the rise of radical Islamist groups in Somalia was perceived as a threat to western*

*interests. It is the core argument of the paper if western powers decide to provide security in Africa, they will be inclined to use proxy instead of deploying own troops. Security provision by proxy in African means that African troops are doing the actual fighting and peacekeeping on the ground while western powers basically pay the costs, the logistics, and the training of local African troops. The paper concludes that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in Somalia and The African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) in Mali are proxies for the USA and the European Union.*

Link: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09662839.2014.884074>

### **Does counterterrorism militarize foreign aid? Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa.**

- Tobias Heinrich (2017)

*This article studies whether the pursuit of counterterrorism militarizes foreign aid flows. It focuses on the case of US foreign aid to sub-Saharan African states, which recently have experienced an increase in the presence of al-Qaeda or its affiliate terrorist organizations. This article argues that as terrorist groups carry out attacks inside a state's territory, aid towards that state will serve such counterterrorism goals. For one, the state's executive branch will receive increased military aid to immediately fight al-Qaeda or affiliates. For the other, the United States also steps up aid for civil society and development, which could over time undermine al-Qaeda's mobilization and recruitment efforts. In an empirical analysis that covers 46 African states from 1996 to 2011, our results largely corroborate the hypothesized patterns for attacks that occur on a country territory and in the neighborhood. We note, though, that the overall composition of aid shifts relative to the military when there are direct attacks, something that does not occur when attacks happen in the neighborhood only. Our article concludes that concerns about militarization of aid are warranted, but that actual manifestations are nuanced.*

Link: <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022343317702708>

### **Revenge or Reward? The case of Somalia's suicide bombers**

- Stig Jarle Hansen (2010)

*This article explores the social mechanisms that lead to the emergence of suicide attacks in new theatres, as well as factors influencing the frequency of such suicide attacks, by studying one of the states in which suicide attacks have most recently occurred – Somalia. The article argues that a suicide attack in the Somali setting seems to be a well-planned reaction to diplomatic or military moves by opposing parties in the conflict. However, it also poses that the initial emergence of suicide attacks in Somalia is grounded in ideological elements new to Somalia. The article thus argues that while frequency variations in suicide attacks are best understood as the result of rational calculations within an organisation, ideological elements and organisational belief systems have to be explored in order to understand the initial adoption of suicide attacks in Somalia.*

Link: <https://jtr.st-andrews.ac.uk/articles/10.15664/jtr.165/>

### **The Global War on Terror in Somalia: the Politics of Destabilization**

- Debora Valentina Malito (2016)

*During the last three decades, Somalia has become an arena of persistent conflict. After 9/11 and the escalation of the Global War on Terror (GWOt), the study of the Somali crisis has been monopolized by the Failed State Orthodoxy, a modernization approach and narrative which elaborates on the association existing between state failure and international terrorism. While the study of global security challenges generated by 'failed states' has received great emphasis, the domestic challenges produced by foreign interveners has received, so far, less systematic scrutiny. In contrast with the Failed State Orthodoxy, this article explores a set of historical events that are useful for revealing the politics of destabilization activated by the Global War on Terror in Somalia.*

Link: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311935126\\_The\\_Global\\_War\\_on\\_Terror\\_in\\_Somalia\\_the\\_Politics\\_of\\_Destabilization](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311935126_The_Global_War_on_Terror_in_Somalia_the_Politics_of_Destabilization)

## **African Security Governance:**

### **Hybrid security governance in Africa: rethinking the foundations of security, justice and legitimate public authority**

- Niagale Bagayoko, Eboe Hutchful & Robin Luckham (2016)

*This article asks whether the concept of 'hybridity' offers a more convincing account of security governance in Africa than the standard state-focused models. It seeks to clarify the complex intersections between formal and informal, state and non-state security actors, and the varied terrains on which hybridity is constructed, instrumentalised and recalibrated over time. Rather than romanticising informal or 'traditional' institutions, it suggests that they too embed their own power hierarchies, become sites of contestation, and do not work equally well for everyone, least of all for the weak, vulnerable and excluded. Thus the focus is placed upon the real governance of security in hybrid systems, and the patterns of inclusion and exclusion (including gender biases) they reinforce. Finally the paper considers how policy-makers and shapers can work with the grain of hybrid security arrangements to create more legitimate, broadly-based and effective African security governance.*

Link: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14678802.2016.1136137>

### **Security Sector Reform, Statebuilding and Local Ownership: Securing the State or its People?**

- Eleanor Gordon (2014)

*It is widely acknowledged that while local ownership is one of the core principles of successful Security Sector Reform (SSR) programmes, the concept is narrowly interpreted in terms of who owns what. Moreover, the focus of SSR is often on building state institutions, rather than building the relationship between people and the state, which further limits the extent to which people, particularly at the community level, are engaged in SSR processes. It is argued that without ensuring meaningful and inclusive local ownership of SSR programmes, public trust and confidence in state security and justice sector institutions will be limited. Crucially, this will leave the state vulnerable to renewed outbreaks of conflict. To rectify this it is proposed that a hybrid SSR approach be promoted by incorporating community safety structures into SSR programmes.*

Link: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17502977.2014.930219>

### **Security sector reform in Africa: Donor approaches versus local needs**

- Nadine Ansorg (2017)

*Many African states have security sector reform (SSR) programs. These are often internationally funded. But how do such programs account for previously existing security institutions and the security needs of local communities? This article examines SSR all over Africa to assess local ownership and path dependency from a New Institutional perspective. It finds that SSR, particularly in post-conflict countries, tends to be driven by ideas and perceptions of international donors promoting generalized blueprints. Often, such programs only account in a very limited way for path-dependent aspects of security institutions or the local context. Hence, the reforms often lack local participation and are thus not accepted by the local community eventually.*

Link: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2016.1278343>

### **Leadership Changes and Civil War Agreements: Exploring Preliminary Links**

- Carmela Lutmar & Lesley Terris (2016)

*The emergence of civil wars as the predominant type of conflict in the twenty-first century has prompted scholars to reformulate and revisit many of the questions treated in the interstate conflict literature. One of these questions concerns the impact of leadership changes on policy decisions within the realm of war and peace. Studies have suggested that in interstate disputes, the coming to power of new leaders in one or both of the disputing governments increases the prospects of war termination. We argue that within the context of intrastate disputes this relationship is more complex and multilayered due to factors that are characteristic of rebel groups and civil wars. We suggest that leader overturns in rebel groups are likely to lead, under certain conditions to more, rather than less, hardline conflict positions, at least in the short term, thus hindering possible negotiation processes. We test our hypothesis on a dataset of leadership changes and agreements ending civil wars in Africa, 1975–2007.*

Link:

[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/309294145\\_Leadership\\_Changes\\_and\\_Civil\\_War\\_Agreements\\_Exploring\\_Preliminary\\_Links](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/309294145_Leadership_Changes_and_Civil_War_Agreements_Exploring_Preliminary_Links)

### **Modern post-conflict security sector reform in Africa: patterns of success and failure**

- Sarah Detzner (2017)

*This piece examines recurring patterns in the ‘where’ and ‘how’ of security sector reform (SSR) implementation failures in post-conflict African SSR programmes featuring substantial external involvement that have been undertaken since the mid-1990s. It finds, briefly that in these efforts, gaps in SSR implementation have tended to occur at the same points in the SSR process repeatedly. The most common issues include failures to correctly assess the post-conflict security environment, failures to ensure local ownership of reform efforts, failures to devote sufficient resources and attention to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR, a process with close ties to SSR and force integration), failures by donors to coordinate goals and resources, and failures to include critical parts of both the de jure and de facto security sector in reforms. Post-conflict African success stories also share common characteristics, most notably a deep and wide level of societal involvement at most stages of the SSR process. These patterns, analysed as a necessary first step to discovering the ‘why’ of implementation failures in such cases, collectively suggest a focus on the early mobilisation of domestic political demand for SSR, rather than on varying methods of applying external pressure, as a fruitful avenue for future research.*

Link: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10246029.2017.1302706>

### **New directions for African security**

- Toni Haastrup & Hylke Dijkstra (2017)

*African security, particularly conflict-related political violence, is a key concern in international relations. This forum seeks to advance existing research agendas by addressing four key themes: domestic politics and peacekeeping; security sector reform programs; peace enforcement; and the protection of civilians. Each of the articles in this forum makes a case for analyzing African agency when it comes to African security. As a way of introduction, this short article sets out the main debates and concludes by providing further directions for future research.*

Link: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2017.1293392>

### **From States to Secretariats: Delegation in the African Union Peace and Security Council**

- Heidi Hardt (2016)

*African Union member states are formally responsible for deciding on peace operation mandates, yet evidence from the African Union Peace and Security Council indicates that states informally delegate some decision-making autonomy to the commission. Given the commission’s formal responsibilities in implementation, why have member states delegated any decision-making in international security? This article argues that, faced with resource limitations, African Union states surrender some decision-making autonomy to access relevant information, make informed decisions, and strengthen*

*mandates. The argument challenges assertions that delegation does not occur in security decision-making. Findings draw on interviews with African Union ambassadors, commission staff, and other regional organization elites.*

Link: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19392206.2016.1208474>

### **Filling a Leaking Bathtub? Peacekeeping in Africa and the Challenge of Transnational Armed Rebellions**

- Damien Deltenre & Michel Liégeois (2016)

*This research addresses the issue of transnational civil wars and United Nations peace operations in Africa and seeks to understand what is wrong with the current practices of international peacekeeping and why they underperform when confronted to transnational non-state actors. Based on a dynamic approach to armed conflicts and quantitative data, this paper finds that the current international peacekeeping practices are inadequate in the African context where porous borders and competing weak states dominate. It argues that border control should become a primary concern of every peace operation deployed in Africa.*

Link: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19392206.2016.1132902>

### **African solutions to African problems? The AU, R2P and Côte d'Ivoire**

- Ella Abatan & Yolanda Spies (2016)

*The African continent is inextricably linked to the development of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm and the latter's ethical interpretation of the duties associated with state sovereignty. With the African Union (AU) having institutionalised R2P in its legal-institutional foundation of 2000, the stage seemed set for the new African Peace and Security Architecture to demonstrate the continent's ramped-up interventionist approach to security. One of the first cases that presented an opportunity to do so was the humanitarian crisis that erupted after the 2010 elections in Côte d'Ivoire. As the crisis unfolded, however, it became clear that the AU was not only unable to operationalise its institutionalised R2P mechanisms, but indeed reluctant to invoke R2P explicitly. This raises serious concerns about the AU's willingness to intervene in its member states when humanitarian atrocities are perpetrated by governments against their own people, and throws into serious doubt the AU's promise to provide 'African solutions to African problems'.*

Link: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10220461.2016.1153516>

### **Civilian protection in Africa: How the protection of civilians is being militarized by African policymakers and diplomats**

- Linnéa Gelot (2017)

*This article explores how the protection of civilians is being militarized by African policymakers and diplomats. I draw on practice approaches to analyze what social groups are doing when they claim to "protect civilians." I show how innovative protection mechanisms can be seen as a function of officials and diplomats coping with the changing circumstances of increasingly militarized politics in Africa. Specifically, accountability mechanisms for unintended and intended civilian harm by African security operations have originated in connection with this development. I argue that these are results of anchoring practices, which means that everyday informal interactions in one context become linked to another context. I argue that these emerging accountability mechanisms represent a new combination of practices, with the potential of changing the routine activities and mutual learning between policymakers and diplomats.*

Link: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2017.1291564>

### **The imperative of African perspectives on International Relations (IR)**

- Amy Niang (2016)

*This article argues that location, as both geography and epistemology, can be a place of innovation in the discipline of international relations (IR). Specifically, it suggests that a re-appropriation of IR as a product of a global history in which the Global South, in general, and Africa, in particular, played an important role can help displace the moral*

*and historical centrality of Western theory where it has failed to give credence to 'peripheral' experience and social thought. This belief coincides with a commonsense according to which the production of knowledge is by necessity inseparable from the intellectual conventions, traditions and lineages of the place of production. This means that African universities in particular have the opportunity to generate new perspectives in IR based on the analyses of the historical events that marked the life of the continent. In this manner, thinking and teaching IR in Africa would consist of revisiting the received truths about the evolution of the international order and society by revising their historical underpinnings, where necessary, and by interrogating the 'unit-ideas' that structure disciplinary impulses.*  
Link: <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0263395716637092>

### **Explaining & Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Towards a Cultural Theory of Democracy**

- L. Adele Jinadu (2007)

*This paper explores the relationship between armed conflict and constitutional and political engineering in ethno-plural African societies. These societies are often characterized by persistent deep-rooted and identity-related conflicts. These are conflicts fuelled by "a combination of potent identity-based factors with wider perceptions of economic and social injustice," regarding the distribution or means of sharing economic, social and political resources within the state (Harris and Reilly 1998: 9). In Africa there have since the mid-1960s been prolonged and protracted ethnic-related violent political conflicts, including in some cases, civil wars in the following countries: Algeria, Burundi, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire), Cote d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger Republic, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, the Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe. Little wonder, therefore, that there has been a renewed global policy-related and intellectual interest in ethnic conflict in recent years, because of the state building-including peace, development and security-problems they continue to pose for domestic and international politics.*

Link: <http://nai.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A278846&dswid=-5503>

### **Exporting decentred security governance: the tensions of security sector reform**

- Rita Abrahamsen (2016)

*Security Sector Reform (SSR) has become the developed world's preferred approach to transforming security governance in poor and fragile countries and a key instrument in the state builder's toolkit. This article approaches SSR as a social technology informed by international 'best practice' and models of governance that seek to build secure communities in so-called fragile states while simultaneously securing the developed world from the perceived risks posed by these states. It shows how recent efforts to export security governance reflect the impact of modernist social science on development policy and how the ascendancy of networked policy models has inspired reforms to endorse non-state security actors and build security partnerships between state and non-state actors in fragile states. These approaches are however fraught with tensions, in large part because the non-state – especially after the events of 11 September 2001 – remains associated with state failure and danger. Thus, much as SSR has by necessity come to acknowledge the multiplicity of security providers in fragile states, current initiatives nevertheless seek to position the state at the hub of a network of security providers. In so doing, SSR fails to recognise the 'statelessness of the state' and the manner in which governance, order and security are produced and assembled in interaction and competition between multiple actors and institutions.*

Link: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17440572.2016.1197507>

### **Democratic Institutions, Natural Resource Governance, and Ghana's Oil Wealth**

- Felix Kumah Abiwu (2017)

*The literature on natural resources is endowed with works on countries that have experienced slow economic performance despite their abundant natural resources (resource curse), with the exception of Norway and other few*

*countries. Strong institutions and good governance practices have been underscored as some of the explanatory factors to the high performance of the outlier countries. Ghana's oil discovery in the era of its advancing democratic practices has led some to argue that the country might escape the resource curse phenomenon. While recognizing the importance of this argument, this article, however, argues that Ghana's likelihood of escaping the resource curse could be problematic due to its exclusive emphasis on democratic governance without greater focus on oil sector governance. Drawing on the theory of agenda setting and the existing literature, the article makes the case for agenda shift in the debate on Ghana's oil wealth and development. It stresses the need for a dualistic governance (the democratic and the oil sector) approach in the broader discourse on how Ghana can escape the resource curse.*

Link: <https://doaj.org/article/56b20ef326f843348ed3f8bf7804a6ac>

### **African problems with African solutions: The history of a common phrase**

- Katharina P. W. Döring (2015)

Link: [https://issuu.com/leolux/docs/powision\\_ownership\\_issuu/16](https://issuu.com/leolux/docs/powision_ownership_issuu/16)

### **Escaping Statebuilding: Resistance and Civil Society in the Democratic Republic of Congo**

- Marta Iniguez de Heredia (2012)

*That statebuilding entails violence and dispossession, even in its contemporary form, is illustrated by the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The question this begs is not whether resistance exists but rather where and how it operates. Following James Scott, the article shows that resistance takes place as a quotidian strategy of mitigation, avoidance and escapism for which civil society acts as a platform. Highlighting civil society's ambiguity and heterogeneity, the article conceives of it as a site of resistance and analyses three strategies that are channelled through it: the deployment of counter-discourses, the use of violence and the production of the social fabric.*

Link: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17502977.2012.655567>

### **Gender and Security in Africa:**

#### **Women, peace and security in Africa: Conceptual and implementation challenges and shifts**

- Cheryl Hendricks (2015)

*This article highlights and critiques the underlying conceptualisations and assumptions of the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda that emerged with the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000. The main argument is that we need to rethink the WPS agenda to produce more holistic and groundbreaking responses for the types of challenges encountered, i.e., that gender inequality and insecurity are deep rooted and multi-layered, and thus negate mechanistic responses that do not deal with cultural and structural issues. It specifically focuses on gender and peace-making and gender and peacekeeping to point to the pitfalls in the current conceptions and practices in this arena. Article ahead-of-print.*

Link: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10246029.2015.1099759>

#### **Militarism, conflict and women's activism in the global era: challenges and prospects for women in three West African contexts**

- Amina Mama & Margo Okazawa-Rey (2012)

*This article develops a feminist perspective on militarism in Africa, drawing examples from the Nigerian, Sierra Leonean and Liberian civil wars spanning several decades to examine women's participation in the conflict, their survival and livelihood strategies, and their activism. We argue that postcolonial conflicts epitomise some of the worst excesses of militarism in the era of neoliberal globalisation, and that the economic, organisational and ideological*

*features of militarism undermine the prospects for democratisation, social justice and genuine security, especially for women, in post-war societies. Theorisations of 'new wars' and the war economy are taken as entry points to a discussion of the conceptual and policy challenges posed by the enduring and systemic cultural and material aspects of militarism. These include the contradictory ways in which women are affected by the complex relationship between gendered capitalist processes and militarism, and the manner in which women negotiate their lives through both. Finally, we highlight the potential of transnational feminist theorising and activism for strengthening intellectual and political solidarities and argue that the globalised military security system can be our 'common context for struggle' as contemporary feminist activist scholars.*

Link: <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/fr.2011.57>

### **A case study of gender and security sector reform in Zimbabwe**

- Netsai Mushonga (2015)

*This article explores gender and security sector reform (SSR) in Zimbabwe from 2008 to the present. It firstly postulates that the purpose of gender-sensitive SSR is to transform security services so as to enhance human security, as opposed to having an exclusive focus on state and territorial security. A comprehensive analysis of the policy and legislative framework governing gender and SSR at the global, continental, sub-regional and national levels will be presented, followed by the argument that efforts to reform the partisan and oftentimes non-professional tendencies of the security sector – especially the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, Zimbabwe Republic Police, Central Intelligence Organisation and Zimbabwe Prison Services – to promote democracy have met with firm resistance. However, gender-sensitive SSR has made significant headway in Zimbabwe since it is considered less threatening by the government. It should be noted, nevertheless, that gender-sensitive SSR has the potential to shift levels of professionalism and accountability within the sector as well as change attitudes to enhance security at the personal and communal levels. The process can gradually increase the percentage of women serving in the security sector. In conclusion, recommendations are made to broaden and deepen gender-sensitive SSR as the only viable alternative in the current political environment in Zimbabwe.*

Link: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2015.1088655>

### **Useful Links and Policy Documents**

#### **AU Solemn declaration on a common African defense and security policy (2004)**

<http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/declaration-cadsp-en.pdf>

#### **African Peace and Security Architecture: Roadmap 2016-2020**

<http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/2015-en-apsa-roadmap-final.pdf>

#### **AU Peace and Security Department at a glance: ending conflicts, sustainable peace**

<http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psd-brochure-eng-.pdf>

#### **AU protocol relating to the Establishment of the peace and Security Council of the African union**

<http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-protocol-en.pdf>

#### **Common African position on the UN review of peace operations**

<http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.502.peace.operations.29-04-2015-1-.pdf>

#### **African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA): 2010 Assessment Study**

<http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/report-of-the-apsa-assessment-study-july-oct-2010-eng.pdf>

**Peacebuilding, conflict prevention and conflict monitoring in the African Peace and Security Architecture**

<http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/African-Peace-Security-Architecture-Background-Note-ECDPM-2016.pdf>

**Military Expenditure (% of GDP)**

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS>

**Military spending in Africa**

<http://visuals.sipri.org/>

**African Peace Facility**

<http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/success-stories/african-peace-facility>

**US Security Assistance**

<https://securityassistance.org/africa>

**Securing Predictable and Sustainable Financing for Peace in Africa**

<http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auhr-progress-report-final-020916-with-annexes.pdf>

**Conflict Trend Report in Africa**

<http://www.acleddata.com/research-and-publications/>

**AU Peace Fund Could Be Catalyst for True UN Partnership**

<https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/07/african-union-peace-fund-united-nations/>

**Financing the AU**

<https://au.int/en/financingau>

**Strategy for the Harmonization Of Statistics In Africa (Shasa) Governance, Peace And Security (Gps) Data**

[http://www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/library/reports/strategy\\_for\\_the\\_harmonization\\_of\\_statistics\\_in\\_africa\\_shasa\\_governance\\_peace\\_and\\_security\\_gps\\_data.html](http://www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/library/reports/strategy_for_the_harmonization_of_statistics_in_africa_shasa_governance_peace_and_security_gps_data.html)

**Enhancing U.S. Support for Peace Operations in Africa**

<https://www.cfr.org/report/enhancing-us-support-peace-operations-africa>