

**Research workshop “The African Union and
unbridled militarization?
New approaches to African peace and security
governance”**

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**The Positive and Negative Militarization
Nexus**

Dr. Carmela Lutmar
School of Political Sciences
Division of International Relations
University of Haifa
clutmar@poli.haifa.ac.il

Introduction

Since the beginning of the de-colonization process during the Cold War the question of regime stability and democratization gained momentum in the conflict resolution literature. The Powers proxy wars strategy in Africa prevented a global support for these processes. Since the 1990s the connection between conflict resolution in Africa and democratization was identified in theory and in practice mainly during many interventions in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan. Traditionally, conflict resolution theory emphasizes processes such as demobilization, disarmament and de-militarization to encourage trust between belligerent parties.

In practice during the 21st century the AU political and security framework also encourages national and regional militarization to increase the capacity of national militaries in order to improve the political stability in the country, address unemployment, and deal with terrorist threats

Therefore, we identify in this paper two types of militarization -- a positive one and a negative one -- that together create a nexus. Using conflict resolution theories and militarization literature our project aims to introduce a series of variables which have an effect on what type of militarization is being developed in a specific African countries. That is, we aim to analyze under what conditions would the two different types of militarization identified earlier develop in various African countries?

This project aims to look at variables such as military leaders, size of the army, existence (or lack of) of conscription, military alliances, military procurement,

military budget, political leaders, regime type, involvement in conflicts (past and present), and political stability.

The hope is that we will be able to provide a theoretical and analytical framework to a very important and relevant question in a continent that increasingly attracts well-deserved scholarly attention.

For the workshop I chose to focus on the role of leadership change in inducing more peaceful relations in the aftermath of civil wars, and following peace agreements. Later on we will introduce additional variables into the discussion. The goal here is to basically introduce the general project – and then a few insights about the links between leadership change, civil wars, and peace agreements in Africa.

Leadership Changes during Conflict

Research focusing on interstate conflict has produced a growing body of leader-specific research that explores the influence of leadership changes on foreign policy decisions. Numerous studies suggest that negotiation processes might be prompted by domestic shifts such as the rise of new leaders, the emergence of a divided leadership, or a split in a government previously unified in its war aims (Mitchell, 2000: 89; Schelling, 1966: 85-86; Stedman 1991). Several explanations are proposed to account for this effect. First, internal political changes expose strategies and ways out of a situation which might have been overlooked or ignored by the previous leadership (Stedman 1991; Greig 2001). Secondly, even cases in which the current leadership supports negotiations, a change in leadership might be needed to pull away from failed conflict policies (Lieberfeld, 1999; Mitchell, 2000; Stedman, 1991). Thirdly, new leaders are not necessarily

committed to the policies of their predecessors or held accountable to them. Therefore, they will find it easier—and politically less costly—to 'change course' (Mitchell, 2000, p. 89-90). In fact, the very advent of a new leader will often produce, or result from, an expectation for a policy shift, thus creating an environment in which new strategies are easier to pursue. Finally, adversaries are less likely to harbor distrust against new leaders than against their predecessors, making it easier to engage in negotiations. Thus, periods of leadership change may signal the potential for the development of a peaceful conflict resolution process.¹ Bercovitch and Lutmar (2010) find statistical support for this argument when tested against a dataset covering 221 interstate conflicts that took place in the 1945-2000 period. They find that conflicts in which one or both of the participating countries experienced leadership changes are likely to be conducive to the initiation of negotiations and mediation, and that this relationship is stronger in democracies than in non-democracies.

Yet whereas research on leaderships and leadership changes has flourished in the context of interstate relations, a similar shift to leadership-specific research has not occurred in the scholarship on intrastate war. This neglect is particularly puzzling considering the fact that the majority of conflicts taking place in the international system since the end of the Cold War constitute civil wars. A sizable body of literature has emerged on the outbreak, severity and duration of intrastate disputes (e.g., Fearon 2004; Fearon & Laitin 2003; Fearon, Kasara & Laitin 2007; Fuhrmann & Tir 2009; Hegre et al., 2001; Metternich 2011; Regan 2002; Regan &

¹Changes in leadership might not always lead to changes in policy. New leaders might simply assume the positions of those they have replaced, especially if the old leaders are established and well regarded. It is not also necessarily the case that a change in leadership and a subsequent review of options, goals and policies, will result in a more conciliatory pattern of behavior (Mitchell 2000, p. 90). That said, given that conflict is already taking place, conciliatory options that did not exist (or were not perceived as existing) beforehand are more likely to surface or become exposed with a "change of the guards".

Stam 2000; Sambanis 2001; Walter 2014). A similarly impressive body of literature has focused on the conditions under which settlements ending civil war are reached, and the conditions that promote the durability of these settlements (e.g., Badran 2014; DeRouen, Ferguson, Norton, Park, Lea & Streat-Barlett 2010; DeRouen, Lea & Wallenstein 2009; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Fortna, 2004; Greig and Regan, 2008; Hampson, 1996; Hartzell 1999; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Hartzell, Hoddie, & Rothchild, 2001; Licklider, 1995; Mason & Fett, 1996; Walter, 1997, 2002). However, the role of leaders and leadership shifts in these intrastate processes has drawn limited attention, and to date has not been put to statistical testing.²

Civil Wars and Rebel Group Leadership Change – Research

Hypothesis

A key motivation for researching conflict processes is to gain a better understanding into the conditions that might lead to the de-escalation of conflict once violence has erupted. Within this context, internal conflicts pose considerable challenges for peaceful conflict resolution. Civil conflicts carry potentially grave consequences - for domestic populations, neighboring states, and regional or even global stability. Not only do a high number of civil conflicts result in complex humanitarian crises, but rarely do they remain contained within the borders of the conflict state. In many cases, either massive refugee flows are prompted by the violence and/or the conflict spills over national boundaries. In other cases, allies

² One notable exception is Licklider (1993). Additionally, Lounsbury and Cook (2011) indirectly touch upon this issue by investigating whether changes in the cohesiveness of rebel groups (specifically, the splintering of rebel groups) tend to precede or result from mediation attempts. In a separate paper we develop a theoretical framework for the examination of the effect of leadership change on mediation in intrastate conflict and use the data presented here to systematically explore our hypotheses.

are drawn into the conflict transforming the conflict into a multiparty internationalized confrontation. The high costs and potential for spread involved in intrastate disputes render such conflicts events in which internal and external parties might be expected to have a high interest in resolving, or containing at the very least. Yet, at the same time, intrastate disputes are particularly difficult to resolve peacefully. They often concur with a revolutionary struggle and involve individuals who place principles before interests, thereby rendering a compromise particularly difficult to negotiate (Stedman 1991; Olson & Pearson 2002). This lends to conflicts that tend to be more complex, drawn out and intractable than interstate wars, consequently entailing particularly high negotiation costs and risks.

Thus, there is a need to gain a better understanding of the dynamics involved in civil conflicts and of the conditions that might promote their resolution by peaceful means. Within this context the role played by leadership changes among rebels groups and the government side constitute important information both for decision makers among the disputing parties and for third parties considering the prospects of intervention.

Because civil conflicts often spawn a multiplicity of groups, alliances, and sub-groups, some of the complexities entailed in ending civil conflicts as compared to interstate disputes are linked to the number of groups involved and competing interests among their leaders. Instead of clearly defined and legitimate representatives of governments that partake in interstate negotiations, leaders of these groups are not always officially recognized, are often reluctant to engage in any formal negotiations and are motivated themselves by complex and often contradicting interests. New leaders, might not only be reluctant to break away from such fluid circumstances but might also seek to bolster support of the group members and strengthen cohesion among them by emphasizing intransigent positions both vis-à-vis the government and vis-à-vis competing groups, rather

than flexibility. When these groups constitute rejectionist movements, splinter groups, or spoilers, intent on derailing any progress made in negotiations new leaders are even more unlikely to shift to positions that allow for compromise. Although rendering negotiations a particularly difficult endeavor such actors cannot be ignored. The collapse of the Arusha Accords in 1994 and the ensuing genocide exemplify the potential catastrophic consequences of failing to include such extremists in negotiations or otherwise neutralize them (Clapham 1998; Stettenheim 2000). Thus we expect leadership changes under conditions of multiplicity of competing groups and sub-groups to lead to greater inflexibility, at least in the short-term. Another leader-specific factor that may impinge on a peaceful impact of leadership change is that in many intrastate conflict situations, rebel groups, especially their leaders, profit personally from the ongoing conflict especially when natural resources are used to fuel the dispute (Collier 2000; Collier & Hoeffler 2004; Collier, Hoeffler & Soderman 2004). This implies that neither the current nor the succeeding leader would have a strong incentive to reach a settlement. While governments involved in interstate conflict may as well benefit from conflict as well, such benefits are typically in the realm of public support (such as in a rally around the flag effect), do not last long and are not likely to survive over leadership shifts.

The above suggests that when it comes to leadership changes among sides engaged in civil war, these complexities will lend to a relationship that is less straightforward and pronounced between leadership change and conflict resolution than that which appears to exist in interstate conflicts, particularly when the leadership change is on the side of a rebel group. Even in cases where the new leaders identify an interest in ending the conflict peacefully, new rebel leaders will find it more difficult and politically risky to change course than new government leaders. One explanation for this is that new rebel leaders often lack the necessary

legitimacy-base, political apparatus and resources that new government leaderships—both in democratic and non-democratic regimes—possess and that are needed to implement policy shifts without destabilizing their power base. Thus, the complexities involved in civil war will lead to different, and more sophisticated, causal mechanisms between leadership change and negotiations processes.

We examine below the impact of leadership shifts on intrastate postwar dispute resolution outcomes in Africa, 1975-2007. We chose to focus on Africa because of the number of civil wars, and the multiple peace agreements and ceasefires that have been reached in those civil wars along the years.

Leadership Change and Peace Agreements in Africa – Data and Empirical Results

The data on rebel leader changes was taken from a new dataset on rebel leader changes in civil wars, compiled by the author. For government leader-change data we rely on the Archigos data base on leaders (Goemans, Gleditsch & Chiozza 2009). Data on civil war peace agreements and cease-fires is taken from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (V2).

The analysis focuses on whether a peace agreement was reached between the government and rebel group(s) following a leadership change on either the government side or within any of the rebel groups involved in the conflict. In order to capture both short and longer term influence, we look at three different timeframes: peace agreements reached within 6 months of the leader change, within 12 months, and within 18 months. Our subset contains 57 civil wars. During the period covered 90 peace agreements were reached, suggesting the recurrence of war in many cases leading to subsequent agreements. Rebel group leaders changed only 39 times as compared to 59 government leadership shifts.

During the first 6 months following a leadership change on either the government or rebel side, 5 peace agreements were reached, and in the six months after that an additional 5 agreements were signed. In the last 6 months examined one additional settlement was reached. Thus 11 peace agreements were reached within 18 months of a leadership change on either one or both sides, which is 12.2% of the total peace agreements reached. In other words, the majority of civil war settlements (87.8 %) were reached more than 18 months after a leadership change, indicating a weak relationship, if any at all, between leadership change in civil wars and peace settlements.

When we look at the impact of leadership changes that occur on the rebel side only, this trend is even more pronounced. Whereas government leadership change prompted the signing of 5 peace agreements within 6 months of the leader change, rebel leader changes did not prompt peace agreements at all in the short term. No peace settlements were reached within 6 months of a leadership change on the rebel side. This lends support to our claim that rebel leader changes might lead to less flexible strategies, at least in the short term.

Conclusions

In contrast to theorizing and findings based in the interstate dispute literature, the preliminary results presented in this paper suggest that in civil wars the relationship between leadership shifts and ending conflict is more complex than it is found to be in interstate disputes, and may discourage, rather than promote, peace. In this sense, leadership changes, especially when they take place on the side of the rebels, may lead, at least initially, to more astringent, rather than moderate, conflict positions. An examination of the more long term effects of leadership change in rebel groups may shed further light on this process.

Also, a better understanding of other factors involved in rebel groups and leadership changes such as the effects of different types of leadership changes (violent or non-violent) or whether the rebel group was motivated by territorial or political objectives may provide further insight into the different ways by which leadership changes in rebel groups may impact a conflict's course. Clearly, these issues warrant further theoretical and empirical attention. A deeper understanding of the impact of leader shifts in civil war will provide important information for policy makers among the conflicting sides regarding the conditions under which the prospects for successful conflict resolution are highest in civil wars. The findings will also provide important information for third parties considering the option of triggering or supporting a leadership change.

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Figure 1: No. of Conflicts by No. of Groups Involved




Table 1

# of rebel groups	# of civil wars
1	90
2	38
3	13
4	4
5	8
6	1
7	3
8	1
9	0
10	0
11	1


Table 1a

# of rebel group leaders	Way of ending tenure
15	Natural Death
12	Ousted internally
5	Ousted externally
69	Political election
11	Arrested/Surrendered
10	Exiled/Fled
20	Assassinated
13	Killed
28	Unknown

Table 1b

# of rebel group leaders	Way of ending tenure
12	Natural Death
7	Ousted internally
5	Ousted externally
38	Political election
9	Arrested/Surrendered
3	Exiled/Fled
19	Assassinated
17	Killed
28	Unknown

Figure 2. Rebel Groups by Group Goals



1=secessionist goals; 2=irredentist goals; 3=autonomy 4=greater political power/rights; 5=government overturn; 6=unknown

Table 3 – Conflicts in Africa 1975-2007

Ethiopia – 1962-1991
Sudan – 1963-1972
Rwanda – 1963-1964
Chad – 1965-1972
Uganda – 1966
Nigeria – 1967-1970
Congo (Kinshasa) – 1967
Uganda – 1971-1972
Zimbabwe – 1972-1979
Mauritania – 1975-1979
Morocco – 1975—
Angola – 1975-1991
South Africa – 1976-1994
Congo (Kinshasa) – 1977
Chad – 1978-1982
Uganda – 1978-1979
Mozambique – 1979-1993
Nigeria – 1980-1981
Zimbabwe – 1980-1988
Uganda – 1981-1986
Gambia – 1981
Chad – 1983-1988
Sudan – 1983 – 2010
Nigeria – 1984
Nigeria – 1986 –
Uganda – 1986-1988

Burundi – 1988
Liberia – 1989-1996
Rwanda – 1990-1994
Niger – 1990-1995
Mali – 1990-1995
South Africa – 1991-1999
Djibouti – 1991-1994
Somalia – 1991 – 2010
Burundi – 1991-1992
Chad – 1991-1995
Sierra Leone – 1991-1999
Congo (Kinshasa) – 1992-1997
Kenya – 1992-1999
Egypt – 1992-1999
Ethiopia – 1992-2010
Angola – 1992-2009
Algeria – 1992-2010
Burundi – 1993-1994
Burundi – 1996-1999
Congo (Brazaville) – 1996-1997
Guinea – Bissau – 1998
Congo (Kinshasa) – 1998-1999
Uganda – 2000-2010
Liberia – 2000-2003
Rwanda – 2000-2010
Senegal – 2000-2003
Sierra Leone – 2000
Congo – 2000-2008

Burundi – 2000-2008

Chad – 2000-2010

Mali – 2007-2009

Table 4

Peace Agreements in Africa 1975-2007

Conflict	Year of peace agreement	6 mo	12 mo	18 mo
Congo, Kinshasa	1999	1	1	1
South Africa	1991	0	1	1
Zimbabwe	1975	0	1	1
Zimbabwe	1975	1	1	1
Mozambique	1979	1	1	1
Rwanda	1990	1	1	1
South Africa	1991	0	1	1
Somalia	1996	0	0	1
Burundi	2001	0	1	1
Somalia	2008	1	1	1
Sudan	2005	0	1	1

5 conflicts reached a peace agreement within 6 months,
10 within 12 months,
and 11 within 18 months.

Leadership change in rebel groups – violent and non-violent

Natural Death

Lebanon – 11/98 – Georges Saadeh

Ethiopia – 10/77 – Tafari Benti

Chad – 6/82 – Ahmat Acyl

Sudan – 7/05 – John Garang de Mabior

Iraq – 3/79 – Mustafa Barazani

Angola – 1/03 – Isaias Samakuwa

Thailand – 12/08 – Kabir Abdul Rahman

England – 5/71 – Frank Keane

Pakistan – 8/09 – Baitullah Mehsud

Myanmar – 12/06 – Bo Mya

Nigeria – 6/98 – Sani Abacha

Somalia – 12/02 – Hussein Muhammad Farrah Aidid

Ousted Internally

Burundi – 12/01 – Pierre Nkurunziza

Rwanda – 10/90 – Fred Rwigyema

Cambodia – 2/96 – Pol Pot

Pakistan – 1/08 – Sufi Muhammad

Burundi – 3/01 – Cossan Kabura

Sudan – 8/71 – Emilio Tafeng, Joseph Lagu

Algeria – 2/93 – Cossan Kabura

Ousted Externally

Myanmar – 1/71

Spain – 1/71 – Emilio Lopez adan “Beltza”

Spain – 1/88 -- Emilio Lopez adan “Beltza”

Chad – 4/79 – Goukouni Oueddei

Myanmar – 2/71

Arrested/Surrendered

Sri Lanka – 5/71 – Janath Vimukthi Peramuia

Philippines – 11/77 – Jose Maria Sison

Gambia – 8/81 – Kokoi Samba Sanyang

Peru – 2/92 – Nestor Cerpa Cartolini

Georgia – 2/91 – Jaba Ioseliani

Turkey – 12/98 – Abdullah Ocelan

Burundi – 4/05 – Boulenouar Oukil

Sri Lanka – 4/71 – Rohana Wiweera

Peru – 2/92 – Abimael Guzman

Exiled/Fled

Nigeria – 1/70 – Chukwuemeka Odumegwo Ojukwu

Ethiopia – 5/91 – Mengistu Haile Mariam

Myanmar – 12/69 – Thakin Soe

Assassinated

Colombia – 4/48 – Jorge Gaitan

Myanmar – 5/69 – Thakin Than Tun

Myanmar – 8/69

Sudan – 6/68 – Joseph Oduho

Spain – 1/79 -- Emilio Lopez adan “Beltza”

Spain – 4/86 -- Emilio Lopez adan “Beltza”

Myanmar – 8/68 – Bo Tun Nyein

Bangladesh – 11/83 – Manabendra Narayan Larma

Mozambique – 10/79 – Andre Matsangassa

Peru – 4/97 – Nestor Cerpa Cartolini

Russia – 4/96 – Dzokhar Dudayev

Myanmar – 9/51 -- Thakin Than Tun, Bo Zeya

England – 10/70 – Maureen Keegan

Zimbabwe – 3/75 – Ndabaningi Sithole, Herbert Chitepo

Afghanistan – 3/95 – Abdul Ali Mazari

Pakistan – 8/09 – Hakimullah Mehsud

Spain – 2/76 – Pekito (Mujika Francisco Garmendia)

England – 2/80 – Seamus Costello, Dominic McGlinchey, Hugh Torney

England – 2/94 -- Seamus Costello, Hugh Torney

Killed

Yugoslavia – 6/99 – Adem Jashari

Chad – 2/68 – Ibrahim Abatcha

Spain – 12/70 – Juan Jose Etxabe

Spain – 10/74 -- Emilio Lopez adan “Beltza”

Mauritania – 6/76 – El-Quali Mustafa Sayed

Indonesia – 1/79 – Nicolau dos Reis Lobato

Burundi – 2/02 – Antar Zouabri

Burundi – 7/04 – Rachid Abou Tourab

Russia – 9/07 – Rappani Khalilov

Russia – 11/08 – Abdul Madzhid

Russia – 3/09 – Omar Sheikulayev

Russia – 6/10 – Umalat Magomedov

Russia – 7/10 – Magomed Vagabov

Chad – 9/02 – Youssouf Togoimi

Philippines – 8/03 – Salamat Hashim

Burundi – 6/96 – Djamel Zitouni

Myanmar – 10/88 – San Suu Kyi

Political Election

Congo Kinshasa – 4/99 – Emile Ilunga

Colombia – 6/56 – Alberto Lieras Camargo, Laureano Gomez

Colombia – 5/57 – General Gabriel Paris

Colombia – 1/58 – Jacinto Cruz Usma, Efrain Gonzalez

Colombia – 1/59 – Alfonso Lopez Michelsen

Colombia – 1/61 -- Alfonso Lopez Michelsen

Hungary – 11/56 – Janos Kadar

Yemen Arab Republic – 10/67 – Abdullah as-Sallal

South Africa – 2/91 – Oliver Tambo

Lebanon – 2/83 – Pierre Jamayel

Lebanon – 3/85 – Georges Saadeh

India – 8/88 – Muhammad Zia ul-Haq
India – 12/90 – Mirza Aslam Beg
India – 8/91 -- Mirza Aslam Beg
India – 1/93 – Asif Nawaz
India – 1/96 – Abdul Waheed
India – 10/98 – Jehangir Karamat
India – 12/90 -- Mirza Aslam Beg
India – 8/91 -- Mirza Aslam Beg
India – 1/93 – Asif Nawaz
Azerbaijan – 5/92 – Ayaz Mutallibov
Azerbaijan – 7/92 – Isa Gambar
Azerbaijan – 9/93 – Abulfaz Elchibey
Bosnia – 7/93 – Milivoj Petkovij
Bosnia – 11/93 – Slobodan Praljak
Bosnia – 8/94 – Ante Roso
Uganda – 3/79 – Yoweri Museveni, Tito Okello, David Oyite Ojok
Uganda – 6/79 – Yusuf Kironde Lul
Zimbabwe – 6/75 – Robert Mugabe
Zimbabwe – 12/87 – Joshua Nkomo
Nigeria – 8/93 – Ibrahim Babangida
India – 1/85 – Arun Shridhar Vaidya
India – 5/88 – Krishnaswamy Sundarji
India – 6/90 – Vishwa Nath Sharma
India – 6/93 – Sunith Francis Rodrigues
India – 11/94 – Bipin Chandra Joshi

India – 9/97 – Shankar Roychowdhury

Cambodia – 5/85 – Pol Pot