Empowerment, Militarization, CVE and Deradicalization
(The Case of Kenya and Somalia)

Draft

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The Kenyan intervention in Somalia in 2011 was a watershed in CVE/Deradicalization work in Somalia. First it heralded a territorial expansion of the forces of the African Union in Somalia, and their allies, enabling the creation of programs targeting the recruitment to Shabaab, in several cities vacated by the Shabaab, secondly it created terror in Kenya, putting CVE work higher up on the agenda. The 'Horn of Africa CVE boom' included non-governmental organizations the United Nations, as well as surprisingly weak state involvement on behalf of Kenya and Somalia. At times, it empowered the opposition towards the citing government, and it empowered actors not usually included in a security dialogue. The effects are more nuanced than an outright 'militarization' thesis in the sense that although it sets focus on security related developments, has empowered actors operating in other fields, and in many cases avoids the military. Indeed, the type of actors often involves civil society organizations, clan groupings, states, as well as international organizations. While CVE and deradicalisation programs bring these actors into a field related to security, they also provide an alternative to the military actors. The militarization thesis thus need to be nuanced in the case of Deradicalization and CVE work in East Africa.

The word 'militarization' has, as increasingly been used to describe western engagement in Africa. as well as the rhetoric of African leaders.[1] Often militarization is often seen as an increased military engagement by the west, an increased in rhetoric focusing on traditional security related issues, and at times worsen the possibilities for development and peace.[2] At the same time, western military engagement in Africa have increased as a consequence of the war on terror , symbolized by American military presence in 20 African countries and indeed Africa , the American African command, in 2007.[3]

The use of the term 'militarization' needs to be used with care. Militarization can easily be seen as something new. Writers as Divon and Derman (2017), have showed that military and security considerations for example guided American interaction with Africa, from the Truman Administration and onwards, and the United States supported regimes like Moi's Kenya, and Mobutu's Congo because of this, while the Soviet Union supported Mengistu Haile Mariam's Ethiopia.[4] As claimed by Shai Divon "for the most part - security, military and economic interests (which feedback to power and security in many cases) are behind most (US) policy decisions for Africa", and "Has been since the end of WWII".[5] Moreover, the term can easily create an impression of militarization is superimposed by the west on the African states, leaving the Africans without agency. This is, as will be shown, simply is not the case in Kenya and Somalia and CVE and Deradicalization programs,, where interaction between non-government organizations, international organizations, donors (often western governments) and the state, create a dynamic that at times actually shift away from military actors. The term 'Militarization' can easily lead to a state-centric approach, this although non-state actors plays a crucial role in deradicalization.

In order to proceed, Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) has to be defined, as has 'deradicalization, CVE is often claimed to be preventative in nature and to be "an approach intended to preclude individuals from engaging in, or materially supporting, ideologically

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[1] Eriksson & Gelot (2017) "Workshop in Uppsala, 22-24 November 2017", Conference Call, http://nai.uu.se/events/2017/african-security-and-unbr/ (accessed 17 November 2017)

[2] De Waal and Mohammed (2014)" A Handmaid to Africa's Generals" *New York Times,* 15 August

[3] Myre (2017)" The U.S. Military In Africa: A Discreet Presence In Many Places " NPR 20 October, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/10/20/558757043/the-u-s-military-in-africa-a-discreet-presence-in-many-places (accessed 17th November 2017)

[4] Divon and Derman (2017), "United States Assistance Policy in Africa", Routledge: London

[5] Communication with Shai Divon, the 17th November 2017

motivated violence".[6] Deradicalisation can be "the social and psychological process whereby an individual's commitment to, and involvement in, violent radicalization is reduced to the extent that they are no longer at risk of involvement and engagement in violent activity. De-radicalization may also refer to any initiative that tries to achieve a reduction of risk of re-offending through addressing the specific and relevant disengagement issues".[7] These definitions are contested and relatively open in their form, and indeed what they strive to address, the belief in the use of violence or the actions themselves. It is possible to group definitions of deradicalisation and CVE into a 'narrow' category that only includes rejection of ideological violence, and 'broad' that includes rejection of an ideological worldview that could legitimize violence.[8] The first version becomes close to 'disengagement', behavior changes, while the ideological or psychological aspects are left aside.[9] Some researchers will maintain that disengagement is the more feasible option; others would say that without addressing the attraction points to the ideology one has a much higher risk of re-radicalization and failure to exit. Successful programs based on both views exists. One has to keep in mind that deradiclization programs runs in totalitarian, or semi-totalitarian, regimes, and a focus on de-radicalization as changing a mindset, can be misused. (Zulaika and Douglass 1996; Agrawal 2013).[10] De-radicalization could easily become an excuse to prevent political activism for promoting democracy, political dialogue or the promotion of minority rights. Indeed, it could serve as a justification for avoiding deeper societal changes, as expressed by Al Jazeera's Margot Kiser about De-radicalization programs in east Africa "It [deradicalisation] seems a concept 100% politicized even before out the gate."[11]

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[6] Williams, (2017)." Prosocial behavior following immortality priming: experimental tests of factors with implications for CVE interventions". *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, 9(3),17

[7] Horgan, J., & Braddock, K. (2010). "Rehabilitating the Terrorists? Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalization Programs". *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 22(2),153

[8] Lid & Hansen (Forthcoming), «Introduction», in Lid & Hansen, *Handbook in Deradicalization*, Routledge: London

[9] Horgan, (2009). *Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements*. New York: Routledge (Political Violence Series); Horgan& Braddock. (2010). "Rehabilitating the Terrorists? Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalization Programs". *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 22(2),153; Koehler, Daniel (2016) "Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in Europe Current Developments and Issues for the Future" *PRISM Volume* 6, No 2

[10] Breen Smyth, Gunning, Jackson,. Kassimeris, and Robinson. (2008). "Critical Terrorism Studies – An Introduction." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 1 (1); Winkler (2006). *In the name of terrorism: presidents on political violence in the post-World War II era*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press; Zulaika & Douglass (1996). *Terror and taboo: the follies, fables, and faces of terrorism*. London: Routledge; Aggarwal (2013), "Mental discipline, punishment and recidivism: reading Foucault against de-radicalization programmes in the War on Terror", *Critical Studies of Terrorism* 6 (2)

[11] Correspondence with the writer 1 May 2017.

Importantly, varieties of actors are involved in CVE work, different configurations of agents, main implementers, External advisors, and contributors, occur. In United States, Municipality administrations have traditionally have less services to implement than Scandinavian municipalities, very often major agents in implementing the welfare state services. This might be the cause for the prominent role Municipalities enjoy in the Scandinavian de-radicalization arena, although the same implementers are notably absent from the American arena. Similarly, organizations doing development activities as DFID and NORAD will be involved in deradicalisation in Africa. Importantly, the actor implementing CVE work, or deradicalisation need not be related to security services or military forces, it can actually present a counterweight to efforts by such services, as other types of agencies replace them. In this sense, it is possible to argue that disengagement programs and CVE can be a counter weight to militarization, and mere continuations of existing crime prevention programs.

An overview of Deradicalization and CVE efforts in Kenya and Somalia.

In Kenya, many organizations are involved on different levels and with different approaches to CVE. Most of the non-state organizations do rather include CVE and deradicalization in their portfolio rather than only focusing on these themes. Often the organizations in question focuses on human rights promotion, religion or gender rights. Some of the larger organizations are human rights focused, as the Kenyan Human Rights Commission (KHRC), Kenyan National Commission for Human Rights (KNCHR), Independent Medico-legal Unit (IMLU) and Inform Action. In addition to these Nairobi based organizations, in Mombasa you also find HAKI Africa, MUHURI and Human rights Agenda (HURIA). In particular, the organizations in Mombasa are community-based organizations that largely are directly involved in human rights issues for citizens in the community. Some of the nationwide organizations are cooperating through nationwide networks. IMLU is also directly interacting with citizens survived from torture through their legal and aid service.[12] For some of the foreign donors, a such issue linkage, and a similar focus on supporting initiatives from individuals, networks and civil society. For example the CVE sub program of the

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[12] Hansen , Lid & Okwany (2016), "Countering violent extremism in Somalia and Kenya: actors and approaches", *NIBR Report* 2016/10

USAID supported Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI), was one of the pioneering foreign supported CVE efforts in Kenya. The program was operating between 2011 and 2013[13] Its focus, was on funding mechanism that supported individuals, networks and organizations, often with small grants implemented over a short duration, this was actually in contrast to the wider KTI, that , although also focusing on civil society and local communities also had supported courts and government registries.[14]

Several, but not all of the civil society actors, has a troubled past in relations to the Kenyan authorities, some of them, as Haki Africa, has even at times been banned by the authorities. CVE and Deradicalization programs have been used to facilitate dialogue with the police, but the tense relationship has hindered cooperation. Importantly, many of the above organization sees radicalization as a political problem, that has to be solved by structural changes, as well as individual steps. Yet these organizations have received support from outside actors as Norway. In this sense, it empowered indirectly a critique, of sometimes a militant state agenda. International organizations particularly IOM, UNODC and UNDP have been significant involved in CVE and deradicalization in Kenya, and both of them claim to be involved in the reintegration of returnees among the coast, supporting more 'policy blind' CVE and deradicalisation actors, and has been criticized for this.[15]

The key word, for the NGO actors in Kenya seem to be 'a continuation of the past' CVE and deradicalisation efforts are a product of issue alignment, where a continuing focus on crime prevention, and to a less effect poverty alleviation and gender rights promotion, has been expanded to include CVE-Deradicalization themes. The Deradicalization agenda of the west have allowed these organizations to tap into new funds, but have not really altered their modus of operandi, and tensions between them and the state still exists. Moreover, the continuation of the past in CVE and Deradicalization, might have led to a neglect of one of the most important areas for Shabaab

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[13] The program was first operational in Eastleigh and its environs. In 2012 it was expanded to the coast (Lamu, Kilifi, Kwale, Malindi and Mombasa)

[14] Khalil & Zeuthen, (2014) A Case Study of Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) Programming: Lessons from OTI's Kenya Transition Initiative. *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development*, 3(1); compare with the original program guidelines for the general program available at https://www.land-links.org/project/kenya-transition-initiative/ (accessed 17 November 2017)

[15] Hansen , Lid & Okwany (2016), "Countering violent extremism in Somalia and Kenya: actors and approaches", NIBR Report 2016/10

recruitment in Kenya, the North East, was neglected, as it lacked the same strong Human Rights NGOs as the coast and Nairobi.

This is not to say that the state lacked initiative to engage in CVE, but also deradicalisation. The Kenyan states effort in CVE was hampered by widespread distrust towards the preferred actors of the state engaging in such efforts, the police, and a service that also lacked experience in general crime prevention work (Hansen 2013). This was the case even after Kenya lunched a new strategy, to be implemented by the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government , and coordinated by the Kenyan counter terrorism center launched the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) in 2016, who in reality became a public-private partnership, but also stressing the importance of local administration. In one sense, it developed a framework where several of the older NGOs where allowed to run their existing projects , but strengthening coordination mechanisms, in many ways, as expressed by Omondi Owkani "the National Counter Violence Center under Ambassador Martin Kimani is just an office, they have no programs on the ground but coordinate with the interior ministry. "[16]

In Somalia, at least the nominal initiative came from the central government. In 2012, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) developed the National Program for the Treatment and Handling of Disengaged Combatants in Somalia. The purpose was to provide support to Low Risk Al Shabaab disengaged combatants to reintegrate back into the community. Four facilities were initially established, the most important was the one in Mogadishu, named the Serendi center. This center was heavily criticized for lack of transparency, and human rights collations, with original partners distancing themselves from the day-to-day running.[17] The Norwegian government funded it, and then the United Kingdom took over responsibility. Although being a part of a state program, both Somali parliamentarians, including the now minister of the constitution, and the ministry of justice felt that it was beyond their control and traditional elders and human rights groups where highly critical.[18]

A second facility in Baidoa, was funded by the German Government is in Baidoa and managed by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The Centre in Baidoa also included a female focused component, including women who had worked for al-Shabaab doing

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[16] Communication per e-mail with Omondi Okwani 17th November 2017
[17] Hansen , Lid & Okwany (2016), "Countering violent extremism in Somalia and Kenya: actors and approaches", NIBR Report 2016/10, 18
[18] ibid

logistics.   This facility slowly expanded, and became important covering the Bay-Bakool area, and was actually seen as more open by local actors than Serendi. Smaller center' where established in Belet Weyne (funded by the UK Government and managed by Adam Smith International (ASI)) and Kismayo the latter funded by the regional state in question, but later also receiving funding from Germany.[19]

These four centers varied widely in reputation, the Serendi center was by many actors, also as isolationistic, and superimposing them-selves without taking locals into account, as well as secretive, while the center in Baidoa, where seen as more open, and more accessible. Importantly, these centers where not the only option for defectors, nor did they really do CVE, rather focusing on Deradicalization. Perhaps the most common deradicalization structure in Mogadishu was the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) who directly enrolled defectors into its rank, but also including members from the Serendib facility. However, this again created distrust amongst average Somalis in Mogadishu, seeing the NISA as infiltrated, and seeing the same faces in government service that just months before had been a part of the Shabaab.[20] The NISA also has, and had, an important role in screening the participants for the Baidoa and Mogadishu centers, only candidates that are deemed by NISA to be receptive and less dangerous are allowed to participate in these centers. The four-center structure was initiated by the Somali state, but is far from controlled by them, to a certain extent, the lack of transparency and the secrecy in the case of Serendi, and NISAs role could be interpreted as a form of militarization. However, several private actors entered the field, and the profile of these actors are much more similar to the actors in Kenya. After 2013, the non-state CVE and Disengagement actors grew, including the older Elman human rights Centre that engaged in reintegrating children, in addition to their traditional human rights works, that included criticizing the armed forces. The Centre for Community Awareness (CCA) focusing on aiding youth at risk, and New Horizons in Mogadishu, became other important actors. Some of these organizations slide, due to issue alignment, into the CVE

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[19] Ibid; See also Hansen, Gelot & members of Isha human rights group (2017), ANATOMY OF COUNTER-JIHAD COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES ON REHABILITATION AND RECONCILIATION" *Report made to the UN Special Representative to Somalia*; United Nations' Assistance Mission in Somalia (2017)," Rehabilitation center for former Al-Shabaab fighters opens in Kismaayo" UNAMS Report, 2 March, https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/rehabilitation-centre-former-al-shabaab-fighters-opens-kismaayo (accessed 20 November 2017), the latter erroneously claim that the center opened in 2017 in Kismayo, it operated with local funding before thus
[20] Interview with professor Yahya Ibrahim, 20 May 2017.

deradicalisation business, none of them was fully focused on deradicalization, rather again being focused on Human rights work/ Youth empowerment. The same is the case with the Horn of Africa Voluntary Youth Committee (HAVAYOCO), founded in 1992, operates both in Hargeisa and Mogadishu, as well as in Ethiopia (in Addis Ababa and JigJiga), also implemented CVE related projects.

Another, perhaps equally important actor was clan elders, attempting to sway individuals from joining the Shabaab, often being called by parents, and often-channeling youth to the four centers that came because of the action plan. Although in many ways being in the frontline service , such efforts did get little outside support, yet elders coordinated, both with NISA and the United Nations, and played some role in the four centers of the action plan, as well as in other private sector programs. Similarly, religious sheiks at times affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, or Brotherhood offshoots, played a role, but was screened in Mogadishu by the Ministry of Justice.

The difference between Kenya and Somalia was in one sense that an International-National partnership played a larger role in Somalia, but that the Somali state was weaker in this partnership, to the extent of feeling excluded from the Serendi. Yet the State, through NISA was involved in two out of four centers created after the 2012 National program, they had no such involvement in the major Kenyan efforts, which actually was SUPKEMs deradicalisation and disengagement program that seemingly was the largest. In Kenya, CVE actors that was in opposition to the government actually was empowered by their CVE engagement. In Somalia, the private sector actors, save perhaps El Maan, lacked the experience and strength to address some of the more policy related questions influencing CVE- Deradicalisation, the most important actor in Somali Deradicalization and Disengagement work was probably the United Nations.

Conclusions

The increased focus on CVE and Deradicalisation in Kenya and Somalia was in large the results of the war in terror, but only after the Kenyan intervention in Somalia and the Shabaabs defeats in 2011 created the situation where CVE and deradicalization efforts was enabled. In Somalia, it became safer to implement such programs in larger Somali cities, and where the Kenyans learned that Shabaabs networks where a threat in Kenya. In Kenya it was private driven at the start, in

Somalia, the main drive was due to a a government initiative, in partnership with western powers and the United Nations. In Kenya it is possible to argue that the CVE agenda contributed to support to scrutiny of government services , through organizations as SUPKEM and Haki, heavily engaged in deradicalisation, In Somalia this effect was not present, whit the United Nations and foreign donors taking the lead. Yet also in Somalia, private sector initiatives existed, shunning deradicalization, but engaging in more general CVE work.

In this sense Somalia becomes a stronger case of Militarization, but the nuances are also here important, some centers where more open and interactive with the wider Somali community, and they provided an alternative to NISAs secretive more direct interaction schemes. CVE work also empowered civil society actors.