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Jihadi threat in the Sahara-Sahel region and new ad hoc regional security mechanisms
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Abstract

In response to salafi-jihadi insurgencies, new *ad hoc* regional security mechanisms emerged in the Sahara-Sahel region challenging African Union's monopoly over conflict management on the continent. The robust counter-terrorism mandates of these *ad hoc* mechanisms and their innovative architecture stress the deficiencies of both the African and International security systems towards growing asymmetric and regional threats. The emergence of a new form of security-based regionalism in Africa foreshadows an evolution of institutional arrangements between African and international organizations and lay the foundation of peacekeeping's future on the continent. Counter-terrorism efforts through *ad hoc* inter-governmental organizations already altered patterns of military cooperation between African States and their strategic partners and represent consequent extraversion opportunities to African ruling elites.

1. Introduction
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Introduction

Based on the observation of the regionalisation of the Jihadi threat in the Sahara-Sahel region, new *ad hoc* regional security mechanisms emerged with the creation in 2015 of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (*Force conjointe du G5 Sahel - FC-G5S*). Respectively linked to the regional organizations of Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel), we consider these two initiatives as *ad hoc* mechanisms because they are not part of the continental collective security framework developed by the African Union (AU), called the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Indeed, the two organizations are not recognized by the African Union (AU), contrary to the eight Regional Economic Communities (henceforth the RECs) which the continental organization identified as partners to promote peace and security in Africa.

The G5 Sahel, created in February 2014 by the leaders of Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad, defined itself as « *an institutional framework for the regional coordination and cooperation monitoring* » in two main areas: development and counter-terrorism. Thus, the aim of this *ad hoc* organization is to « *preserve territorial integrity of Member States and lead together a resolute action in order to ensure security in Sahel region* ». A coordination committee gathering Chiefs of Defence Staff of Member States was established to define common strategies, develop bilateral and multilateral strategic partnerships and plan operations including joint border patrols. This new crisis management level, favoured by this five Sahelian States, appears to be particularly well suited to non-African stakeholders' efforts against salafi-jihadi groups. French Chief of Staff declared, in October 2014, that the G5 Sahel was « *the best body to improve security in the region* ». In July 2017, the Heads of States of the G5 Sahel invited the French president Emmanuel Macron to announce, in Bamako, the official deployment of the Joint Force. Following a decision of the Heads of States' Summit of N'Djamena, in November 2015, the creation of the Joint Force became a reality, in February 2017, when the Heads of States approved, during an emergency Summit held in Bamako, the architecture and mandate of the Force. After months of diplomatic efforts to get the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) validated by the AU and the UN[1], respectively in April and June 2017, the Joint Force entered its deployment phase and conducted its first operation, called "Haw Bi", in November 2017.

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[1] PSC and UNSC 2017.

Although the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), created in 1964, is a much more older organization than the G5 Sahel, it has not yet been recognized by the AU as part of its collective security system, the APSA. Over last decades, this *ad hoc* organization has gathered Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger[2] to enable a concerted governance of Lake Chad's water and fishing resources. With the emergence of Boko Haram, the regional organization has imposed itself as the relevant institutional level to fight this threat in the region. In response to Boko Haram's intensified attacks in the region, the Member States and Benin decided, in February 2015, to create the FMM (Force Multinationale Mixte), a 8,700-strong joint regional military operation. This African-led operation received an international support from non-African stakeholders, such as France, United Kingdom and United States, especially in training programs and intelligence sharing.

The research on these new *ad hoc* regional mechanisms is at the intersection of different academic literatures on regionalism, counter-terrorism, peacekeeping and the concept of extraversion that emphasises the particular relations African States nurture with their international partners. In the Sahel region, the newly-created Joint Force of the G5 Sahel is a phenomenon interesting to study as all these concepts interact with each other.

Indeed, the emergence of new *ad hoc* security mechanisms in the Sahara-Sahel region stresses the formation of a Sahelian collective defence architecture which contests the monopoly of the APSA and steers its ongoing reconfiguration. The reshaping of the continental architecture and birth of new institutional arrangements between the African Union and regional organizations demonstrate the ongoing in-depth transformation in practices of conflict management in the region and Africa.

Moreover, the focus on counter-terrorism of this new security regionalism provide interesting insights on the foreseeable evolution of peace operations in Africa and their adaptation to environment characterized by rising asymmetric threats. The juridical, political and moral limits inherent to the UN prevent its mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to engage in a direct fight against salafi-jihadi groups which threatens the application of its mandate. The creation of the G5

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[2] Central African Republic and Libya became Member States of LCBC respectively in 1996 and 2008 but never got actively involved

Sahel's Joint Force is a strategic phenomenon that foreshadow a new "division of labour" between the UN and African organizations in charge of conflict management.

Furthermore, the research on counter-terrorism cooperation enhances the understanding of relations Sahelian States nurture with their international environment, especially with their privileged technical and financial partners such as the African Union (AU), United Nations (UN), European Union (EU) and France. Studying these relations implies to move beyond criticism based on the simple observation of African States' dependence on their extra-African partners. This work intends to focus on the reasons of Sahelian States, and their ruling elites, to participate to these regional initiatives. The political willingness of African ruling elites to favour action through *ad hoc* regional organizations is a reality and, in this regard, cannot be disregard. The extraversion strategies designed and implemented by African ruling elites should be placed at the core of the research on this new security regionalism because they tend to govern the relationship between Sahelian States and their strategic partners.

This paper is based on our PhD research and previous professional experiences. During the last two years we collected information and organized interviews in Paris, Brussels, Abuja, Ouagadougou and Dakar. Because of the sensitive nature of the issue, particularly for what deals with terrorist and anti-terrorism activities, we agreed with our interviewees to adopt the "Chatham House rule".

This paper intends to be a first step in the long process of the PhD research by delineating the conceptual framework of the project.

G5 Sahel's Joint Force & MNJTF, third wave of modern African regionalism

First researches on regionalism appeared, in the aftermath of the World War II, at the moment of the European construction which was supported by the Marshall Plan and the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The institutionalisation of international relations, following inception of the United Nations, and their bipolarization during the Cold War favoured the emergence and development, in the 1970s, of the regionalism studies as a subfield of the International Relations Studies, mostly focusing on regional integration.

Regionalism studies got a spectacular boom in the early 1990s after the collapse of the Cold War bipolar system and emergence of new inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) such as the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), the Mercosur and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The *New Regionalism Approach (NRA)* initiated by Fredrik Söderbaum and Björn Hettne[3] gave a decisive impulse to the comparative study of regionalisms and challenged the projection of European integration on regionalism in the rest of the world[4]. The dawn of multipolarity pushed the researchers to rethink the concept of regionalism. On the emergence of this "new" regionalism, Daniel Bach explained:

"this ongoing wave of regionalism, also branded "new" regionalism, was frequently associated with an acknowledgement of less-state and euro-centric patterns of region-building. The contribution of such non-state actors as the diasporas or private firms was reassessed and heavy reliance on institutions-building and rule of law, as in Europe, was no longer considered as the only viable path towards integration".

Bach 2014:182

Regionalism-Regionalisation, An analytical distinction

In the mid-1990s, Björn Hettne introduced the regionalism/regionalisation dyad that progressively challenged the previous focus on integration/cooperation. Today, there is a consensus to define regionalism as cognitive and/or state-centric projects, while regionalisation points to processes and to *de facto* outcomes.

Daniel Bach defines regionalism as "the ideas or ideologies, programmes, policies and goals that seek to transform an identified social space into a formal regional institution"[5]. Regionalism is often associated with institution-building and the conclusion of formal agreements. According to *New Regionalism* theories, regionalism would consist in the conception of cooperation strategies under formal coalitions, institutionalized or inter-governmental forms[6]. According to constructivist literature, regionalism also refers to "cognitive and ideational projects associated with the "invention" of regions and construction

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[3] Hettne and Söderbaum 1998; Grant and Söderbaum 2003.
[4] Söderbaum 2005.
[5] Bach 2014.
[6] Söderbaum, Shaw 2003.

of identities and delineation of mental maps"[7]. The definition of regionalism as a social phenomenon challenges essentialist conceptions of the region as "a limited number of states linked together by a geographic relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence"[8]. Fredrik Söderbaum considers that the cognitive perception and interpretation of regionalism by political actors, states or other actors, has become an integral component in the definition and study of (new) regionalisms[9]. Regionalism can account for processes of regional integration through sovereignty pooling, but also for groupings that conceive region-building as sovereignty enhancement. Amitav Acharya explained that "integration by definition implies loss of sovereignty, voluntary or through pressure. Regionalism does not."[10]

Regionalisation relates to the build-up of interactions that are not necessarily associated with an explicitly asserted or acknowledged regionalist project. Daniel Bach explains that:

"regionalisation is a more encompassing notion than regionalism since it takes into account processes and configurations within which states are frequently not the key players Regionalization may correlate with the implementation of the policies adopted by regional organizations or result from processes of cross-border economic interactions. Regionalization may equally, as mentioned above, involve a loss of state territorial control and the emergence of autonomous regional spaces."[11].

Bach 2014: 183

Diasporas, cross-border trade networks, multinationals activities are many examples used to develop the concept of regionalisation at its beginning. More generally, definitions of the dynamics of the regionalisation converge towards the study of "undirected economic and social interactions between non-state actors, whether individuals, companies or non-governmental organisations"[12].

Until recently, the study of regionalisation and regionalism in Africa was under-developed and overwhelmed by the "old" EU studies and the developing "new regionalism" literature. Daniel Bach underlines that Africa "is no longer a dead angle in the study of regionalisms and regional

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[7] Bach 2016.
[8] Nye 1968.
[9] Söderbaum 2011.
[10] Acharya 2012.
[11] Bach 2014. Op.cit.
[12] Fawcett and Gandois 2010.

integration" and, even, affirms that the "continent is becoming the crucible for conceptualising and contextualising cross-border regionalisation processes, the interplay between territory, space and networks, or global frontier narratives"[13].

Successive waves of regionalism in modern African History

Until the emergence of *ad hoc* security mechanisms, the African security framework was exclusively incarnated by the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), inherited from previous waves of regionalism. Regionalism in Africa is not a new phenomenon but evolved from its initial emphasis on regional economic integration to its current focus on regional security and counter-terrorism. Since the period of independences, many regional organizations were created on the continent. We can distinguish successive waves of regionalism with a growing interest for security and conflict management.

- *First Wave*

The movement known as the first wave of regionalism had surged in the aftermath of the decolonization era and was shaped by a dual approach of African States' independences. First, regionalism relied mostly on economic and monetary integration through the creation of regional organizations, now known as Regional Economic Communities (RECs). For instance, the *Conseil de l'Entente* was created in 1959, the *Union monétaire ouest-africaine (UMOA)* in 1962, the *Union douanière et économique de l'Afrique centrale (UDEAC)* in 1964, the *Union économique de l'Afrique centrale (UEAC)* in 1968 and the *Communauté économique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEDEAO)* in 1975. Some of the newly-created inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) were an implicit continuity of colonial federalism and even kept same delineation. They can be described as the "continuation (and relegitimisation) of colonial arrangements (CFA monetary zone) that have been pursued beyond independence"[14].

At that time, regionalism in Africa was also shaped by decolonization movements and agendas of African leaders. The second characteristic of the first wave is the Pan-Africanism ideology that irrigate it. Its main outcome was the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. According to Daniel Bach, "Pan-Africanism is the oldest and most pre-eminent form of expression of African regionalism"[15].

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[13] Bach, Daniel. 2016.
[14] *Ibid.*
[15] *Ibid.*

- *Second Wave*

Second wave of regionalism in Africa occurred in the early 1990s, after the collapse of the Cold War's bipolar system. In this context, a security-based regionalism emerged in Africa. Until then, security was absent from the mandates of Africa's regional and sub-regional organizations. Until the early 1990s, regional integration was associated with transferring components of sovereignty to a supranational entity and, thus, was kept away from security and governance agendas by African leaders who saw in it a direct threat to their power[16]. Their perception of regionalism progressively evolved along with growing awareness of regional impact of violence through potential contagion of conflicts upon permeable borders. The multiplication of armed conflicts in Africa combined with the non-interference principle of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), brought the African States to develop regional crisis management tools through the pre-existing RECs to defend their sovereignty. It was a short-term cure to the OAU's inability to manage conflicts on the continent. Over the last two decades, regional security and governance became priorities of the (O)AU and RECs. As Daniel Bach explained, "Region-building in Africa has become mostly and overtly focused on state (re)construction and sovereignty enhancement"[17]. This shift

The famous report called "An Agenda for Peace", written in 1992 by the UN Secretary General (UNSG), Boutros-Boutros Ghali, is a capital event that highly contributed to the development of security regionalism in Africa. This report is the doctrinal source of what Cyril Obi identified as a "growing consensus among African decision-makers and policy practitioners on the need for "African Solutions to African Problems"[18]. Indeed, in its chapter VII, named "Cooperation with regional arrangements and organizations", the UNSG's report described a new international "division of labour":

"regional arrangements or agencies in many cases possess a potential that should be utilized in serving the functions covered in this report: preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, peace-making and post-conflict peace-building. Under the Charter, the Security Council has and will continue to have primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, but regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with United Nations

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[16] Bach 2014.
[17] *Ibid.*.
[18] Obi 2014.

efforts could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs"[19].

UNSG Boutros-Boutros Ghali 1992

In other words, the UN expressed its strong willingness to share the burden of security with regional organizations, especially with African organizations regarding the growing number of conflicts in Africa in the early 1990s.

To this extent, the UNSG report paved the way to the transformation of the OAU into the AU. Initiated in Sirte, Libya, at a summit in September 1999, the new continental organization was officially launched in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002 after the adoption of the legal-institutional framework, called *Constitutive Act of the African Union* on 11 July 2000 in Lomé, Togo. To respond to criticism regarding its inertia, the OUA/UA decided to abandon its principle of non-interference and to create robust peace and security organs to implement the new consensus on the right to intervene in the internal affairs of member states. The "turn from politics of non-interference to non-indifference", as defined by Engel and Porto[20] was consecrated by the Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act. Thus, the first challenge for the newly-created continental organization was to quickly reshape the African collective security system with effective organs. The *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council* adopted by the AU on 9 July 20002 enunciated all the institutions and decision-making procedures of the APSA, also known as pillars. Designed around a new decision-making authority, namely the AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC)[21], the continental framework is composed of the Panel of Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Peace Fund. The security organs created by RECs are incorporated into the architecture of the APSA. The PSC has at its disposal the African Stand-by Forces (ASF) which can be deployed to prevent, manage or resolve conflicts in Africa. A new mechanism called African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) was created in 2013 while awaiting the operationalization of the ASF. However, neither ASF nor ACIRC have been deployed since the creation of the AU. What is considered as main APSA deployments are not operations commanded by its own mechanisms (ASF, CARIC) but has relied on troops from capable and willing member states rather than a solely regional

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[19] UNSG 1992.
[20] Engel and Porto 2014.
[21] African Union 2002.

arrangement. Indeed, African deployments of armed forces are mostly operated through punctual coalitions gathering African Troop-Contributing Countries (TCCs) from different RECs.

- *Third Wave*

My main research hypothesis is that the emergence of the G5 Sahel and Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) as central actors of conflict management prefigures the third wave of regionalism in Africa. The regionalism studied here, around *ad hoc* counter-terrorism mechanisms, is, to a large extent, different from the RECs' model encountered in the 1990s and the African Union security framework developed in the 2000s. The security organs and procedures elaborated by RECs and AU during the second wave of regionalism can already be listed as obsolete regarding the evolution of the threats African States are facing.

I assess that this new wave of regionalism was provoked by the failure of the continental security framework of the African Union to address security threats posed by salafi-jihadi groups. The following international interventions in the Sahara-Sahel region (French Operation "Serval", UN mission in Mali, French Operation "Barkhane", growing US military deployment, EU training programs) stressed the inability of African actors, States and Organizations, to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts involving jihadi insurgencies. Consequently, new *ad hoc* African-led initiatives, supported by international partners, emerged with a clear focus on counter-terrorism.

Tanja A. Börzel explained that "there are many roads to regionalism and not all of them lead to new forms of regionalism"[22] but we support the hypothesis that these counter-terrorism initiatives embody a new form of regionalism in Africa, which I named Counter-Terrorism Regionalism (CTR).

The Joint Force of the G5 Sahel, a river into which many tributaries flow

At the end of the 2000s, several projects of security cooperation based on counter-terrorism spread over the Sahel. Besides Muammar Gaddafi's attempt to unite Sahelian States through the Community for Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), first initiatives were under Algerian

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[22] Börzel 2012.

leadership with the creation the Joint Military Staff Committee (called CEMOC for Comité d'État-Major Opérationnel Conjoint) and the Unité de fusion et de liaison (UFL).

Despite the absence of Algeria, the creation process of the Joint Force of the G5 Sahel seems to be inspired in part by these Algerian-led regional cooperation initiatives. Looking for leadership in counter-terrorism efforts in the Sahara-Sahel region, Algeria launched, in April 2010, the CEMOC with Mauritania, Mali and Niger. Based in Tamanrasset, this organization projected to hold Chiefs of Staff meetings, to create mixt patrols along borders and to elaborate a regional security plan. The CEMOC never became fully operational but, after successive relaunches, still exist as a framework of strategic debates between its Member States facilitating the formation of military officers from the Sahelian States to Algeria.

Fully aware of the APSA's deficiencies during the Malian crisis, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU launched the "Nouakchott Process"[23], in March 2013, in Mauritania. Gathering Algeria, Burkina Faso, Republic of the Ivory Coast, Guinea, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Chad, this initiative intends to strengthen security cooperation and to operationalize the APSA in the Sahara-Sahel region, which is still divided into three different RECs, and associated regional brigades of the African Standby Force (ASF), according to the continental security architecture. The "Nouakchott Process" proposed, at several occasions, the creation of joint patrols, mixt units and to send a counter-terrorism force in Northern Mali but with no success.

Through this new forum, AU tries to overcome its own inertia and to take back control on conflict management in the region after French-led intervention in Mali, operation *Serval*, which transformed into operation *Barkhane*. Despites its reluctance towards the G5 Sahel that it perceived as a concurrent organization under French patronage, the PSC of the AU had no choice but to recognize that the Joint Force of this Sahelian *ad hoc* institution was following the footsteps of its "Nouakchott Process". The AU's decision to approve the deployment of the Joint Force, in April 2017, was subsequent to the approval of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)'s creation.

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[23] African Union 2013.

The political willingness of G5 Sahel's Members States to create their own Joint Force is undoubtedly inspired by the experiment of the MNJTF against Boko Haram. This regional force endowed with a clear and robust counter-terrorism mandate aims to increase the common planning and coordination of national armies' operations through joint headquarters in N'Djamena (Chad). National Armies are allowed to fight on both sides of borderlands in restrictive operational zones according to hot pursuit rights. It's important to stress that Chad and Niger are Members States of both G5 Sahel and Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), which emphasizes the evident linkage between their two respective forces.

The last military cooperation initiative in the Sahel that could have nurtured the reflections on the transborder architecture of the G5 Sahel's Joint Force is the creation of a Joint Force between Chad and Sudan, in January 2010, following the signing of a political agreement. They agreed and succeed to deploy a permanent transborder military mechanism of 3,000 soldiers along their common frontier to stop and prevent smuggling, kidnapping and hostile activities through joint patrols. Every six months, the nationality of the Force Commander and the host-country of the headquarters change. In other terms, when the Commander is Chadian the Headquarters are in Sudan and *vice versa*. This innovative military mechanism in the region is considered as a success although it has no support from a strategic partner such as operation *Barkhane* could be for the G5 Sahel's Joint Force. The analogy between the two joint forces is striking.

Counter-terrorism regionalism, a response to jihadi insurgencies' regionalisation, internationalization of counter-terrorism efforts and reshaping of ruling elites' extraversion strategies

From interviews and academic research, we identified few factors which actively participated to the emergence of a counter-terrorism regionalism in the Sahara-Sahel region through innovative *ad hoc* regional security mechanisms. The regionalization of jihadi activities, recruitment and logistical networks combined with the deficiencies of pre-existing African security mechanisms underlined the need for actions at regional level and generated the conditions for an internationalization of counter-terrorism efforts in the Sahara-Sahel region. External actors' growing military presence deeply alter the strategic environment of the region that progressively pushed African ruling elites to redesign their extraversion strategies. Sahelian States launched African-led restricted *ad hoc* initiatives whose main advantage is to bypass pre-

existing inefficient mechanisms bogged down in heavy and complex decision-making processes.

This paper uses the generic term "counter-terror operations" to refer to African-led or international military operations against "salafi-jihadist groups" that I define as groups using armed jihad as a tool to enforce a return to the *salaf* [24]. In other words, a return to what they consider as the pure and correct practices of the Prophet Mohammed and his companions. They share a common rejection of the notion that Church and State should be separate. As explained by McGovern, "a central tenet of Salafist ideology is that everything necessary to ordering society is contained in the religion's sacred texts, thus the common Salafi retort: "The Qur'an is my constitution"."[25]. Regardless to their allegiances, these groups challenge the authority of African States by the use of violence. While African States and their external partners defined all jihadi groups as terrorist, we prefer to identify them as asymmetric insurgencies. Labelling groups with mantles such as "terrorist" would distort, rather than inform, the debate. Important to note that their *modus operandi*, differ from each group; some targeting civilians more than others. They use a wild range of actions, that I prefer to qualify as asymmetric, such as the posing of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), suicide bombings, kidnappings, direct or indirect attacks on military targets, assassination of presumed informants or local leaders and burning of schools.

Salafi-jihadi insurgencies took advantage of poor control of Sahelian borderlands to extend their resources of income, recruitment networks and reach some long-distance arms' supply chain. Nowadays, we observe that after an attrition of jihadi groups' capacities following quick and robust French operation *Serval,* the epicentre of the Malian crisis has spread over Northern-Mali. Even more worrying is the probable coordination and cooperation between different, and until-then rival, jihadi groups at least at the strategic level.

We won't make an exhaustive list of international actors' interventions in the region but the most visible and significant are French military operations, *Serval* and *Barkhane*, the UN mission in Mali called MINUSMA, the EU Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali or another Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) mission in Niger and several US initiatives going from drone surveillance to training programmes and targeting of High Value Targets

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[24] "Salaf" literally means ancestor or predecessor, and from this meaning comes the figurative sense of purity.
[25] McGovern 2010

(HVTs). All these actors manage different type and scale of actions in Sahelian countries and elaborated regional "Sahel strategies".

Strategic awareness of the regional cooperation landscape with international partners and its dynamics led African leaders to favour *ad hoc* regional initiatives. It will be a considerable mistake to downplay the political willingness of African political authorities by reducing these initiatives to external ones. Support of external partners, would it be consequent, must not elude the analysis of the construction processes of these innovative initiatives as it shows the active consent and leadership of Sahelian members States. Our argument is that regionalization of external actions nurtured the emergence of *ad hoc* regional mechanisms as such as the emergence of these African-led initiatives nurtured the regionalization of international interventions in the region.

In order to study the aforementioned political willingness of African political authorities to create and develop these mechanisms, the understudied concept of extraversion developed by Jean-François Bayart in 1989 is interesting. Jean-François Bayart's article published in the revue *Critique Internationale* in 1999, in which he developed the concept of extraversion arising from his book *L'État en Afrique : La Politique du ventre,* is undoubtedly the opening point of a new field of research. Unsatisfactory attention is being drawn on extraversion strategies despite the relevant questions that they raise to understand the complexity of the relations between African and non-African actors. According to J.-F. Bayart, "*it is not a question of denying the existence of dependence, but to think the dependence without being dependentist"*. Criticizing the ideological representation of a dependence imposed by non-African actors, he evokes "*the dependence as a form of action"* by the African ruling elites.

Indeed, African States, as any other State, develop a strategic analysis of the challenges and opportunities of its environment and elaborate strategies aimed at serving its own interests. He defined extraversion as « the construction and the capture of a veritable rent of the dependence »[26] or « the mobilisation of resources that are derived from the (possibly unequal) relationship with the external environment »[27].

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[26] Bayart 1989, 1999.
[27] *Ibid.*

These two regional organizations are characterized by an institutionalization and regionalisation of extraversion strategies of African ruling elites. African States are highly dependent on international assistance in the fight against terrorism for specific trainings, equipment, logistics and intelligence gathering. The extraversion strategies are the efforts made by African government elites to access these external resources and thereby capitalize on their foreign dependency.

Bayart observed that the 1990s saw an « *exacerbation and a radicalization of the extraversion strategies* » and listed several categories of extraversion. The most famous may lie on a pro-democratic discourse but he also mentioned economic extraversion through the acceptance of the reforms imposed by the international financial institutions during the 1980s. He also noticed cultural, political and military extraversion strategies. Denis M. Tull brought an interesting contribution explaining that the choice by African ruling elites of the most efficient extraversion strategy widely depends on the priorities of the international Community: "In order to secure support, governments often pick up on the tenets of fashionable discourses - currently, for example, economic transparency, gender equality, environmental and resource protection, or human rights". In the 2000s, new extraversion strategies inevitably appear after the tremendous turmoil that the « Global War On Terror » represented in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. According to Denis M. Tull, "the fact that Western actors are under pressure to address problems like state collapse or terrorism can present local elites with political opportunities"[28]. Despite this significant change in the international community priorities and the tremendous international assistance in the matter, there are too few scientific works on the subject.

From my point of view, Bayart's concept is a very powerful analytical tool. It facilitates the understanding of the complex interactions between African States and their international environment, especially regarding counter-terrorism efforts in the Sahara-Sahel region.

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[28] Tull 2011.

Conclusion and Outlook

The regionalization of the threats combined with the failure of bilateral military cooperation with non-African actors and the intractable weaknesses of African security system led the actors to launch *ad hoc* regional military initiatives. The MNJTF and G5 Sahel's Joint Force brought a new frame for international counter-terrorism assistance. We can observe a shared interest by the Sahelian countries and their international partners to conduct their counter-terrorism efforts through these mechanisms. The upsurge of such efforts from external actors, eager to bypass the deficiencies of the APSA, reshaped extraversion strategies of African ruling elites. These military initiatives forced the African Union to rethink in-depth its peace and security architecture and its partnership with the UN and the EU. Progressively, these *ad hoc* mechanisms are getting incorporated into the continental framework through the "Nouakchott Process" and had already modified the African peace and security governance.

What's interesting about these regional military initiatives is the way they are restructuring the inter-African relations as the election of the Chadian candidate, Moussa Faki Mahamat, over the Senegalese candidate, demonstrates. He got elected because all G5 Sahel's Members States voted for him and not for the declared candidate of ECOWAS, organization to which they belong for decades.

The challenge of their integration in the African and international institutional landscape underlines the limits these mechanisms are facing but might also foreshadow the future framework of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in Africa.

Thus, our current researches focus on the integration of G5 Sahel's Joint Force and MNJTF into African and International institutional frameworks which is linked to the debate over the legal basis of such *ad hoc* counter-terrorism mechanisms. We also pay a particular attention to ongoing negotiations on the evolving AU-UN and AU-EU partnerships, especially on the underlying question of how to finance future AU-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs).

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